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2Abstract
This dissertation focuses on two central capital market transactions, takeovers 
and initial public offerings (IPOs), from both a theoretical and an empirical point 
of view. After an introductory chapter, the first two chapters analyse how minority 
shareholders are affected by a change in take-over regulation (introduction of the 
mandatory bid rule) in Germany in 1995. The last chapter focuses on the pricing and 
timing of going-public transactions.
Chapter 2 focuses on the absolute wealth effect of the mandatory bid rule and 
formalises the trade-off minority shareholders of corporate raiders face with respect 
to the adoption of a mandatory tender offer after a shift in control. Under plausible 
assumptions about the distribution of security and control benefits, minority share­
holders of acquirers profit from the adoption of the mandatory bid rule. A subsequent 
empirical study supports this hypothesis by measuring the stock price effects after the 
acceptance of the German Takeover Code.
Chapter 3 uses a dataset of German dual-class shares dining 1988-1997 to study 
how the change of corporate governance rules affects the price differential between 
voting and non-voting stock. First, the chapter discusses how mechanisms to separate 
control from cash-flow rights relate to the value of control. Second, the chapter 
analyses how minority voting and non-voting shareholders participate in transfers 
of corporate control under the alternative regulatory structures pre- and post- 1995.
By providing an analysis of sequential going-public decisions, Chapter 4 outlines 
conditions under which the likelihood of a second IPO increases after a first firm has 
gone public (‘hot issue markets’). Two effects can trigger the rise of hot issue markets 
in a setting with asymmetric and costly information about both firm quality and 
industry prospects: risk-induced selling pressure and informational free-riding on the 
industry news conveyed by a first IPO. Finally, the model offers an explanation for 
the empirical finding that hot issue markets exhibit a higher degree of underpricing 
than cold issue markets.
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C hapter 1 
Introduction
1.1 Overview
The thesis focuses on two central capital market transactions from both a theoret­
ical and empirical point of view: initial public offerings and takeovers. These are 
both transactions which change the ownership structure of companies, the former 
by introducing formerly privately held companies to the stock market, the latter by 
changing the majority owner of the company. The difference is that an IPO trans­
forms concentrated into dispersed ownership, whereas takeovers imply a new majority 
owner, arising either from a dispersed ownership structure or a different prior con­
trolling blockholder. The emphasis of the first part of the thesis lies on takeovers and 
their regulation (Chapter 2 and 3). These chapters analyse how different regulatory 
structures affect the wealth of minority shareholders in takeovers. Chapter 2 focuses 
generally on wealth effects for minority shareholders under a change in takeover rules. 
Chapter 3 analyses how a change in corporate governance rules affects the control 
value of voting stock, as measured by the price differential between voting and non­
voting shares. The forth chapter studies the timing and pricing of Initial Public 
Offerings (IPOs). By providing an analysis of sequential going-public decisions, the 
paper proposes a model which explains the driving forces for the evident swings in 
IPO activity over time.
1.2 Takeovers and corporate governance (Chapters 
2 and 3)
1.2.1 Takeover regulation
While virtually absent in the 1960s, takeover regulation has appeared on the Conti­
nental European policy agenda only in the 1980s, along with an increase in takeover
9
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activity in the European Union. In an attempt to create a ‘level playing-field’ in Eu­
ropean takeover regulation, the EU Commission drafted a Proposal for a Thirteenth 
Council Directive on Company Law in 1989. Its current version, which was presented 
in 1990, contains disclosure rules, prescriptions on public takeover bids and rules on 
the equal treatment of all shareholders. The most controversial element of the pro­
posed Company Law Directive, probably the most disputed regulation among takeover 
rules as such (Burkart [1997]), is the Mandatory Bid Rule (MBR). The mandatory 
bid rule stipulates that a party which purchases a controlling interest of another listed 
company’s voting equity is obliged to make an offer to the remaining target share­
holders at a price not smaller than the price paid for the controlling block. Besides 
the proposed Directive, the rule has been adopted in various European countries in­
cluding France, Italy, Norway and Germany. Germany introduced the MBR through 
the Takeover Code which was introduced in Germany in 1995 as a self-regulatory 
initiative. The MBR is also part of the UK City Code on Takeovers and Mergers and 
prevalent in the US state legislation of Pennsylvania and Maine. The Williams Act, 
the principal federal US legislation, however, reneges on the MBR and allows partial 
bids (market rule). Despite its widespread use the MBR has only gained relatively 
scarce attention in the literature (for an overview of the theoretical contributions see 
Chapter 2). The first two chapters of the thesis seek to address this shortcoming by 
analysing the wealth implications of the MBR for minority shareholders from both a 
theoretical and an empirical point of view.
1.2.2 Assum ptions about ownership structure
The first two chapters differentiate themselves from the main body of the corporate 
governance literature in that their assumptions reflect the institutional reality of Con­
tinental European corporate governance. Whereas the prevalent corporate governance 
literature is based on the ‘US-UK’ paradigm of a large publicly traded company with 
dispersed ownership, these chapters presuppose that companies are controlled by an 
incumbent blockholder. Ownership concentration in Continental European economies 
is characterized by a widespread presence of block ownership. In Germany, for exam­
ple, concentration of ownership is prevalent: the average free float of companies fisted 
on the segments ‘Amtficher Handel’ and ‘Geregelter Markt’ equals roughly 30% of the 
companies’ equity capital and there are only 40% of companies without a dominant 
ultimate blockholder. There is also increasing evidence that even in Anglo-Saxon 
economies large controlling shareholders are not negligible. A recent study on world­
wide corporate ownership structures by La Porta et al. [1998] challenges the ‘Berle 
and Means image’ of ownership of public corporations. Berle and Means [1932] called
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attention to the separation of ownership and control in US publicly traded corpora­
tions. While ownership was dispersed among atomistic shareholders, a small number 
of managers exerted de facto control over the corporation. This view has transfixed a 
large stream of the corporate governance literature which focused on the agency con­
flicts between dispersed shareholders and management. The recent empirical study 
of worldwide ownership patterns by La Porta et al. [1998] is so far the most compre­
hensive report which questions the empirical validity of the image of the widely-held, 
manager-run corporation. They report that only 36% of large publicly traded com­
panies in 27 industrialized economies are widely held without a major shareholder 
owning more than a 20% equity fraction. Even in the UK and the US about 40% 
and 10% respectively of medium-sized publicly traded companies possess a significant 
shareholder owning more than 20%. These findings corroborate the results of other 
studies which have highlighted the importance of incumbent blockholders, e.g. Dem- 
setz and Lehn [1985], Shleifer and Vishny [1988], Holderness and Sheehan [1988], and 
Barclay and Holderness [1991]. This body of research suggests that the potential con­
flict of interests between majority and minority shareholders is of central importance 
for corporate governance. La Porta et al. [1998] conclude that
“... the principal agency problem in large corporations around the world is 
that of restricting expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling 
shareholders, rather than that of restricting empire building by professional 
managers unaccountable to shareholders. ”
Most literature surveys on corporate governance have given the latter prime con­
sideration (e.g. Hart [1995], and Shleifer and Vishny [1997]) and only marginally 
focused on the potential expropriation by large blockholders. The above conclusion 
provides a new direction to research in corporate finance focusing on inter-shareholder 
rather than shareholder-manager agency problems. The two chapters following the 
introduction seek to do justice to this objective and study the effect of takeover reg­
ulation in the presence of shareholders with a controlling influence.
1.2.3 Ownership structure, control transfers and takeover 
regulation
The prevailing ownership pattern and means of control transfers are crucial for the 
analysis of the impact of takeover regulation on shareholder wealth. The majority of 
the literature on takeover regulation presupposes a dispersed ownership structure and 
tender offers as the dominant mode of control transfer (see Burkart [1997]). Given 
the empirical evidence discussed under 1.2.2, the presence of a controlling blockholder
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is the key assumption in the first part of the thesis. As a consequence of this own­
ership pattern transfers of control take place through sales of share packages rather 
than share purchases from atomistic shareholders (via tender offers or purchases in 
the open market). Franks and Mayer [1997] report that even in the UK about 40% of 
control changes take place via sales of blockholdings. This influences the way in which 
takeover regulation affects shareholder wealth. In particular, it does affect the payoff 
to minority shareholders of target companies under the MBR. If control is transferred 
via sales of share stakes, the MBR opens the opportunity for minority shareholders 
of target companies to participate in the surplus resulting from the control transfer. 
The incumbent blockholder is only willing to sell the controlling stake to the ‘control 
aspirant’ if he obtains at least his reservation value, i.e. the sum of security and 
private benefits of control. Since minority target shareholders are entitled to partici­
pate in the transfer on the same terms as the selling blockholder, they are able to be 
compensated for the private control benefits of the incumbent blockholder. With a 
dispersed ownership structure and no competition for control minority shareholders 
will not profit from the mandatory bid rule since the control aspirant will only com­
pensate them for the security benefits under his management (Grossman and Hart 
[1980]).
The first two chapters of the thesis analyse how the MBR affects shareholder 
wealth under the assumptions about ownership and control transfers as discussed 
above. Chapter 2 investigates the absolute wealth effect for minority shareholders of 
companies which are controlled by an incumbent blockholder and likely to undertake 
acquisitions in the future. Chapter 3 focuses on the relative wealth effects for voting 
and non-voting shareholders upon adoption of the MBR. The chapter analyses the 
differential payoff to voting and non-voting shareholders under the MBR and derives 
implications for the voting premium. Since the price differential between voting and 
non-voting stock reflects the control value of voting stock, the first chapter analyses 
the effect of the MBR on the value of control which a voting share confers.
1.2.4 The effect on shareholder wealth (Chapter 2)
The focus of Chapter 2 rests on the wealth effects for minority shareholders of blockholder- 
controlled companies with a high acquisition activity (‘barbarians’), which the debate 
on the welfare implications of takeover regulation has so far largely ignored. The 
two-fold objective of this paper is to study the wealth effect for minority shareholders 
of acquirers from both a theoretical and empirical perspective.
The chapter first proposes a model which formalizes the trade-off minority share­
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holders of corporate raiders face with respect to the adoption of a mandatory tender 
offer after a shift in control. On the one hand, minority shareholders of bidders are 
worse off because the MBR effectively grants a call option to the minority shareholders 
of the target, thus redistributing wealth from (minority) shareholders of the bidder 
to minority shareholders of the target. On the other hand, the MBR reduces the 
number of wealth-decreasing bids by preventing the bidding blockholder from acquisi­
tions which do not sufficiently increase security benefits for its minority shareholders. 
Under reasonable assumptions about the distribution of security and control benefits, 
the model suggests that minority shareholders of acquirers profit from the adoption 
of the mandatory bid rule.
The subsequent empirical study tests this hypothesis by measuring the wealth 
effects for minority shareholders of acquirers in response to the acceptance of the 
German Takeover Code. The Code contains the mandatory bid rule as its core el­
ement and was introduced in Germany in 1995 as a self-regulatory initiative. The 
excess stock returns of signatory companies are regressed on variables proxying for 
the likelihood of becoming a prospective bidder. A fully efficient maximum likelihood 
estimator is derived for a trivariate regression model which estimates characteristics of 
corporate acquirers and takes account of the endogeneity of the acceptance decision. 
The empirical study confirms the hypothesis of the theoretical model that minority 
stockholders are better off with ‘Barbarians in chains’.
1.2.5 The value o f control (Chapter 3)
Whereas the previous chapter analyses the overall wealth effect resulting from the 
adoption of the MBR, this chapter focuses on the effect on the control value of voting 
minority shareholders, A substantial body of empirical literature has analysed the 
price differential between voting and non-voting stock. Almost all of the studies which 
focused on the determinants of the voting premium (e.g. Zingales [1994], Zingales 
[1995], Rydqvist [1997], Nicodano [1997]) have argued that the premium arises because 
voting shares can make a difference to the outcome of a control contest. These studies 
mainly use majority control as a proxy for the degree of control competition. If a 
company is majority-controlled, competition for control is thwarted and the voting 
premium correspondingly lower. This reasoning crucially depends on competition for 
control; as soon as control is uncontested, atomistic voting shares do not capture any 
private benefits of control and hence give not rise to a voting premium. In Anglo- 
Saxon capital markets competition for control is intense so that the framework is 
useful to study explanatory factors for the voting premium. Franks and Mayer [1997]
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point to a virtual absence of an active market for corporate control in Continental 
European capital markets. For instance, they report that there were only three cases 
of hostile takeovers of non-financial corporations in Germany between 1945 and 1994. 
In Continental European countries the analysis therefore has to be complemented 
with another dominant mode of control transfer, sale of share stakes. This becomes 
particularly important when analysing the effect of the MBR on the payoffs to minority 
voting and non-voting shareholders in corporate control transactions. Whereas in the 
absence of the MBR minority voting shareholders will be excluded from any sale- 
of-control transaction, the MBR provides the option to participate in the control 
transfer on the same terms as the selling blockholder. The presence of a controlling 
blockholder can therefore, even in the absence of competition for control, result in a 
superior payoff to voting minority shareholders.
The chapter investigates the determinants of the voting premium, the price differ­
ential between voting and non-voting shares in Germany during 1988-1997. It shows 
that the price differential results from two factors: the value of controlled assets per 
unit invested in voting stock and the way in which minority voting and non-voting 
shareholders participate in transfers of control. Both factors are influenced by the 
existing regulation of corporate governance. The paper studies how a change in cor­
porate governance rules in Germany in 1995 affects the voting premium through these 
two channels. The German stock exchange introduced the mandatory bid rule through 
a voluntary Takeover Code in October 1995.
The chapter focuses on the regulatory change from two different points of view: 
first, it examines the effect on the voting premium as a result of an individual accep­
tance decision of the Code and second, it analyses the overall change in the payoff to 
minority voting and non-voting shareholders in corporate control transactions. First, 
the paper shows how non-voting stock, debt and a pyramiding structure of subsidiaries 
increase the amount of controlled assets without diluting control rights. Acceptance 
of the Code reduces the extent to which a pyramiding structure of subsidiaries can be 
used to increase the control value of voting stock and therefore has a negative effect 
on the voting premium. Second, in the absence of the mandatory bid rule share­
holders of voting and non-voting stock experience identical payoffs when a majority 
block changes hands. The existence of a majority shareholder tends to preclude any 
superior payoff for voting minority shareholders. Under the mandatory bid rule, how­
ever, voting minority shareholders can participate in a sale-of-control transaction on 
the same terms as the controlling blockholder. Regressions of the voting premium 
on majority-control support this hypothesis and show that the coefficient estimate is
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negative during the pre- 1995 period and positive after 1995.
1.3 In itial Public Offerings (C hapter 4)
1.3.1 Empirical evidence on the tim ing and pricing o f IPO s
Whereas the first two chapters focus on ownership transition from one controlling 
shareholder to another via takeovers, the last chapter deals with Initial Public Of­
ferings (IPOs). In an IPO a controlling shareholder sells a formerly privately-held 
company to dispersed shareholders by introducing a fraction of the company’s shares 
to the stock market. Besides the phenomenon of long-term underperformance of IPO 
shares (e.g. Loughran and Ritter [1995], Levis [1993], and Ljungqvist [1993]), three 
empirical regularities have emerged in the literature on IPOs: short-run underpricing, 
a concentration of IPO activity in periods of high stock market valuations and an 
industry-specific clustering of IPO activity. Underpricing denotes the average price 
run-up from the issue price to the secondary market price, i.e. the average percentage 
price change from the offering price to the market price. Significant positive initial re­
turns were found in all stock markets, although the magnitude of underpricing differs 
across countries (Loughran et al. [1994]). A second stylized fact suggests that firms 
time their primary equity issues for periods of high stock market prices. There is a 
large body of empirical evidence across different countries which confirms a positive 
correlation between IPO volume and the level of stock valuations (see Loughran et al. 
[1994] for a cross-sectional overview). More recent empirical evidence shows that the 
bunching of IPO activity coincides with an increase in underpricing. In a recent paper 
Helwege and Liang [1996] document that underpricing averaged 14.6% in the hot issue 
year of 1983 and only 6.6% in 1988, where the number of IPOs shrunk to a quarter of 
the 1983 figure. Ljungqvist [1997] also reports that a positive macroeconomic climate 
raises the average amount of underpricing. Thirdly, there exists evidence that hot 
issue markets typically arise from the bunching of IPO activity in a few industries 
(Ritter [1984], Helwege and Liang [1996]).
While theoretical explanations for underpricing are abundant in the literature, the 
timing of the IPO decision has only recently been the subject of theoretical investi­
gation (see Chapter 4 for an overview). In particular, there has so far been no model 
which explains the positive correlation between issuance activity and the magnitude of 
underpricing. Chapter 4 seeks to provide a model which in a first step offers an expla­
nation for the bunching of IPO activity and subsequently establishes a link between 
underpricing and the level of issuance activity.
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1.3.2 IPO clustering and underpricing
The main objective of Chapter 4 is to determine the driving forces which cause the 
evident swings in the quantity of initial public offerings (IPOs) over time. By providing 
an analysis of sequential going-public decisions the paper outlines conditions under 
which hot issue markets arise, i.e. to define conditions under which the likelihood of 
a second IPO increases after a first firm has gone public. The feed-back mechanism 
from one IPO to the next consists of informational externalities about a common 
value factor (industry outlook) conveyed by the first IPO. In this respect the chapter 
is related to herding models with information externalities (Welch [1996]). A common 
value factor might represent the prospects for a specific industry or the overall state 
of the economy.
In the model there are two risk-averse utility maximising owner-entrepreneurs 
who successively decide whether to undertake an IPO or to remain private. There 
axe potential gains to an IPO, since the entrepreneur can sell his firm to risk-neutral 
investors. At the same time entrepreneurs and investors have to overcome frictions 
due to bilateral asymmetry of information. The aggregate value of the firm depends, 
in a multiplicative way, on a firm-specific and an industry-wide factor. Whereas the 
entrepreneur knows the firm-specific factor, investors are neither aware of the firms’ 
quality nor the industry prospects. They can, however, purchase a noisy signal about 
the overall firm value.
The signal realization in the wake of the first IPO allows investors to update their 
expectation about the industry-wide factor and thus the value of the second firm in 
the industry. There are two key factors in the model which increase the likelihood 
of a second IPO: risk-induced selling pressure and informational free-riding. First, if 
the uncertainty about the state of the industry rises after the first IPO, the risk of 
staying private increases so that the entrepreneur’s private valuation decreases relative 
to the market valuation. Second, the superior knowledge about industry prospects 
after the first IPO reduces the marginal benefit of further information production. 
If investors free-ride on this additional information and abstain from further costly 
information production, the market valuation can increase to a larger extent than the 
entrepreneur’s private valuation.
Finally, the model offers an explanation for why hot issue markets often coincide 
with more pronounced underpricing than cold issue markets. Underpricing comes 
about if the private information accrued by investors during the IPO is better than 
prior expectations about the firm value. Equally, risk-induced selling pressure is
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triggered by unexpectedly positive industry information. So, both the clustering and 
underpricing phenomena result from the same underlying fact, i.e. positive surprise 
about industry prospects.
C hapter 2
‘Barbarians in C hains’ - Takeover 
R egulation and M inority  
Shareholder W ealth
2.1 Introduction
Hitherto the debate on the welfare implications of takeover regulation (for an overview 
see Burkart [1997]) has largely disregarded the wealth effects for minority shareholders 
of ‘barbarians’, i.e., of companies with a high acquisition activity. Most studies on 
takeovers and their regulation portray the acquirer as a unified entity (the ‘bidder’ 
Grossman and Hart [1980], ‘rival’ (Harris and Raviv [1988]), ‘outside buyer’ Bebchuk 
[1994], etc.). Very frequently, however, acquirers are publicly traded corporations and 
subject to potential conflicts of interest between majority and minority shareholders. 
Inter-shareholder conflicts are especially acute in an institutional setting where own­
ership is concentrated. The presence of block ownership, a widespread characteristic 
of Continental European corporate governance, raises a number of unresolved welfare 
issues for minority shareholders of companies with acquisitive intentions. Is it, for ex­
ample, in the interest of minority shareholders to adopt regulation that confines the 
company’s acquisition activity, i.e., to ‘lay the barbarian in chains' ? One regulatory 
measure to decrease takeover activity is to implement a mandatory bid requirement, 
which requires a tender offer to minority shareholders after a shift in control. Do 
minority shareholders of corporate acquirers fare better under this mandatory bid 
rule?
An answer to this question seems pressing as the mandatory bid rule (MBR) 
belongs to the core issues of takeover regulation and is currently subject to a contro­
versial regulatory debate. Germany introduced a voluntary Takeover Code in 1995, 
which contains the mandatory bid rule as its core element. Its declared distributional
18
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objective is the protection of minority shareholders. This warrants a closer look at its 
wealth effects on minority shareholders of potential ‘barbarians’. The mandatory bid 
rule (MBR) stipulates that a party that purchases more than x% of another listed 
company’s voting equity is obliged to make an offer to the remaining target share­
holders at a price not significantly smaller than the price paid in the original offer. 
The threshold of x% should reflect a controlling interest and usually varies between 20 
and 50 percent of the company’s voting equity. The MBR applies both in the case of 
dispersed ownership, where x% of shares are acquired via tender offer or open market 
purchases, and in a transfer of a controlling block of more than x%. The unsettled 
theoretical debate on the wealth effects of the MBR is reflected in diverse regulatory 
implementations across different countries. The MBR is part of the UK City Code on 
Takeovers and Mergers and the proposed Thirteenth EU Company Law Directive. It 
is also present in the US state legislation of Pennsylvania and Maine. The Williams 
Act, the principal federal US legislation, however, abstains from the MBR and allows 
partial bids (market rule).
The objective of this chapter is two-fold: it studies the wealth effects for minority 
shareholders of acquirers from both a theoretical and empirical perspective. The first 
objective of the chapter is to model the wealth effects for minority shareholders of 
corporate bidders in the two alternative regulatory environments of the MBR and the 
market rule. On the one hand, the MBR restrains the ‘control hungry’ barbarian from 
acquisitions that do not sufficiently increase the security benefits of the target. On 
the other hand, it gives minority target shareholders the option to participate in the 
takeover, reducing the wealth of the shareholders of the acquiring company. Under 
reasonable distributional assumptions about control and security benefits under the 
incumbent controller and acquirer, the model suggests that minority shareholders 
profit from the adoption of the mandatory bid rule. The second objective of the 
chapter is to test the hypothesis by analysing the stock price reactions of companies 
in response to the acceptance of the German Takeover Code. The empirical study 
confirms the hypothesis of the theoretical model: Minority stockholders are better off 
with 1 Barbarians in chains’.
In the first part the chapter develops a theoretical model that analyses the wealth 
trade-off for minority shareholders of corporate acquirers with respect to the MBR. At 
the same time, the model takes account of the institutional characteristics of Continen­
tal European corporate governance. A view on German corporate control transactions 
reveals that corporate rather than individual ‘barbarians’ are predominant. Out of 
the 85 transfers of share blocks of publicly traded companies (with a fractional equity
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ownership of at least 20%) during 1990-1995 a total of 54 (or 63%) of listed companies 
have been acquired by another listed company. Besides the prevalence of corporate 
raiders empirical evidence suggests that both bidder and target companies are likely 
to be controlled by a large blockholder. La Porta et al. [1998] report that only 36% 
of large (!) publicly traded companies in 27 industrialized economies are widely held 
without a major shareholder owning more than a 20% equity fraction. In Germany 
concentration of ownership is even more prevalent: the average free float of compa­
nies listed on the segments ‘Amtlicher Handel’ and ‘Geregelter Markt’ equals roughly 
30% of the companies’ equity capital and there are only 40% of companies without a 
dominant ultimate blockholder.
In this institutional setting the large blockholder of the bidder has two potential 
sources of preserving a takeover gain. The bidder can bargain with the blockholder of 
the target over the surplus resulting from the control transfer. If the security benefits 
under the management of the acquirer are higher than the negotiated takeover price, 
the blockholder of the bidder is better off compared to share purchases from atomistic 
shareholders. Secondly, and crucial to the argument of this chapter, the costs of 
acquisition are partly passed on to the small shareholders who do not share any 
private benefits of control. The introduction of the MBR has two opposite effects on 
the welfare of small shareholders of the bidder. In the event of a control transfer the 
tender option of atomistic shareholders of the target company can lead to a welfare loss 
for the shareholders of the bidder. The expected welfare loss corresponds to the value 
of the call option embedded in the obligatory tender offer. This redistributes wealth 
from (minority) shareholders of the bidder to minority shareholders of the target. On 
the other hand, the amount of wealth-decreasing transfers is reduced under the MBR 
since the relative importance of future cash-flows increases in the overall takeover 
benefit. As the blockholder of the bidder will have to make an offer for the entire 
stock of the target, security benefits have to be higher, ceteris paribus, to warrant a 
takeover. The interests of small shareholders and blockholder of the bidding company 
are thus better aligned. In this respect the MBR is analogous to the ‘one share-one 
vote’ principle analysed in Grossman and Hart [1988]. In the same way in which 
‘one share-one vote’ crystallizes more efficient bidders, the MBR sifts out targets with 
higher efficiency gains than the market rule.
The subsequent empirical study measures the wealth effects for minority share­
holders in response to the acceptance of the MBR, which was introduced in Germany 
as part of the voluntary Takeover Code in 1995. The wealth effects are analysed in 
two ways: by measuring the abnormal returns of likely acquirers in a standard event
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study procedure and by conducting a cross-sectional return study where abnormal 
returns are regressed on firm-specific characteristics. The voluntary nature of the 
acceptance decision makes it necessary to take account of a potential selection bias 
in the cross-sectional return regression which surfaces because we only focus on ex­
cess stock returns of companies that signed the Code. Recent cross-sectional return 
studies have used consistent estimators by explicitly allowing for the selection bias 
in analysing excess stock returns following voluntary corporate events (Eckbo et al. 
[1990] and Acharya [1993]). This chapter uses a maximum likelihood estimator to 
incorporate potential correlation between the error terms of the selection equation, 
i.e., the acceptance decision of the Code, and the continuous cross-sectional return 
regression. By incorporating the endogeneity of the Code’s acceptance in the speci­
fication the estimation will cast light on the incentive structure of management with 
respect to the compliance decision.
The specification consists of a three equation system for which a fully efficient 
maximum likelihood estimator is derived. The theoretical model suggests that the 
likelihood of undertaking future acquisitions is crucial both for the acceptance deci­
sion and the magnitude of abnormal stock returns subsequent to acceptance. The 
specification therefore includes a first equation that determines the characteristics 
of corporate acquisition activity. The predicted future acquisition activity is used 
together with other firm-specific characteristics as an explanatory variable for the 
acceptance decision in the second equation. Finally the third equation which only 
incorporates the truncated observations of companies with a positive acceptance de­
cision explains the excess returns in the wake of the compliance decision. The excess 
stock returns of signatory companies after the publication of the acceptance decision 
are regressed on firm characteristics including the number of predicted takeovers.
The chapter proceeds as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical 
literature on the welfare effects of the mandatory bid rule. Section 3 develops a model 
that analyses the trade-off for minority shareholders of acquiring companies with re­
spect to the introduction of the mandatory bid rule. The model allows us to derive 
hypotheses regarding the wealth effects for both minority and majority shareholders 
of ‘barbarians’ under the mandatory bid rule. The second half of the chapter tests the 
hypotheses of the theoretical model and conducts an empirical study on the wealth ef­
fects minority shareholders of corporate acquirers experience following the acceptance 
of the Takeover Code in Germany. The empirical specification is developed in three 
steps. Because fundamental to both the acceptance decision and the wealth effects, 
Section 5 determines the characteristics of corporate acquirers. The following section
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then discusses the costs and benefits of compliance with the Code. Section 7 finally 
estimates the complete model including the cross-sectional return equation.
2.2 Literature
The theoretical contributions on the welfare effects of the mandatory bid rule can be 
subdivided into two classes according to the ownership structure of the target com­
pany: models where the target company is controlled by a large incumbent blockholder 
and models of target companies with dispersed ownership. As part of the former cat­
egory Bebchuk [1994] derives the aggregate welfare of target shareholders and bidding 
investor with and without the obligation to submit a tender offer to minority share­
holders after a transfer in control. He first outlined the basic welfare trade-off between 
the market rule and the mandatory bid rule. Partial bids facilitate efficient transfers 
of control, but are inferior in discouraging inefficient transfers. If existing and new 
controllers draw their characteristics from the same distribution the chapter shows 
that the market rule dominates the MBR. In a similar setting Burkart, Gromb, and 
Panunzi [1998] find that the MBR increases social welfare since it results in a larger 
stake held by the new controlling party, which implies less inefficient extraction of 
private benefits. Yarrow [1985] falls into the latter category of models of target com­
panies with a dispersed ownership where control is acquired via tender offers. Under 
the MBR non-differentiated bids are not possible, since all target shareholders are to 
be offered a price not lower than the price at which the initial equity position was 
acquired. Yarrow [1985] focuses exclusively on the detrimental effects of the market 
rule. In his setting the MBR serves as means to protect target shareholders from 
being forced into a minority position subject to oppression from a large shareholder. 
Under the same ownership assumptions Bergstrom, Hogfeldt and Molin [1995] find 
that the MBR only increases the welfare of target shareholders if the difference in 
private benefits of two contestants for control is significant. In this case the MBR 
puts relatively more weight on security benefits so that the relative willingness to pay 
for security benefits is similar and competition is as fierce as possible.
There are two ways in which empirical studies have directly or indirectly addressed 
the welfare effects of the MBR for atomistic shareholders of target and bidder com­
panies. Karpoff and Malatesta [1989] have analysed the stock price reactions after 
the enactment of the MBR in Pennsylvania, Maine, Utah and New York1. They 
found negative, but insignificant average excess returns for the stocks of the com­
1The MBR in New York and Utah was repealed in 1987; for details see Karpoff and Malatesta 
[1989].
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panies incorporated in these federal states on the two-day interval of announcement 
and pre-announcement day. Whereas this study provides an estimate for the overall 
welfare implications of the MBR, it blurs the wealth effects for small shareholders 
for potential target and bidding companies2. In a different approach Holderness and 
Sheehan [1988] focus on the wealth effects for minority shareholders following sale- 
of-control transactions. They report that in cases in which a simultaneous offer was 
made to minority shareholders, abnormal event period returns for target company 
shareholders were significantly higher than for the complete sample. This finding 
lends support to the wealth-increasing effects of the MBR to target shareholders in 
the case of a takeover. However, it does not (and does not claim to) provide a direct 
test on the welfare effects of the MBR, since it disregards the potential of the MBR 
to hinder wealth-increasing bids for minority target shareholders.
The overview of the existing literature shows that although comparative studies on 
target shareholder or aggregate welfare effects are numerous, the wealth implications 
for minority shareholders of bidding companies have not yet been the focus of the 
welfare analysis. Since the MBR originates in the distributional objective of protecting 
minority shareholders it seems equally important to analyse how minority shareholders 
of potential corporate raiders are affected by the rule.
2.3 M odel
2.3.1 Assum ptions
There are two publicly traded companies, R and T, both controlled by an existing 
blockholder. The set-up of the model is similar to Bebchuk [1994] with the main 
difference that the raider is another listed company with a dominant shareholder. The 
companies have nr  and hr shares outstanding, of which hr and kn shares are owned 
by the incumbent blockholders respectively. Both kr  and kn should be sufficiently 
large to grant control. The remaining nr — kr and Ur — kR shares are dispersed among 
public investors. The blockholder of R, r, is a potential new controller of T. Under 
the control of its existing owner t, the value of firm T consists of its discounted future 
cash-flow stream, Yi, and private benefits of control, Bt,
Vt = nTYt +  nTB t
2 The market price reaction to the introduction of the MBR reflects a change in share value to 
the marginal investor. Since it is unlikely that the marginal investor is a controlling shareholder, 
the shareprices reflect the value of the shares to a small shareholder uninvolved in the control of the 
company.
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of which (tit — kr)Yt accrue to the small shareholders and kTYt 4- nTBt to the con­
trolling blockholder. Under the control of the new blockholder, r, the firm value of 
T corresponds to Vr =  nTYr 4- Ut B t . The variables Yr , Br , Yt, and Bt are common 
knowledge and Br, Bt > 0. The bargaining game between t and r about the transac­
tion price is modelled in the following fashion: In one round of bargaining one of the 
two randomly chosen parties will make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the other party. 
The contender r  will make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to t with probability 9, and t will 
make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to r with probability (1 — 0).
2.3.2 Transfers of control
First, we will compare the conditions under which transfers of control take place 
in the two regulatory environments. Under the market rule (MR) the seller is free 
to sell the control block to the acquiring party without being obliged to extend an 
offer to minority shareholders. Under the mandatory bid rule (MBR), however, the 
acquiring party has to make an offer to minority shareholders on the same terms as 
to the blockholder. In both instances a sale-of-control transaction will only occur if 
the parties agree on a price that will make both of them better off. This is the case 
if r  has a higher reservation value for the share block than t.
P roposition  1 Under the MR a transfer of control will occur if and only if
n  + > Yt + T Bt- f2-1)K r  K'J' KT
p er  share value o f  block to r  p e r  share value o f block to t in  absence o f  sale
Since r can bargain with t about the price of control transfer his takeover gain is 
not completely dissipated3. Inequality [2.1] is more likely to be satisfied, the smaller 
the controlling equity position of r in R, The smaller his fraction of cash­
flow rights, the more r  can (mis)use the funds from minority shareholders in order to 
finance his private benefits of control. This result might explain why VW instead of 
BMW succeeded in the takeover bid for Rolls Royce. Assume that the blockholders of 
the two companies derived the same security and control benefits from an acquisition 
of Rolls Royce. The company which is controlled with a smaller equity block is in 
a position to make a higher bid. This was VW which is only controlled with a 25% 
equity stake by the Federal State of Lower Saxony, whereas the major shareholder of 
BMW, the Quandt family, owns just under 50% of the company’s equity. Analogously, 
the higher the equity fraction r has to acquire of T, the smaller his reservation value
3 Proofs for propositions and lemmas that are not a straightforward result from the model set-up 
will be relegated to the Appendix.
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for Vs block. In the extreme case where kT/nT =  1, as is the case under the MBR, 
we obtain Proposition 2:
The transaction price under the MBR has to be greater than Yt +  (nTBt) / kx to 
make t better off, but cannot be larger than Yr + (nRBr)/kR: since r would incur a 
welfare loss. The component of private benefits in r ’s reservation value for the share 
block shrinks because small shareholders of the target company have the option to 
tender their shares. The raider’s willingness to pay is reduced and with an unchanged 
reservation value of t a transfer of control is less likely. A comparison of condition 
[2.1] and [2.2] shows that the circumstances in which transfers occur under MBR are 
a subset of circumstances in which transfers occur under MR. Whereas the analysis 
of control transfers has been independent of the surplus division between t and r, the 
study of the wealth effects will have to take account of the relative bargaining power 
of the two parties.
2.3.3 Aggregate Comparison of W ealth Effects
The analysis of the wealth differential between the MR and MBR follows two steps. 
First, we divide the possible states of nature into three subsets. We subsume under 
Case 1 all states of nature where transfers of control do not take place either under 
the MR or under the MBR. Since all transfers which occur under the MBR also occur 
under MR, it is sufficient to impose Yr +  (nRnTBr)/(kTkR) < Yt +  (nTB t)/kT for 
no transfers to take place. For Yr +  (nRBr) /k R < Yt + (nTBt)/h r  no sale-of-control 
transactions occur under the MBR, but condition [2.1] ensures that transfers occur 
under MR (Case 2). A transfer of control from t to r will take place under both 
regimes if inequality [2.2] is satisfied (Case 3).
In order to determine which of the two rules generates greater wealth to the mi­
nority shareholders of R, we derive the welfare differential between the two rules for 
each of the three cases. We denote AW as the difference between the expected payoff 
for small R shareholders under MR and under MBR, i.e., AW > 0 implies a welfare 
surplus of the MR over the MBR. In particular, AWtn  stands for the welfare effect 
of the MR in case 2, where no transfers occur under the MBR. The wealth differential 
AW tn thus exclusively depends on whether transfers of the MR are wealth-increasing
P roposition  2 Under the MBR a transfer of control will occur if and only if
(2.2)
p e r  share value o f  block to r  p e r  share value o f  block to t in  absence o f  sale
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or wealth-decreasing for minority shareholders of R. When transfers occur under both 
rules, AW tt  captures the wealth difference between MR and MBR.
Lemma 1 The aggregate expected welfare differential between MR and MBR to mi­
nority R shareholders, A W , equals
A W  = Prob(Yr +  % B r > Yt +  % B t) ■ E (AW tt  \ Yr +  f f  Br > Yt + % B t) (2.3) 
+Prob(Yr +  g Br < Y t + % B t < Y r + f* % B r)
■E(AWTN I Yr +  g s r < Yt + % B t < Y r + % % B r) .
The first term on the right-hand side corresponds to the expected welfare differ­
ential between MR and MBR in cases where transfers occur under both regimes. The 
second term on the right-hand side corresponds to the expected welfare differential 
between MR and MBR in cases where transfers occur under MR, but not under MBR. 
When no transfers occur the wealth difference is zero.
Lemma 2 I f  conditions are such that transfers occur both under the MBR and MR 
(Case 3), the differential welfare effect for minority R shareholders between MR and 
MBR corresponds to
A W tt — —& T lR -k RnR (nT -  h r )  ( yt -  max{yr , Yt + g B t}) ] . (2.4)
Small shareholders of the bidding company are likely to incur an expected differential 
welfare loss under the regime of the MBR, i.e., E(AW tt | •) — R
The only difference in the payoffs between the two rules results from the tender offer 
the bidder has to submit under the MBR. The obligatory tender offer confers a call 
option with the payoff max{Yr , Yt-\-{nTBt) /  kx) to the small shareholders of the target. 
The wealth loss to small shareholders of the bidder under the MBR equals the value of 
the option to tender. It can be easily seen from [2.4] that the MR is superior for small R 
shareholders if Yr < Yt +  (nTBt)/kT, i.e., if small shareholders of T have an incentive 
to exercise their call option. Because of this wealth redistribution from bidder to 
minority shareholders of T it is always more profitable for R to only acquire the 
block of shares under the MR. Only if Yt +  (nTBt)/kT < Yr, axe small R shareholders 
indifferent between the two rules (A W tt =  0). In this case small target shareholders 
are better off to refrain from tendering their shares and remain shareholders of T. 
The welfare differential is also zero if r  never enjoys absolute bargaining power, i.e., 
6  =  0. In this case t skims the surplus from r  under both rules, so the wealth gain 
to r is zero. Small T shareholders, however, still have to finance r ’s private benefits
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in an order of magnitude of —nxB r(nR — kR) /k R. The two regulations only differ 
in how the surplus is divided between the minority shareholders and blockholder of 
the target. Under the MR the blockholder of T obtains Yr +  (nRnTBr)/ (kRkT) per 
share and minority shareholders receive security benefits of Yr. Under the MBR all T 
shareholders receive a payoff of Yr +  (nRBr)/k R if t makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to 
r.
Lemma 3 I f conditions are such that transfers occur under the MR, but not under the 
MBR (Case 2), the differential welfare effect between MR and MBR for the minority 
R shareholders corresponds to
AWTN =  (e[kT(Yr -  Yt) -  nTBt] -  (1 -  0)nr f*B r)  .
Small shareholders of the bidding company will always incur an expected differential 
welfare loss under the regime of the MR, i.e., E (AW tn  I •) < 0.
In this case the welfare differential AWtn  equals the payoff small R shareholders 
receive from the acquisition of tfs block of T shares. The first term in the inner 
square brackets corresponds to their share of the bargaining surplus which arises if r 
has absolute bargaining power. At the same time, small R shareholders still have to 
finance part of r ’s private benefits, utB i . However, if t is the one making the take-it- 
or-leave-it offer, there will be no bargaining surplus for R and small R shareholders will 
have to finance the full value of private benefits (nRnTBr)/k R. The incremental term 
nR/k R takes account of the fact that r  can spread the financing costs of the acquisition 
across its minority shareholders. In a sense, if t enjoys absolute bargaining power, t 
‘exploits’ the fact that r  can ‘exploit’ minority R shareholders in financing his private 
benefits of control.
If transfers occur under MR, but not under MBR this implies that kr(Yr — Yt) < 
nrB t. The private benefits of the existing blockholder t, for which he has to be 
compensated, are larger than the increase in cash-flows from which small shareholders 
of R can profit. The only potential source of gain for small R shareholders are increased 
security benefits under the new management of r. Since these are smaller than the 
minimum outlays for private benefits of control, nTBt, small shareholders of R do 
incur a wealth loss. So far, we have seen that the MR implies higher welfare for small 
shareholders of ‘barbarians’ in situations where transfers of control would occur under 
both regulatory regimes. The MR, however, reduces minority shareholder wealth in 
control transactions which would not have taken place under the MBR.
CHAPTER 2. BARBARIANS IN  CHAINS 28
Proposition  3 I f  t makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to r with a higher than 50% 
probability, then the ex post welfare of minority R shareholders is lower under the MR 
than under the MBR, i.e., \E(AW tn  I -)l > B (A W tt I •)•
A smaller bargaining power of r  makes the relative advantage of the MR over the 
MBR in Case 3 shrink. As discussed above, as r ’s bargaining power approaches zero, 
the small shareholders of the bidder fare equally well under the two rules. A smaller 
probability with which r  is the one making the take-it-or-leave-it offer to t, however, 
does affect the expected loss of the MR in Case 2 in an opposite way. The worse r ’s 
bargaining position the higher the price t obtains and thus the higher the price which 
is the basis of the tender offer to minority shareholders of T. If the probability of t 
making a take-it-or-leave-it offer to r  is greater than 50%, the former effect outweighs 
the latter.
So far we have exclusively focused on ex post welfare implications of the two 
rules. In order to derive the aggregate wealth impact of the regulations one has 
to take account of the ex ante expected values of the different cases. This requires 
distributional assumptions about the private control benefits and cash-flow generating 
power of the two parties. We obtain an unambiguous result of the ex ante wealth 
effects under the following distributional assumptions:
P roposition  4 I f  Br and Bt are distributed on [0; ar] and [0; a t\ respectively, and 
i fY r — Yt is uniformly distributed on [— with uq and aq sufficiently large, the 
MBR constitutes ex ante a welfare-increasing regime for small shareholders of R.
With these general assumptions about the distribution of control and security ben­
efits of the two parties, small shareholders of prospective acquirers will unequivocally 
profit from the introduction from the MBR. Note that the assumptions do not require 
symmetric characteristics of the incumbent controller and the control aspirant. The 
superiority of the MBR results from the fact that the probability of a welfare loss of 
the MBR in cases of transfers under both rules is smaller than the probability of a 
welfare gain in cases of transfers under only the MR. With transfers under both rules 
a wealth loss occurs in the presence of the MBR if Yr — Yt ranges between B tnx/kx  
and BtUx/kT — Brnn/kn, i.e., in an interval length of Brnn/kn. This is the case since 
the MBR only entails a wealth loss with respect to the MR if transfers occur under 
both rules and the small target shareholders decide to tender their shares. When 
transfers occur only under the MR, the welfare gain of the MBR occurs whenever 
Yr — Yt ranges between Btnx/kT — Brnn/kR  and B tnr/kx  — BrnTnn/(kRkT), i.e., 
in an interval length of — 1)- Because of the uniform distribution
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of Yr -  Yt the frequency of welfare gains due to the MBR outweighs on average the 
frequency of welfare losses.
So far we exclusively focused on the welfare of minority shareholders of R. The 
model can also be used to study the wealth effects for the controlling blockholder of the 
acquirer. In fact, we find that the controlling blockholder of R will be unequivocally 
worse off under the MBR (Bebchuk [1994]).
P roposition  5 The controlling blockholder of a corporate acquirer suffers a welfare 
loss under the MBR .
For a formal proof see Bebchuk [1994]. Propositions 1 and 2 have shown that 
circumstances in which transfers occur under MBR are a subset of circumstances in 
which transfers occur under MR. Since r will only purchase a control stake in T if 
this makes him better off, it suffices to derive the wealth differential if transfers occur 
under both rules. In this case r  suffers in a similar way as R’s minority shareholders 
from the tender option of minority shareholders of T. It can be easily seen that r ’s 
wealth loss corresponds to the value of the call option to minority T shareholders.
2.3.4 M odel conclusions and hypotheses
The model has highlighted the wealth effects for both controlling and minority share­
holders of companies with acquisition intentions under the alternative regulatory de­
signs of the MR and the MBR. The model has shown that a controlling blockholder 
of a publicly traded firm experiences a wealth loss under the MBR (Proposition 5). 
In case of an acquisition the blockholder has to compensate minority target share­
holders on the same terms as the selling blockholder if they decide to sell off their 
shares. It is obvious that this wealth loss only occurs when the blockholder faces 
profitable acquisition opportunities. Companies under blockholders which generally 
produce relatively high Yr and Br (so that [2.1] is frequently satisfied) will experience 
a greater wealth loss than companies which are unlikely to undertake acquisitions4. 
Proposition 5 thus translates into the following hypothesis5:
4 For companies that abstain from takeovers the wealth effect for minority shareholders upon the 
adoption of the MBR should be zero (see Table I). However, already a slight nonzero probability of 
future acquisitions yields a positive wealth effect in response to the MBR.
5 We abstract here from agency problems between (controlling) shareholders and management. In 
the absence of a controlling blockholder, management is assumed to act in the interest of its dis­
persed shareholders. Since atomistic shareholders by definition derive no private benefits of control, 
management will only proceed with a takeover when the per share cash-flow value of the target block 
under their management exceeds the reservation value of the incumbent target blockholder, i.e. if 
Yr > Yt + j^Bt. Management will be indifferent between MR and MBR, since, due to the free-riding 
behaviour of atomistic shareholders, minority target shareholders will always obtain Yr.
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H ypothesis 1: A controlling blockholder is reluctant to adhere to the mandatory 
bid rule. He is less inclined the larger his future acquisition agenda.
The wealth effects for minority shareholders of corporate acquirers are less clear- 
cut. Whereas the MBR prevents wealth-decreasing acquisitions, it can incur a wealth 
loss because it imposes an obligatory tender to the small shareholders of the target. 
The superiority of either of the two rules for the minority shareholders of bidding 
companies depends on the size of the blockholder of both bidder and target, the 
relative bargaining power of the two parties and on the distributional assumptions 
about Yr , Yt, Bt and Br. Proposition 4 finds that the MBR constitutes ex ante a 
welfare-increasing regime for the small shareholders of the acquiring company under 
reasonable distributional assumptions about control and security benefits of the two 
parties. Again, the wealth loss only occurs if the controlling blockholder is likely to 
engage in future acquisition activity. We therefore posit the following hypothesis:
H ypothesis 2: Minority shareholders of potential acquirers experience a wealth 
increase upon the adoption of mandatory bid rule. The wealth increase is higher the 
more likely the company undertakes acquisitions in the future.
The following empirical study will cast light on the validity of these hypotheses. 
In particular, the empirical analysis will depict the relation between the existence 
of a controlling blockholder, corporate acquisition activity and minority shareholder 
wealth following a change in corporate governance regulation in Germany in 1995.
2.4 Empirical analysis of wealth effects
2.4.1 The Takeover Code in Germany
In Germany a voluntary Takeover Code came into effect in October 1995 which (listed 
and unlisted) companies can decide to sign or not to sign. Drafted by an expert com­
mission (consisting of representatives of banks, listed companies, small shareholders 
and the Frankfurt stock exchange) the Code relies on the principle of self-regulation. 
A Takeover Commission (‘Ubernahmekommission’) at the Frankfurt stock exchange 
supervises the adherence to the rules of the Code.
If a company decides to abide by the Code, it is restrained both in the role of a 
potential bidder and as a potential target. Its main element, the mandatory bid rule, 
imposes a minority buy-out clause on the bidder. If a company purchases more than 
50% of another listed company’s equity, it is obliged to make an offer to the remaining 
minority shareholders within the next 18 months. The offer price must not be smaller
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than 25% of the price at which the initial shareholding was acquired and should 
be in adequate relation to the current stock price (Articles 16 and 17). Following 
severe criticism regarding the laxity of its stipulations the Takeover Commission has 
reduced the threshold for the mandatory tender offer to 30%. In its revised form, 
it also prescribes that the offer has to follow immediately upon the acquistion of 
control. Furthermore, the offer price must be in adequate relation to the highest 
price in the preceding three months and the 25% discount clause for the offer price 
has been removed. The new regulations came into effect on 1st January 1998 after 
the end of the sampling period of this data set. The change in the conditions of the 
MBR increases the option value to minority shareholders of the target company and 
decreases the gains to the bidder. The initial laxer conditions therefore form a lower 
bound for the wealth effects of the MBR. If the study finds significant wealth effects 
during 1995-1997, then these should be even more pronounced after the introduction 
of the more stringent condition in 1998.6
Secondly, the Code obliges a signatory to abstain from any defensive measures in 
case it is itself the subject of a public tender offer. The annotations to the Code list 
as exemplary measures the issue of new shares and significant changes in the com­
pany’s assets and liabilities (Article 19). This enumeration is by no means exclusive. 
According to the Takeover Commission the measures generally comprise all formal 
defense actions, including the imposition of voting right restrictions. A precise delim­
itation of all the measures subsumed under this category is currently, however, not 
possible. The Takeover Commission will decide on a case-by-case basis which actions 
are incompatible with the Code. The acceptance of the Code will, however, clearly 
limit the span of defensive measures in the event of a takeover bid. Other stipulations 
regulate the length of the offer period, the appropriate disclosure of offer terms and 
of purchases of shares subsequent to the offer, and conditions for improved offers of 
the same bidder.
Approval of the Code is subject to a company’s management board. So far the ac­
ceptance decision has not been delegated to shareholders’ approval at an AGM. Given 
the constraints the Code imposes on its signatories, what axe the benefits of acceptance 
or, alternatively, what are the sanction mechanisms for non-acceptance? The immedi­
ate effect of the compliance declaration is a note of acceptance in the ‘Borsenzeitung’, 
the main stock exchange publication. It appears on average two days after the notifi­
cation of acceptance has reached the Takeover Commission. The special symbol, IH
6The tightening of the conditions of the MBR has, in fact, been discussed since the introduction 
of the Code in 1995. Therefore the measured effects in this study also incorporate the expectations 
of a more stringent tender offer clause.
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next to the company’s name and stock code designates compliance with the Code. 
Sanction measures with moral suasion character include press articles which stress the 
importance of compliance to the attractiveness of Germany’s financial system. These 
articles usually contain lists with the companies that officially abide by the Code, and 
a ‘red list’ with ‘resistant insurgents’. An often articulated threat is the enactment 
of a legally binding code if an insufficient number of companies abide voluntarily. 
In addition, government officials use their influence to pressurize the largest German 
companies to accept the Code.7 Even though the Code is based on a private initiative 
of the Stock Exchange and industry representatives it is given more weight by a joint 
declaration of German banks not to accompany any raider which has not signed the 
Takeover Code. The only ‘hard’ form of penalty, however, is a possible non-admission 
of companies to the stock market indices DAX and MDAX.8 Acceptance of the Code 
is also a prerequisite for a listing in Germany’s new stock market segment for growth 
companies, ‘Neuer Markt’. How companies are penalized if they de facto violate the 
Code in a sale-of-control transaction, is still largely untested ground. So fare, the 
Takeover Commission has only issued a critical statement concerning a takeover bid 
of Glunz AG by Future Holding AG in 1996 which violated formal bid requirements 
of the Code (but not the lack of a mandatory tender offer). The provisions of the 
Code have been adequately followed in various transfers of control. In line with the 
assumptions of the model proposed under [2.3] the common feature of these cases has 
been a purchase of a controlling interest from an incumbent blockholder9.
2.4.2 Some Conceptual Issues
The objective of the empirical study is to analyse the stock price reaction ensuing 
the acceptance of the Takeover Code. At first, however, some conceptual issues sur­
rounding the implications of the acceptance decision have to be resolved. First, it 
is questionable whether the acceptance of the Code represents a credible long-term 
commitment. The fickleness of Metallgesellschaft which first acceded to the Code, but 
withdrew its signature after it lost its membership in the DAX might suggest that 
formal acceptance is of a quite discretionary quality. Metallgesellschaft has been,
7 Someone no less prominent than Dr Theo Waigel, former German Finance Minister, personally 
wrote to four resistant major German companies including VW and BMW (in vain!) and urged 
them to officially accept the Code.
8This does, however, not extend to existing members of the DAX or MDAX. Even if they fail to 
abide, they are not removed from the indices.
9 Examples include the takeover of Rosenthal by Waterford Wedgwood, Hapag Lloyd by Preussag, 
AMB by Assicurazioni Generali, and Berlinische Lebensversicherung by Commercial Union.
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however, the only company with a capricious stance towards the Code.10 Not any 
of the other 268 publicly traded companies which formally abide by the Code, have 
questioned their commitment to the rules since the implementation of the Code more 
than three years ago. Therefore we can reasonably assume that the signatories will 
comply with the provisions of the Code at least in the medium term, i.e., sufficiently 
long to make a difference in a future control transaction.
A second issue are the welfare effects of the Code which can derive from two 
potential sources. Firstly, the Code possibly restrains bidding activity through the 
mandatory bid requirement. Secondly, it prohibits defensive measures in the presence 
of public tender offers. In general, there are two competing hypotheses concerning 
the wealth effects of takeover defenses. On the one hand takeover defenses raise the 
cost of replacing inefficient management and reduce stockholder wealth of target com­
panies11. On the other hand, shareholders might secure a higher control premium in 
the event of a takeover bid. Given the institutional characteristics of German corpo­
rate governance, however, it is very unlikely that these wealth effects blur the stock 
price reaction resulting from the mandatory bid component of the Code. Takeover de­
fenses are only economically significant if there are possible hostile takeover attempts 
which the managements seeks to avert. The paucity of hostile takeover attempts 
in Germany (Edwards and Fischer [1994], Franks and Mayer [1997]), however, gives 
takeover defenses limited relevance. The virtual lack of hostile takeovers is due to 
the widespread presence of block ownership in Germany (Hommel [1998]). Also, ten­
der offers are not a common means of acquiring control of companies with dispersed 
ownership. Virtually all acquisitions of listed companies with dispersed ownership 
during 1985-1995 took place through open-market purchases (e.g., Metro AG, Hoesch 
AG, Otto Stumpf AG). The introduction of more stringent disclosure requirements 
of shareholdings in 1995 has certainly reduced the extent of share purchases in the 
open market. During 1995-1997, however, only 2 public tender offers were submitted 
with the objective to acquire control (see Appendix). In all other transfers of control 
an acquisition of a share block has preceded the mandatory tender offer. Finally, the 
range of takeover defenses is limited by German corporation law. Poison pill securities 
which are common as takeover defenses in the US are prohibited in Germany. These 
considerations suggest that the abstinence from takeover defenses should have a minor
10It might be argued that Metallgesellschaft was relatively immune to the negative public relation 
campaign which was launched by the stock exchange following its withdrawal from the Code. Due 
to Metallgesellschaft’s massive derivative losses and management turmoil it already enjoyed a very 
moderate public relations profile.
u Malatesta and Walking [1988] find that poison pill defenses reduce stockholder wealth by a 
statistically significant amount.
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impact relative to the imposition of the mandatory bid requirement12.
In addition to these a priori theoretical considerations we will also empirically test 
whether the wealth effect is due to the pre-commitment or the MBR. If the wealth 
effect is due to the pre-commitment to abstain from takeover defenses, then the effect 
should be smaller for companies which axe immune to takeover threats. This is the 
case for companies which axe majority-controlled. For majority controlled companies 
the wealth effect should be weaker than for companies under dispersed ownership for 
which a hostile tender offer is an acute threat.
2.4.3 D ata
The data used for estimation consists of variables measured during two time periods, 
A tl  and A t 2 , and at two distinct points in time, t = 1, and t = 2. This data is 
used to explain the abnormal stock returns as a result of acceptance decisions of the 
Takeover Code from 1995-97. The time line below depicts the different sample points 
and intervals.
FIGURE I
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The estimation presupposes that wealth effects from the acceptance of the Code 
differ between potential bidders and companies likely to be uninvolved in corporate 
control transactions. The pre-1995 data is used to determine the characteristics of 
corporate acquirers. Variables measured in October 1995 are included to proxy for 
factors which influence a company’s acceptance decision of the Code. A subset of 
these variables and other firm-specific characteristics in 1995 are used to explain the 
stock price reactions subsequent to a firm’s approval of the Code. The event study
12In fact, the majority of public statements about the reasons for a company’s rejection of the Code 
has critizised the lack of leeway with respect to corporate control transactions. Georg Obermeier, 
CEO of VIAG AG, said the Code ‘costs a lot of money’ since his company pursues a 51% participation 
model with its non-energy subsidiaries (Stiddeutsche Zeitung, 13 November 1997).
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focuses on the acceptance decisions between 25 July 1995 and 23 October 199713. A 
detailed description of the data sources can be found in the Appendix.
Table II lists the summary statistics of the sample at the different sampling points 
and intervals. The number of acquisitions during the two time intervals October 1985- 
October 1990 and October 1990-October 1995 are obtained from the M&A Review 
Database at the University of St. Gallen. The Database comprises all corporate 
transactions in which a German company has been involved since 1985. For purposes 
of this study all corporate acquisitions undertaken by domestic companies listed on 
German stock exchanges were retrieved. In terms of M&A Review Database notation 
this corresponds to transaction type 0 which designates equity participations in other 
companies. In addition, an increase of existing equity stakes (transaction type 6) 
and control contracts (‘ Beherrschungsvertrag’ - transaction type 8) were taken into 
account14. All equity participations exceeding 25% in listed and unlisted companies 
(there is no indicator for a stock exchange listing) were included in the sample. Pur­
chases of substantial parts of a company’s long- or short-term assets do not fall into 
the category of equity participations and are therefore excluded from the number of 
acquisitions. The number of acquisitions during October 1985 and October 1990 is 
obtained for all companies which were listed in October 1990, while the number of 
acquisitions in the consecutive five year period is retrieved for all companies listed 
in October 1995. Since the database comprises acquisitions of listed and unlisted 
companies, acquisitions can be retrieved even if the company has not been listed for 
the entire preceding five years. In case a company has been subject to a merger, an 
equity carve-out, or a takeover with a change in business activities during this five- 
year period, the company is excluded from the sample, if its acquisition track-record 
in its current form is less than 2 years. For companies with an acquisition history 
of more than two but less than five years the number is extrapolated to a five-year 
acquisition figure. Nordag Immobilien AG, for example, has been listed since May 
1995, but has been part of the liquor producer Doornkaat AG before it was carved out 
as a real estate business at the end of 1994. It is therefore excluded from the sample. 
The ‘acquisition king’ during 1985-1990 was Deutsche Bank AG with 25 acquisitions 
replaced by Siemens AG in the subsequent period 1990-1995 with 34 purchases of 
equity stakes.
13 Some companies signed the acceptance declaration before the Code entered into force on 1 
October 1995. Up to October 31, 1995 113 firms formally agreed to abide by the Code, the number 
rose to 235 by September 26, 1996. By October 23, 1997 a total of 270 companies on the German 
stock exchange accepted the Code.
14 Other categories of corporate transactions include foundations of new subsidiaries, mergers, 
strategic alliances, cross-holdings and management (resp. leveraged) buy-outs.
CHAPTER 2. BARBARIANS IN  CHAINS 36
Authorized capital is the maximum amount of equity capital by which the man­
agement board can increase the current amount of subscribed capital without consent 
of the company’s shareholders. A prerequisite is an authorization by shareholders at 
the AGM, where a 75% majority is needed for a decree to increase authorized capital. 
The amount of authorized capital, however, must not exceed half of the current share 
capital and is only valid for 5 years (§§ 202-206 AkG). The frontrunners in terms of 
authorized capital have changed between the two sampling points from companies in 
the chemical sector to companies in telecommunication related industries. Whereas 
in 1990 BASF was the company with the highest authorized capital (750m DM), 
Deutsche Telekom AG takes the lead in 1995 with 1431.5m DM of authorized capital, 
followed by Siemens AG with 800m DM.
The ratios capital gearing and net current assets over total assets are only mean­
ingful for non-financial institutions (including insurance groups). This explains the 
reduced sample size in both periods. The net current asset ratio can turn negative if 
short-term liabilities exceed short-term assets. Bluthardt AG and Koln-Dtisseldorfer 
AG with a NCR of -0.52 and -0.32 respectively were two examples of companies in 
1995 where short-term debt could not be covered by short-term assets. The capital 
gearing ratio is greater than 1 if a company is in financial distress with a negative 
equity position. This was the case with K&M Mobel AG in 1995 where liabilities ac­
count for more than 130% of total assets corresponding to a negative nominal equity 
value of 30%. Overall, the leverage of German companies has slightly increased from 
1990 to 1995, though not at the expense of NCR which has equally risen from 22% 
to 23%.
Despite the criticism of the Takeover Code, an average of 38% of listed companies 
formally acceded to the regulation by 31 December 1997. Of the 13% of companies 
included in one of the major stock exchange indices a more substantial fraction of 
61% signed the Code. The DAX consists of the 30 stocks with the highest liquidity 
and market capitalization. The mid-cap index MDAX covers the next 70 securities 
in terms of turnover and market value. The market capitalization of fisted companies 
averages 1.3bn DM in October 1995, with Allianz worth 63bn DM way up in the 
lead before Siemens follows with a market value of 43bn DM. Daimler Benz stock has 
the highest average daily turnover in October 1995 where shares worth about 140m 
DM change hands each day. Banks only represent 6% of fisted companies, but are 
represented on the supervisory board of 22% of other publicly traded companies in 
October 1995.
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As discussed in the introduction, the ownership structure of German listed com­
panies is characterized by a predominance of blockholdings. As opposed to the US 
where about 80% of publicly traded companies are widely held (La Porta et al. [1998]) 
the average free-float in Germany only equals 32% and 71% of companies are directly 
majority controlled. A more substantial 89.3% of listed companies have an immediate 
blockholder with a more than 25% shareholding. The widespread presence of direct 
block ownership, however, does not imply that there is an ultimate controlling individ­
ual shareholder. If a company is controlled by another firm it is necessary to identify 
the owners of the holding company and potential higher-level holding companies. We 
define companies as ‘owner-controlled’ if there is an ultimate individual blockholder 
and the ownership links between the intermediate holding companies exceed 25% 
shareholdings respectively. In Germany shareholdings of more than 25% confer sig­
nificant control rights, enabling the holder to block major corporate decisions such 
as changes in the articles of association, increases in share capital, or mergers. Vere- 
inigte Deutsche Nickelwerke AG, for example, classifies as ‘owner-controlled’, since it 
is majority-controlled by Langbein-Pfannhauser Werke AG which in turn is majority- 
controlled by Michael Schroer. Other companies like Deutsche Centralbodenkredit AG 
or Frankfurter Hypothekenbank AG are not ‘owner-controlled’ since despite blockhold­
ings of more than 25% on the first level, their ultimate owner, Deutsche Bank,- does 
not have a controlling shareholder. Controlling shareholders are strictly individuals 
or families which in addition to a controlling influence possess significant fractional 
cash-flow rights of more than 20%15. Ownership by the State, large cooperatives and 
trade unions on the ultimate level are not considered controlling blockholdings, since 
governing officials -likewise managers in companies with dispersed ownership- do not 
directly possess significant cash-flow rights in the company. With this definition only 
59% of listed companies qualify as ‘owner-controlled’. This findings are comparable to 
the results of a study conducted by Schreyogg and Steinmann [1981] which analyses 
the ownership structure in the 300 largest industrial enterprises in Germany in 1972. 
They found that 89.7% of companies were owner-controlled at the first level of owner­
ship (i.e., where the sum of block shareholdings exceeded 25%), but only 49.7% were 
owner-controlled at the ultimate ownership level. The comparatively lower percent­
age of companies with ultimate owner control can be attributed to a size effect, since 
the Schreyogg and Steinmann [1981] sample only includes the largest 300 industrial 
companies, whereas this sample comprises all listed German companies.
15 Control and cash-flow rights can be separated through the issuance of non-voting equity and a 
pyramiding structures of subsidiaries.
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The excess returns associated with the acceptance of the Takeover Code are cu­
mulated during the 10-day event window tO =  —2 to t l  = 7:
ti
CARlOi =  (2-5)
t=t0
£it =  Tn 0Q {T mt
where 0Oi of the market model is estimated with return data from day -280 to day -30 
prior to the acceptance of the Code. We use the broad based MDAX with seventy 
index constituents as an approximation to the market portfolio. The event window 
covers seven post-event days to allow for publication of the acceptance declaration 
in the ‘Borsenzeitung’ and its dissemination by the stock exchange. The event day 
0 is the day at which the notification of acceptance reaches the Takeover Commis­
sion. Companies for which turnover data is unavailable or which trade with a lower 
than daily frequency axe excluded from the sample. This reduces the sample to 232 
companies from a total of 270, which obliged by October 1997.
2.4.4 Estim ation
‘Once a barbarian - always a barbarian’: Characteristics of corporate ac­
quirers
Since the objective of the chapter is to analyse the welfare implications of the MBR for 
small shareholders of potential raiders, we first have to determine the characteristics of 
corporate bidders. Like other studies before (Malatesta and Thompson [1985], Schip- 
per and Thompson [1983]) we conjecture that firms carry out continuous acquisition 
programs. It seems likely that once firms have reached a certain stage of development 
acquisitions become relatively more important than internal development in ensuring 
growth. The number of acquisitions during the 5 year-period 1985-1990, y^Ati-, is 
therefore included as an explanatory variable for the acquisition activity in the sub­
sequent period 1990-1995, i/i,At2 - Further, we assume that the amount of available 
financing means determines the extent to which firms are able to engage in corporate 
acquisition activity. We include three variables to capture possible existing and fu­
ture financing sources for acquisitions. The ratio of existing net current assets to total 
assets, NCR, in October 1990 should capture the extent to which currently available 
short-term funds can finance future purchases of equity stakes. Authorized capital, 
AC, and the capital gearing ratio, CGR, are both included to proxy for future means 
of financing. The degree of leverage should proxy for possible constraints to incur 
new debt given that a high debt ratio makes credit rationing more likely. We would
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therefore expect highly indebted companies to undertake fewer acquisitions. Autho­
rized capital limits the amount of seasoned equity offerings which can be issued at 
management’s discretion. A large amount of authorized capital gives the manage­
ment flexibility in the timing of equity issues to finance a takeover. It can raise new 
equity capital without calling an AGM and obtaining shareholders’ approval. This 
can be particularly important in the case of takeovers where information leakage can 
undermine an acquisition attempt because of rising share prices and possibly new 
competition. The amount of authorized capital should therefore be positively corre­
lated with the number of subsequent takeovers. From the above considerations we 
obtain the following empirical specification:
2/h,a*2 =  PiVuAti +  p2^^i,t=i +  /^ N C R ^ 1 +  A iC G R j^ i  +  Uujt=i (2 .6)
where yu,At2 denotes the number of acquisitions during 1990-1995 and
2/li,Ai2 =  0 if 2/li,A*2 ^  0
yii,At2 =  1 if 0 < Vu,At2 ^  01
2/lz,At2 =  2 if < 2/li,At2 ^  02
2/li,At2 =  N if @N ^  2/li,At2‘
The number of ordered categories, N, is set equal to 6, where categories 1 to 4 de­
note the actual number of acquisitions during the 5-year period, category 5 subsumes 
five to nine acquisitions and 6 captures all observations with ten or more acquisi­
tions16. Equation [2.6] is estimated with maximum likelihood as an ordered probit 
model. Table III below presents the estimation results of alternative specifications 
with different variable combinations. The estimation results confirm the conjecture 
‘once a barbarian - always a barbarian’, i.e., that firms pursue continual acquisition 
programs. The regression coefficient (31 is positive and significantly different from 
zero at the 99.99% level in all four specifications17. Furthermore, we find that access 
to present and future means of financing has a significant impact on bidding activ­
ity. The coefficient estimate /?2, which represents the impact of authorized capital 
on acquisition activity, is positive and significantly different from zero at the 99.99% 
level in specification I. Whereas authorized capital is included as an absolute value,
16 The results are very similar if one assigns a separate category to each specific number of acquisi­
tions. The used re-classification leads to a more equal distribution of observations across categories.
17It might be argued that the coefficient estimate is biased, since the sample includes the acquisition 
history prior to and/or after the stock market listing. The coefficient estimate, however, differs only 
marginally if the sample is restricted to companies that have been listed during the full ten year 
period.
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leverage and also net current assets are both related to the amount of total assets. 
This is done to avoid that a size effect is picked up in more than one variable which 
might lead to multicollinearity.
If included separately, both NCR and CGR are significant and carry the expected 
signs. The higher the ratio of net current assets to total assets, the more intense 
the subsequent acquisition activity. Also, the smaller the gearing ratio, the more 
acquisitions are undertaken in the subsequent five years. Because of the collinearity 
between NCR and CGR the variables lose explanatory power if they axe both included 
in regression IV. A likelihood ratio test of I vs. IV shows, however, that p 3 and /34 
are jointly different from zero at the 99.99% level. Therefore both NCR and CGR 
should be included in the model. The estimation results are also robust to alterna­
tive distributional assumptions governing the acquisition behaviour. Ordered logistic 
and Poisson regressions both produce very similar estimates to the ordered probit 
regression.
‘To sign or not to sign’: Determinants of compliance
The decision to sign the Takeover Code is subject to the company’s board of directors. 
The management board will sign the Code if and only if it assesses the benefits of 
signing to be greater than its costs. Outside investors do not observe the discounted 
net benefit of the decision, but only whether the company submitted its acceptance 
declaration or not. The decision about compliance is determined both by observable 
firm characteristics, re?5, and latent information of the management e i^- Specifically, 
the board of company i will accede to the Code (?/2 i =  1), iff
f 1 whenever f i x ?5 +  e2i > 0 
y* = \  0 otherwise. (2'7)
The purpose of this section is to identify observable factors that might influence the 
decision to abide by the Code. Under [2.4.2] we identified the MBR as the core element 
of the Code. The model under [2.3] implied that a controlling blockholder of a bidding 
company will incur a wealth loss under the MBR. Hypothesis 1 therefore states that 
companies with dominant blockholders should be reluctant to accede to the Code. A 
dummy variable, OCi, equal to unity if there is an ultimate controlling blockholder 
and zero otherwise, should capture the impact of the ownership structure on the com­
pliance decision. Further, Hypothesis 1 posits that a potential ‘barbarian’ will be less 
inclined to sign the Code than a company with no acquisition intentions. One of the 
determinants of the compliance decision should therefore be the probability of becom­
ing a bidder. We therefore create an interaction variable of the predicted acquisition
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activity and OQ. The higher the predicted acquisition activity of an owner-controlled 
firm, the less likely the company will abide by the Code.18 We use the estimates of 
the ordered probit model of acquisition activity and the respective firm characteristics 
in October 1995 to make out-of-sample predictions about the number of acquisitions 
during 1995-2000. The predicted scores, y?At2+i =  with X 95 =[BID95, AC95,
CGR95, NCR95], of owner-controlled companies are included as explanatory factors for 
the acceptance decision. It should be noted, however, that the MBR only applies in 
the case of takeovers of publicly traded companies. We therefore implicitly assume 
that the number of acquisitions of listed targets is proportional to the overall takeover 
activity of a company.
Whereas the costs associated with the acceptance of the Code directly derive from 
the MBR, the benefits are less evident. The benefits of compliance are mainly the 
absence of pressure from the stock exchange or the government, possibly also the 
non-admission to one of the major indices. We hypothesize that companies which 
are members of the DAX or MDAX or potential aspirants to membership are more 
susceptible to moral suasion from the stock exchange. Companies have an incentive 
to become an index constituent because this usually implies a higher valuation of 
their stock (Shleifer [1986]). Although current members of the DAX or MDAX are 
not directly threatened by expulsion from the index because on non-acceptance, they 
might be subject to a greater extent of pressure. In addition, one might suppose that 
banks exert influence on the management board of companies in which they are repre­
sented on the supervisory board. This might be the case since major universal banks 
such as Deutsche Bank and Dresdner Bank are members of the Takeover Commission 
(Ubernahmekommission [1996]) and have also been involved in the draft of the Code. 
Two dummy variables, MDAX and BS, are therefore included to proxy for the degree 
of pressure to which a company is subject. Alternatively, we include the average daily 
turnover, TO, and the market value, MV, (as the two major ‘hard’ factors for index 
membership) to also capture the incentives of potential index aspirants to comply.
Another determinant for the acceptance decision might be the behaviour of other 
firms in the industry. If potential competitors for control comply with the Code, then 
it is less costly for a given company to accede as well. It is less disadvantaged in a 
potential contest for a share stake, since all bidders face the same constraint of the 
mandatory bid requirement. As the model under [3] has shown, adherence to the 
MBR reduces the maximum price the controlling blockholder of the raider is willing
18The predicted acquisition activity per se is not included as an explanatory variable, since the 
model only allows to make inferences about the acceptance decision of owner-controlled firms.
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to pay for a target company share. The more companies in an industry abstain from 
the Code, the more likely they will outbid the blockholder of an abiding firm, and 
therefore the higher his wealth loss. These considerations might have guided VW 
and BMW, which have both not yet signed the Code. In fact, it can be seen that 
Code compliance is clustered according to industries. Table A.Ill presents the number 
of acceptance declarations per industry (divided according to the European NACE 
classification scheme). A sign test of the null hypothesis of an equal proportion of 
acceptances and rejections shows that the overall sample is significantly biased to­
wards non-acceptance of the Code. A look at the cross-section of industry behaviour 
reveals that this seems to be the result of clustering phenomena in specific industries. 
In only seven of the thirty industries with more than 6 publicly traded companies is 
the behaviour significantly tilted towards non-compliance. From an industrial orga­
nization point of view it is interesting to note that these are mostly industries which 
are undergoing phases of major restructuring. Not only the food and beverage, but 
also the pulp and paper industry are currently undergoing a process of industrial 
concentration in Germany. On the other hand, the banking industry is ‘significantly’ 
determined to back the Code, with only nine out of forty banks omitting to sign. 
Also, the standard deviation of compliance equals 15% and thus highlights a quite 
substantial amount of cross-sectional variation by industries. As a  crude measure of 
this clustering phenomenon we therefore include the percentage of other comx>anies in 
the industry that accepted the Code, PAI, as an explanatory factor in the estimation 
of the compliance decision19. From the above considerations we obtain the following 
empirical specification:
Vi =  J f f A + e i  . (2.8)
............................  Vt = X l 5 /32 - r M X 91 % )O C 9 5 -he2 ..................... (2.9)
where y\ is defined as in [2.6] above, y^=  1 if > 0 and 0 otherwise, X90 =  [BID90, 
AC90, CGR90, NCR90], X f5 =  [l, MDAX95, PAI, OC95, BS95] and X 95 =  [BID95, AC95, 
CGR95, NCR95]. The superscripts denote the sampling time of the observations. The 
disturbance terms are distributed (£1 , 6 2 ) ~  AT(0,0,1 , 0 2 ,P1 2 ) with P12 denoting the 
correlation coefficient between eq and 8 2 - The correlation coefficient should capture any 
time-invariant unobservable firm-or manager-specific factors in relation to acquisition 
activity, which influence the firm’s decision about Code acceptance (e.g., M&A skills 
of managers). The maximum likelihood estimator for [2.8] is a simplified version of 
the estimator derived in the Appendix under [2.7.3]. For the likelihood function to be
1<JThis presupposes that there is some implicit understanding of future acceptance decisions by 
other companies.
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identified we impose cr2 =  1. Table IV presents the estimation results of the bivariate 
(ordered) probit model.
As put forward in Hypothesis 1, owner-controlled companies are reluctant to ad­
here to the Code. The dummy variable for owner-control in the first specification 
carries a negative coefficient estimate which is significant at the 99.99% confidence 
level. This casts indirect evidence on the fact that firms under managerial control are 
more prone to abide by the takeover rules than owner-controlled firms. Specification 
II includes the interaction variable of owner-control and predicted future acquisition 
activity. The negative and statistically significant coefficient estimate implies that the 
higher the future takeover activity the less likely is an owner-controlled firm to ac­
cept the Takeover Code. The third specification comprises both the dummy variable 
for owner-control and its interaction with future acquisition activity. Both coefficient 
estimates are negative and statistically significant suggesting that independently of 
the predicted takeover activity owner-controlled firms are more hesitant to accept the 
Code20. This might be the case since each firm -independent of its predicted takeover 
activity during 1995-2000- might envisage an acquisition at some point in the future 
for which the owner does not want to restrict himself by accepting the Code today21. 
The estimation results further suggest that membership in the DAX or MDAX does 
have a significant and positive impact on the acceptance decision. A high market cap­
italization and high daily turnover (not reported) have a similar, but less significant, 
effect on the net benefits of compliance. The positive and significant coefficient esti­
mate for the percentage of Code acceptance by other firms in the industry highlights 
the clustering behaviour among firms in the same industry. The costs of compliance 
are lower if other firms face the same bidding constraints. Finally, pressure from 
banks in a company’s supervisory board does not seem to have been conducive to 
compliance. In fact, the sign of the coefficient estimate is negative (but statistically 
insignificant) suggesting -if at all- a contrary effect. The correlation coefficient p is 
negative, but not significant reflecting that unobservable management-specific factors 
of a company’s acquisition activity do not seem to influence the firm’s compliance 
decision.
20Note, however, that because of the non-linearity of the probit model, the effect of the dummy 
variable for owner-control is not a constant shift in the intercept, but that the shift in the intercept 
varies according to the level of the other explanatory variables.
21 This indirectly confirms that there are costs associated with withdrawing from an earlier accep­
tance.
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W ealth effects: Excess returns and cross-sectional return regression
As outlined above, we calculate the cumulative abnormal returns from event window 
tO = — 2 to t l  = 7 in order to measure the absolute size of the wealth effects associated 
with the acceptance of the Takeover Code. The average cumulative abnormal return 
across securities during the 10-day event interval is 0.53%. The variance of cumulative 
abnormal returns equals
ti
Var{CARi) =
t=t0
where of denotes the MSE of the market model regression. Under the null hypothesis 
of zero abnormal returns the test statistic J  is distributed as follows:
J =    C A R  „ ~  N (0 ,1). (2.10)
[Var(CAR)]V2
where CAR  and Var(CAR) denote the cross-sectional means of CARlOi and Var(CARi) 
respectively. With a value of 1.46 the test statistic is not significant at conventional 
confidence levels so that we cannot reject the hypothesis of zero abnormal return for 
the whole the sample. This is not surprising since the C AR  averages the stock price 
effect of potential bidders and companies that are likely to be uninvolved in corporate 
control transactions. The J-statistic becomes significant in both economic and statis­
tical terms if the sample is restricted to owner-controlled firms. On average, minority 
shareholders of companies under owner-control experience a 3.21% wealth increase in 
the ten-day event interval around the acceptance of the Code. For minority share­
holders of prospective bidders the wealth increase is higher than for the whole sample 
(1.80%) and significantly different from zero at the 99.9% confidence level. This find­
ing suggests that minority shareholders of companies with a high predicted takeover 
activity profit from the Code acceptance independent of their control structure. This 
further implies that investors anticipate the possibility that prospective bidders un­
der management-control might revert to owner-control in the future. Finally, when 
restricting the focus to companies that are both owner-controlled and future bidding 
candidates, we find a statistically significant abnormal return of 5.40%! The cumula­
tive abnormal returns for all the subsamples are significantly greater than the excess 
returns for the full sample (Table V - Panel B). This finding lends support to Hy­
pothesis 2. Minority shareholders of owner-controlled companies with high acquisition 
activity profit most from the acceptance of the mandatory bid rule. It is interesting to 
observe that the alphas and betas for the subsample of owner-controlled prospective 
bidders are higher than for the full sample - reflecting higher expected returns from 
potential bidders
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The analysis of the cumulative abnormal returns also casts light on the alternative 
hypothesis that the positive wealth effect results from the abstinence from takeover 
defenses to which the signatories commit. This hypothesis can be rejected since 
the average CAR10 of majority-controlled companies, which are immune to takeover 
threats, equals 1.18% (see Table V) and is significantly higher than for the rest of the 
sample. The hypothesis that the CAR for majority-controlled firms is higher than the 
CAR of companies under dispersed ownership can be rejected at a higher than 96% 
confidence level. This finding corroborates the institutional reasons which suggest 
that the pre-commitment to not defend a hostile bid is of minor importance relative 
to the MBR requirement.
In the following we focus on the explanation of the cross-sectional variation in 
excess returns. This allows us to extend the above preliminary evidence on the relation 
between excess returns and the bidding activity of owner-controlled firms. At the 
same time we will take account of the potential selection bias which arises from the 
voluntary acceptance decision. Since outside investors can infer the management’s 
latent information £ 2  by observing the event indicator in [2.7], the disturbance term 
in the cross-sectional return regression is truncated. This can provoke a bias in the 
cross-sectional return regression
CARW  =  X95/?3 +  e3 (2.11)
where CAR 10 denotes the cumulative excess returns during the 10-day event interval 
and X 95 =  [X95, (X95/?!)]. The explanatory variables X 95 contain variables from X 95 
which are used as factors for a firm’s compliance decision. Since outside investors 
recognize management’s incentives, the conditional expectation of £ 3  at the time of 
the announcement of the acceptance decision equals22
E{e3i \ y2i =  l) =  E  (e3i | ^
where ipi =  [x 2iP2 P Ps(x uPi)]/a'2 , and <j>(-) and $(•) denote the standard normal den­
sity and the cumulative density functions respectively. The ratio equals
the expectation of a standardized normal variate that is truncated below at If 
P2 3 cr3 0 ('0 i)/^>('0 z) is ignored in [2.11], the residual of the cross-sectional return regres­
sion is correlated with the independent variables X 95 and OLS and GLS estimators 
of the explanatory variables are inconsistent. In order to take account of the selection
22 In the set-up of Eckbo et al. [1990] this expression corresponds to a situation where outside 
investors are completely surprised by the event.
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bias we formulate a model which incorporates the model under [2.8] as the selection 
mechanism of the cross-sectional return regression. In particular, we specify23
y\ = X f h  + e! (2.12)
y*2 =  X 92 5(32 + P3 (X !5Pi)OC 9 5 + e 2 (2.13)
CAR10 =  X 95/?4 +  /^ (X 95/^) -f £3 observed only if y2i = 1 (2.14)
with the disturbance terms distributed as follows:
£1 ( ■ 0 ' 1 Pl2a 2 P l3a S
£2 ~ N 0 5 P12&2 P23(T2(TZ
. 6 3 . V 0 PlS^Z P23(T2(73 a 3
The first two equations [2.12] and [2.13] correspond to the set-up analysed in 
Section 2.4.4. The last equation explains the cumulative abnormal event period re­
turns for companies which signed the Code, i.e., it only includes return observations 
if U2i — 1- The explanatory variables in [2.14], X 95 =  [l, PAI, MDAX95, OC95] are a 
subset of the variables determining the acceptance decision of the Code. In particular, 
variables proxying for the degree of moral pressure from banks in supervisory boards 
are not included, since they should not affect the variation in excess stock returns. 
According to Hypothesis 2, both the prospective acquisition activity, X f 5/31, and the 
presence of a blockholder, OC95, should have a positive effect on the size of abnor­
mal returns. Both characteristics are included independently as well as through an 
interaction term, OC95 • X f 5{3li in order to draw comparisons between ‘owner-’ and 
‘manager-controlled’ companies. We also include the percentage of Code acceptance 
of other firms in the industry, since shareholders should profit if all firms in the indus­
try face the same bidding constraints. For the likelihood function to be identified we 
impose < 7 2  =  1 and also p13 =  0 since a potential correlation between latent informa­
tion of acquisition activity and the change in firm value is captured indirectly via p23- 
The problem of cross-sectional dependence should be minor in the present context. 
First, because of the endogenous timing of the acceptance decision most event dates 
are sampled from different time periods. Secondly, Bernard [1987] finds that the bias 
due to cross-sectional dependence is less pronounced for short return intervals. Since 
daily return data is used for the calculation of excess returns problems in inference 
should not be serious. In order to avoid the non-trading bias we restrict the analy­
sis to the segments ‘Amtlicher Handel’ and ‘Geregelter Markt’ which exhibit higher 
liquidity than stocks in the ‘Freier Markt’.
23 The estimation primarily aims at identifying the impact of firm-specific variables on cumulative 
abnormal returns. We use a truncated regression model to correct for the selection bias instead of 
the latent variable model proposed by Acharya [1993] which is shown to consistently estimate the 
value of latent information.
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The maximum likelihood estimator of the trivariate limited dependent variable 
model [2.12]-[2.14] is derived in the Appendix under [2.7.3]. The empirical results 
in Table VII show that the significance of the correlation coefficient, p23, justifies 
the use of the selection model, i.e., there is valuable inside information about the 
net benefits of compliance. The empirical findings also lend empirical support to 
Hypothesis 2. We find that excess returns in the wake of acceptance are higher for 
owner-controlled firms and for companies with high predicted future takeover activ­
ity. Specification II shows that minority shareholders of owner-controlled companies 
experience a wealth increase upon Code acceptance which is higher the greater their 
future acquisition agenda. This result clearly shows that the benefits of the MBR due 
to the prevention of wealth-decreasing acquisitions outweigh the costs of the manda­
tory bid requirement. The MBR indeed acts as a means to prevent the blockholder 
from (mis)using the funds of minority shareholders for the financing of his personal 
private benefits of control. These empirical results indirectly attribute a beneficent 
role to management under dispersed ownership which seems less prone to wealth- 
decreasing takeovers than management under the control of a dominant blockholder. 
However, the first specification highlights that the wealth increase of Code acceptance 
is positively related to future acquisition activity even if we control for differences in 
the control structure. As put forward in the analysis of the absolute wealth effects 
above, this reflects a nonzero probability of a change in the control structure from 
dispersed ownership to ultimate owner-control. Specification III includes the dummy 
variable for owner-control, the predicted takeover activity as well as their interaction 
term. Since all coefficient estimates are positive and significant, we conclude that 
the wealth increase is higher the higher the predicted takeover activity, but that the 
relation is even more pronounced for owner-controlled firms, i.e., there is both an 
additional intercept and an additional slope coefficient for firms under owner-control. 
Therefore, minority shareholders of companies under owner-control experience a fixed 
additional wealth effect independent of the firm’s acquisition activity, but their gains 
also increase more strongly in relation to the firm’s predicted acquisitions than the 
welfare gains for minority shareholders of companies with dispersed ownership. The 
percentage of Code acceptance of other firms in the industry has a positive effect on 
excess stock returns, which indicates that the costs of compliance are lower if the 
competitive dynamics in the market for corporate control are determined by a level 
playing field. Adherence to the MBR decreases the reservation value per target share 
of the controlling raiding blockholder (see Section 2.3). The fewer potential control 
contenders abide by the MBR, the smaller the likelihood of a successful takeover for 
an abiding blockholder. The positive coefficient estimate for the industry acceptance
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ratio therefore highlights that on average non-signatories take away wealth increasing 
acquisition opportunities from companies which have accepted the Code. Membership 
in one of the major indices, however, does not have a significant impact on abnormal 
returns suggesting a minimal potential wealth loss associated with pressure from the 
stock exchange and/or a marginal probability of losing the index status because of 
non-acceptance.
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2.5 Conclusions
The paper has proposed a model that analyses the wealth effects of the adoption of 
the mandatory bid rule (MBR) on minority shareholders of acquiring companies. The 
model identifies two opposing wealth effects for minority shareholders of potential 
‘barbarians’. On the one hand, the MBR redistributes wealth from (minority) share­
holders of the ‘barbarian’ to the minority shareholders of the target by imposing a 
mandatory tender offer requirement. On the other hand, it protects small sharehold­
ers of raiders from acquisitions that do not sufficiently increase the security returns 
from the takeover. Under reasonable distributional assumptions about control and 
security benefits under the incumbent controller and acquirer the model suggests that 
minority shareholders profit from the adoption of the mandatory bid rule. In addition, 
the model predicts that controlling blockholders of acquiring companies will incur a 
wealth loss under the MBR.
The introduction of the Takeover Code in Germany in October 1995 is used to 
study the incentive structure and wealth effects of compliance with the MBR. In line 
with the predictions of the model the empirical study On the compliance decision 
reveals that owner-controlled companies with a large number of predicted takeovers 
are more hesitant to accept the Code. The cross-sectional return study on stock price 
reactions following the acceptance decision gives evidence of positive wealth effects for 
companies under owner-control and with a high predicted future acquisition activity. 
The fact that ‘barbarians’ under the control of a dominant blockholder show stronger 
positive stock price reactions than companies under dispersed ownership suggests that 
inter-shareholder conflicts are potentially more acute than shareholder-management 
agency conflicts. Stockholders in manager-controlled firms seem to profit less from 
a restraint in acquisition activity than stockholders in blockholder-controlled firms. 
This implies that manager-controlled firms act more ‘shareholder friendly’ in their 
acquisition strategy than owner-controlled firms which undertake more takeovers out 
of pure control interests.
An interesting path for further empirical investigation would be to study the intra­
industry effects of a firm’s acceptance decision, i.e., to analyse the welfare effects 
for small shareholders of potential target companies in response to the acceptance 
decision of a potential bidder; or in more concrete terms: What is the effect of BMW’s 
acceptance decision on the stock returns of publicly traded automotive suppliers that 
could be potential target companies for BMW? From a theoretical point of view it 
would be interesting to derive the aggregate wealth implications of the mandatory
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bid rule for both small shareholders of target and bidding companies. This aggregate 
welfare analysis could determine whether the MBR does justice to its distributional 
objective of strengthening the welfare of minority shareholders.
As outlined above, the paper as a whole sheds light on the importance of inter­
shareholder conflicts in publicly traded corporations. In particular, the paper suggests 
that controlling blockholders are more ‘barbaric’ in their control pursuits than man­
agers in companies under dispersed ownership. The paper therefore belongs to the 
growing corporate governance literature (La Porta et al. [1998], Bebchuck [1994]) 
that advocates a stronger focus on agency problems between minority and majority 
shareholders.
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2.6 Tables
TABLE I
CONDITIONS FOR TRANSFERS OF CONTROL
Case MBR MR Parameter conditions AW
1 no no Yr +  <  Yt +  Bt 0
2 no yes Yr + ^ B r <Y t + ^ B t < Y r + AWtn
3 yes yes Yr +  >  Yt +  AWtt
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TABLE II 
S u m m a r y  s t a t i s t i c s
Vaxiable Description Time Mean SD Min Max Obs
y*u number of acquisitions A t l 2.68 4.03 0 25 467
A t2 2.30 4.74 0 34 652
AC t authorized capital (in m DM) t = l 18.69 72.34 0.00 750 478
t=2 29.72 104.73 0.00 1431.5 589
NCR* net current assets/total assets (%) t = l 0.22 0.22 -0.63 0.85 427
t=2 0.23 0.23 -0.52 0.91 548
CGRi liabilities/total assets (%) t= l 0.30 0.22 0.00 1.05 429
t=2 0.31 0.24 0.00 1.32 566
*
v ii =1, if firm signed Code t=2 0.38 0.49 0 1 708
MDAX; =1, if member in DAX or MDAX t=2 0.13 0.34 0 1 705
MV; market value (in ‘000 m DM) t=2 1.23 4.58 0.00 63.27 639
TO; average daily turnover (in m DM) t=2 3.43 19.43 0.00 141.76 531
DMAJ; =1, if firm majority-controlled t=2 0.71 0.45 0 1 605
FFV; freefloat of voting equity (%) t=2 0.32 0.27 0 1 570
BH; =1, if blockholder >25% t=2 0.89 0.31 0 1 605
OC; =1, if firm owner-controlled t= 2 0.59 0.49 0 1 614
BS; =1, if bank in supervisory board t=2 0.23 0.42 0 1 605
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TABLE III
ORDERED PROBIT REGRESSIONS OF ACQUISITION ACTIVITY
The table presents the estimation results of an ordered probit regression for different versions 
of [2.6]. The p-values of the regression coefficients are reported below the coefficient estimates 
in parentheses. The Pseudo R2 is defined a s l  — InL/lnLo where InLo equals the maximized 
value of the log-likelihood function in a regression with a constant term only. The estimated 
cut-off values, 6\ to 6q, are not reported.
2 /i,A ti ACi|t=i NCRi)t=i CGRi)t==i N InL Prob>x2 Pseudo R2
I 0.337(0.000) 0.004(0.000) 465 -277.57 0.000 12.82%
II 0.372(0.000) 0.004(0.002) 0.769(0.006) 365 -136.94 0.000 14.47%
III 0.366(0.000) 0.005(0.002) -0.618(0.021)
369 -140.84 0.000 14.23%
IV 0.370(0.000) 0.004(0.003) 0.638(0.029) -0.452(0.111)
365 -134.64 0.000 14.67%
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TABLE IV
BIVARIATE (ORDERED) PROBIT MODEL OF ACCEPTANCE DECISION
The table presents the estimation results of the bivariate (ordered) probit 
regression for different versions of [2.8]. The p-values of the regression coeffi­
cients are reported below the coefficient estimates in parentheses.
I II III
y*2i Ordered probit model Acquisition activity
y%,Ati 0.313 0.373 0.391
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ACitt=i 0.002 0.004 0.004
(0.026) (0.006) (0.013)
NCR^=i 0.544 0.577 0.562
(0.069) (0.058) (0.055)
CGRi^i -0.439
(0.094)
-0.279
(0.186)
-0.311
(0.126)
P -0.234
(0.197)
-0.198
(0.269)
-0.221
(0.232)
yli Probit model Acceptance Decision
Constant
OCM=2
OCM=2 • 2/i,A t2+l
-0.927
(0.000)
-0.426
(0.000)
-1.004
(0.000)
-0.337
(0.000)
-0.820
(0.000)
-0.412
(0.011)
-0.223
(0.047)
m daxm=2 0.547 0.798 0.773
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001)
PAIi)t=2 2.445 2.389 2.388
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
BSi>i=2 -0.051
(0.730)
-0.083
(0.612)
-0.187
(0.276)
Obs 293 287 287
lnLij2 -245.20 -197.36 -178.22
Prob>x2 0.000 0.000 0.000
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TABLE V
P a n e l  A : E s t im a t e s  o f  a b n o r m a l  s t o c k  r e t u r n s  a r o u n d  a c c e p t a n c e  d a t e
The table presents estimates of [2.5], the cumulative abnormal returns from event window £0 =  —2 
to t l  =  7. The market model is estimated with return data from day -280 to day -30 prior to the 
acceptance of the Code, for which both a  and (3 are reported for the various sub-samples. The 
event window covers seven post-event days to allow for publication of the acceptance declaration 
in the ‘Borsenzeitung’ and its dissemination by the stock exchange. The J-statistic is calculated 
according to [2.10].
Sample Criteria
eoOT—1*<s P CAR10 J-statistic Obs
Full sample 0.067 0.713 0.53% 1.429 232
Companies under OCi =  1 0.001 0.696 3.21% 4.769 94
owner-control
Prospective bidders Vi,At2+l ^  $1 0.102 0.821 1.80% 3.530 114
Owner-controlled OQ =  1 and 0.111 0.791 5.40% 6.594 54
prospective bidders Vi,At2+l 01
Majority-controlled 0.001 0.604 1.18% 2.325 1.25
P a n e l  B: M e a n  C o m p a r i s o n  T e s t s  o n  C u m u l a t i v e  A b n o r m a l  R e t u r n s
The table presents the t-statistics on the differences in the cumulative abnormal returns for 
bidder and owner-controlled companies respectively. The t-statistics are reported both under the 
assumption of equal and unequal variances.
Mean comparions tests on CARs: t-statistics Equal variance Unequal variance
Full sample
Owner-controlled vs manager controlled 3.761 3.524
Prospective bidders vs non-bidders 
Prospective owner-controlled bidders vs others 
Majority control vs dispersed ownership
3.218 3.236 
5.408 4.358 
1.760 1.834
Prospective bidders
Owner-controlled vs manager controlled 2.931 2.985
Owner-controlled firms
Prospective bidders vs non-bidders 3.182 3.756
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TABLE VI
TRIVARIATE LDV MODEL FOR CROSS-SECTIONAL RETURN REGRESSION
The table presents estimation results of the trivariate limited dependent variable 
model as specified in [2.12]-[2.14]. The p-values of the regression coefficients are 
reported below the coefficient estimates in parentheses.
I II III
*Vi,At2 Ordered probit model Acquisition activity
l/i.Atl 0.355 0.287 0.359
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
ACi)t=i 0.002 0.003 0.002
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
NCRi,t=i 0.492 0.543 0.471
(0.065) (0.088) (0.115)
CGRj)t=1 -0.481
(0.117)
-0.407
(0.080)
-0.443
(0.179)
Pl2 -0.142
(0.442)
-0.092
(0.646)
-0.111
(0.531)
y*2i Probit model Acceptance decision - selection mechanism
Constant -0.765
(0.000)
-0.899
(0.000)
-0.897
(0.000)
OCM=2 -0.394
(0.010)
-0.453
(0.009)
-0.451
(0.010)
OCM=2 ' Vi,At2+l -0.213
(0.036)
-0.193
(0.087)
-0.143
(0.107)
MDAXi,t=2 0.541 0.499 0.486
(0.008) (0.000) (0.006)
PAIi)t=2 1.938 1.708 1.965
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
P 23 0.789(0.000) 0.753(0.000) 0.768(0.000)
0.094
(0.000)
0.092
(0.000)
0.089
(0.000)
P23° 3 0.074(0.000) 0.069(0.000) 0.068(0.000)
CAR10 OLS Cross-sectional return regression
Constant -0.159
(0.000)
-0.123
(0.000)
-0.168
(0.000)
OCiit=2 0.035 0.029 0.024
2/i,At2+l
OCi)t=2 * Vi,At2+l
(0.004)
0.028
(0.003)
(0.034)
0.029
(0.019)
(0.083)
0.019
(0.013)
0.020
(0.093)
MDAXi?t=2 0.005 0.022 0.008
(0.276) (0.176) (0.254)
PAli,t=2 0.149 0.147 0.133
(0.008) (0.009) (0.016)
Obs 335 335 335
lnLi)2 -198.17 -197.88 -186.84
Prob>x2 0.000 0.000 0.000
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2.7 Appendix
2,7.1 Proofs to  Lemmas and Propositions
P ro o f to  P roposition  1: The value of the tfs blockholding to r is
^ k r Y r +  utBj., (2.15)
whereas t values the block at krYt +  nrBt- The new blockholder of T, r, will pay the 
fraction kR/n R of the transaction price, (nR — kR)/n R will be carried by R’s minority 
shareholders. If r just compensates t for the value of the share block, r will have to 
pay
M -t +  & rvrBt . (2.16)
In order for a transfer to occur the parties have to agree on a transaction price 
which will make both parties better off. Multiplying [2.15] and [2.16] by n R/k r k R 
we obtain the necessary and sufficient condition for a control transfer, namely Yr +  
(BrnTn R)/kTkR > Yt +  (BtnT)/kT. ■
P ro o f to  P roposition  2: (Bebchuck [1994]). Inequality [2.2] is both a necessary 
and sufficient condition for a transfer of control under the MBR. The transaction price 
under the MBR has to be greater than Yt +  (nrB t)/ hr to make t better off, but cannot 
be larger than Yr +  (nRBr)/k R, since r  would incur a welfare loss. The condition is 
sufficient since the acquisition of the target company will have a value to r of at least 
Yr +  (nRBr)/kR\ more than Yr + (nRBr)/k R if minority shareholders of T keep their 
shares and Yr + (nRBr)/k R if they choose to tender their shares. Inequality [2.2] is 
also a necessary condition, since otherwise there exists no transaction price which will 
make both parties better off. Any price lower than Yt +  (nTBt)/kT will make t worse 
off and any price higher than Yr +  (nRBr)/k R will make r  worse off. ■
Lem m a 2: In order to derive the expected payoff to the small shareholders of R, 
we have to consider the two cases in which t and r make a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the 
respective other party. If r is the party making the take-it-or-leave-it offer, r will offer 
just t ’s reservation value per share, Yt +  (nrBt)/kr. In the opposite case t will skim 
the total surplus and demand Yr +  (nRnrB r)/ (krkR) per share. The expected payoff 
for small R shareholders under the MR is a weighted average of the two bargaining 
scenarios and corresponds to
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E(Pm r) = e[ nTYr - Z g i h r (Yt + % B t) -  ^ ( n T -  kT) I$ .n }
share of cash-flows to R share in acquisition costs cash-flows to small T shareholders
+ (! -  8 ) [ S ^ t nTYr -  kT(Yr + % % B r) -  * £ * ( nT -  kr)Yr] .
Small R shareholders obtain their respective fraction of cash-flows from T, from 
which we have to subtract their share in the acquisition costs and the security benefits 
which accrue to the small shareholders of the target. The second term highlights 
that small R shareholders have to finance r ’s private benefits although they only 
participate in the acquisition via security benefits. Under the MBR only the third 
payoff component changes: small T shareholders now have the option to tender their 
shares and receive the negotiated transaction price or to remain shareholders and 
participate in the security benefits of Yr. The expected payoff under the MBR therefore 
equals
E(Pmbr) = 8  [ = £ * nTYr -  hr(Yt + % B t) -  2fc4a(nT -  fcr )max{Fr iK( +  g B ,} ] 
+(1 -  8 ) rvrYr -  ^ kT(Yr + % B r) -  -  h r ) m»x{Yr, Fr +  Br}] .
In the case where t has complete bargaining power small T shareholder will always 
tender their shares since Yr < Yr+(nRBr)/k R. Simplifying the second half of E(PMbr) 
and E(PMr ) we find that in both cases small R shareholders incur a wealth loss of 
—riTBr(nR — kR)/kR if t dominates the bargaining game. In both cases does t skim 
the surplus from r, so the wealth gain to r is zero. Small T shareholders, however, still 
have to finance r ’s private benefits in an order of magnitude of —nTBr(nR — kR)/k R. 
The difference between the payoffs under the MBR and MR therefore only corresponds 
to the difference in the payoffs to small T shareholders if r has complete bargaining 
power, i.e.
A W tt  = E(Pm r) -  E(Pmbr) =  - 8  [ ^ K  -  hr)(Yr -  max{Fr , Yt + f££,})
P ro o f to  Lem m a 3: Since in case 2 no transfers occur under the MBR, the 
payoff to the minority shareholders of R is zero, i.e. E(Pm br) =  0 so that E (A W Tn |
.) =  E(Pm r). Simplifying [2.17] yields
AWTN = ^  [<9{kr(Yr -  Yt) -  nTB t) -  (1 -  8 )nT^ B r] . ■
For transfers of control to occur under the MR, but not under the MR, the dou­
ble inequality Yr +  (n RBT)/k R < Yt -f (nTBt)/kT < Yr + (nRnTBr)/(kTkR) has to
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hold. Transforming the inequality yields —(nRhrBr) /k R > kT(Yr — Yt) — nTBt > 
— (nRnTBr)/k R. The assumption Br > 0 implies kT(Yr — Yt) — nTB t < 0 which leaves 
small R shareholders with an expected welfare loss, E ( A W tn  I •) < 0 under the MR.
P ro o f to  P roposition  3: We have to show that \A W tn \  under the condi­
tions of case 2 exceeds A W t t  under the conditions of case 3, i.e. E  \ ( A W tn  I -)l >  
E ( A W t t  I •)• We proceed by examining the conditional expectations for given Bt and 
Br and random Yr — Yt. The conditions of case 2 imply that A W tn  ranges between 
—'n-R(nTnRBr/k R) and —7rR(nRBr/k R)[6 kT 4- (1 — 0)nT] where 7rR denotes the frac­
tional equity ownership of minority shareholders in R, (nR — kR/n R). In case 3 A W t t  
can vary from 0 to irR0(nRBr/k R){riT — hr). In order for \E ( A W tn  I -)l to outweigh 
E ( A W t t  | •) for all possible realizations of Yr — Yu the following inequality has to 
hold:
- e ^ k r B r  -  ( 1  -  e ) ^ n TBr 
k R k R
> 0 (nT -  hr) ^ B r .
k-R
The inequality is satisfied if 6  < 1/2. This is true for all possible combinations of Bt 
and Br. ■
P ro o f to  P roposition  4: Both Br and Bt are distributed on [0; a r\ and [0; a f] 
respectively, with density functions f r  and f t . The difference Yr — Yt is uniformly 
distributed on [—uo,ui] where uq ^  arnRn r / (kRkr) — a tn r /k r  and ^  a tnr/kr . 
Defining Yr — Yt =  AY, we can calculate the conditional expected values in [2.3]. The 
positive wealth effect of the MR in situations in which the transfers occur under both 
rules equals:
P (A Y  > % B t -  %Br) ■ E (A W rr  I A Y  > j£B , -  f f Br)
rctr rent |-
= J J  M b _ m B [9^ nT -  -  A y )] ^ A Y f tdBtf rdBr
rotr ra t 2
= 1  I  -  hr)% 0Bl }tdBt}rdBr.
(2.18)
The negative wealth effects of the MR in situations where transfers occur only under
CHAPTER 2. BARBARIANS IN  CHAINS 60
the MR equals:
P(%Bt -  %Br > A Y >  %Bt -  %%BT)E(AWTN \ %Bt -  f£Br > A y > %Bt -
p a r p a t  f j ? - B t  — j A B r  r
=  / / L  ^  r k T A Y  ~  ^  ~  (1 " 6 ) n T ^ B r . J ^ dAYf*dB‘frdBr
i / 0  • /  0  « /  i  B t  —  i  t  Brkr % kRkT*ar /*at
=  j T  I ^  -  f c r ) f  [0 B l f tdBtf TdBr.
(2.19)
Since the last term in square brackets is greater than one, the absolute value of (2.19) 
exceeds (2.18), i.e., the negative relative wealth effects of the MR outweigh the wealth 
gain in situations where transfers occur under both rules. The MBR therefore entails 
positive ex ante wealth effects for small shareholders of R. It can also easily be seen 
that the wealth increase is higher, the smaller the blockholding of the target company, 
kT/n T, and the smaller the size of the controlling blockholder of the raider, kR/n R. ■
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2.7.2 A nnotations to  D ata
TABLE A.I
TENDER OFFERS IN GERM ANY DURING 1995-97 WITH INTENT TO ACQUIRE CONTROL
Date Bidder Target Ownership (pre-bid) Ownership (post-bid)
11/05/95 Caradon pic Weru AG Caradon (11%) 
BBV Holding (6%)
Caradon (51%)
03/09/96 Future Holding AG Glunz AG Fam Glunz (16%)
IBM Pensionskasse (5%) 
PDFM (6%)
minuscule acceptance
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TABLE A.II
DATA DESCRIPTION AND DATA SOURCES
Variable Description D ata Source
number of acquisitions
U2i = 1 , if firm signed Code
AC* authorized capital
NCRi net current a ssets/to ta l assets
CGRi liab ilities/tota l assets
MDAX* member of DAX or MDAX
MVj market value (£000 m DM)
TOi average daily volume (m DM)
BSj =1, if bank in supervisory board
DM AJi = 1 , if firm majority-controlled
OCi = 1 , if firm owned by an ultim ate
controlling individual blockholder
M&A R eview  D atabase U niversity of St. Gallen
Transaction type 0 (purchase of share stake) 
Transaction type 6 (increase of equity stake) 
Transaction type 8 (control agreement)
Ubernahmekommission der D eutschen Borse
H oppenstedt Aktienfuhrer 1991, 1996 
Publication deadline: 30 September of previous year
Datastream  International
Account Item No. 104/723 (October 1995)
Annual reports 1990, 1995 
H oppenstedt Aktienfuhrer 1991, 1996
Datastream  International 
Account Item No. 731 (October 1995)
Annual reports 1990, 1995 
H oppenstedt Aktienfuhrer 1991, 1996
Bbrsenzeitung October 1995
Datastream  International 
Datatype MV (October 1995)
D atastream  International 
Datatype VO (daily average in 1995)
H oppenstedt Handbuch der Gro unternehmen
H oppenstedt Aktienfuhrer 1996
H oppenstedt Aktienfuhrer 1996
Wer gehort zu wem? (Commerzbank 1994)
H oppenstedt Handbuch der Gro unternehmen
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TABLE A .I ll
ACCEPTANCE DECLARATIONS BY INDUSTRY
The table lists the number of acceptance declarations of the Takeover Code in each two-digit 
NACE category in which more than 6 companies were listed during October 1995-December 1997. 
In order to test for the clustering of acceptance decisions in an industry a median-based sign- 
test is used. Under the null hypothesis of Hq := P(X{) =  0.5, where Xi denotes the number 
of acceptance decisions in a specific industry i — 1, ...,30, the random variable Xi is distributed 
binomially i?(ni,0.5). The null hypothesis is rejected if Xi ^ ka/2 or Xi > /ci_a/ 2 , where ka/2
and &i_ a / 2  are the greatest respectively the smallest integers which satisfy X)m=o (^)0-5ni ^ a/2 
and Ylm—kx /2 (m) 0-5ni ^ Q:/2  respectively. Numbers marked with * indicate industries in which 
the null hypothesis can be rejected at the 5% significance level.
Industry NACE S S %S %S N
Manufacture of wood, straw and plaiting 20 6* 1 85.7% 14.3% 7
Office machinery and computers 30 4 3 57.1% 42.86% 7
Automotive supplies and transport equipment 35 6 2 75.0% 25.0% 8
Health and social work 85 5 4 44.4% 55.6% 9
Clothing and dyeing of fur 18 4 6 40.0% 60.0% 10
Pulp, paper and paper products 21 8* 2 80.0% 20.0% 10
Electrical machinery and apparatus 31 6 4 60.0% 40.0% 10
Radio, television and communication equipment 32 6 4 60.0% 40.0% 10
Medical, precision and optical instruments 33 5 5 50.0% 50.0% 10
Furniture, jewelry, musical instruments, etc. 36 8* 2 80.0% 20.0% 10
Land transport and pipelines 60 8* 2 80.0% 20.0% 10
Auxiliary activities to financial intermediation 67 6 5 54.5% 45.5% 11
Fabricated metal products 28 8 5 61.5% 38.5% 13
Automotive industry (motor vehicles and trailers) 34 7 6 53.8% 46.2% 13
Retail trade and repair of household goods 52 7 6 53.8% 46.2% 13
Rubber and plastic products 25 10 4 71.4% 28.6% 14
Non-metalhc mineral products 26 8 6 57.1% 42.9% 14
Other mining and quarrying 14 11 6 64.7% 35.3% 17
Construction 45 16* 4 80.0% 20.0% 20
Wholesale and commission trade 51 18* 3 85.7% 14.3% 21
Basic metal 27 16* 6 72.7% 27.3% 22
Electricity, gas, steam and hot water supply 40 18* 5 78.3% 21.7% 23
Manufacture of textiles 17 14 10 58.3% 41.7% 24
Chemicals and chemical products 24 14 16 46.7% 53.3% 30
Insurance and pension funding 66 13 20 39.4% 60.6% 33
Financial intermediation 65 9 31* 22.5% 77.5% 40
Real estate activities 70 25 15 62.5% 37.5% 40
Machinery and equipment 29 26 16 61.9% 38.1% 42
Food products and beverages 15 45* 12 78.9% 21.1% 57
Other business activities 74 36 26 58.1% 41.9% 62
Mean
Standard deviation
X
SD
62.8
15.1%
37.2%
15.1%
610
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2.7.3 Derivation of M aximum Likelihood Functions
The specification of the three-equation model estimated under [2.4.4] consists of an 
ordered probit regression (2.20), a probit regression (2.21) and a continuous OLS 
regression (2.22) which is selected if y2 =  1» be. if a company has signed the Takeover 
Code. The set-up allows for potential correlation between the disturbance terms £1 , 
£2 , and £ 3 .
Vi
yl
CAR10
+ £ 1
X f(5 2 p p z{X lb(5l) + e2
X 35P4 +  /^ (X i5/^) +  £3 observed only if y2i = 1
(2.20)
(2 .21)
(2.22)
yu =  0 if 0Vli+1 < y*u ^  0Vu+2
yu =  1 if 0yu+l < y*u ^ 0yu+2
yu =  j  i f ^ li+1
V2i =  1 if
0A•«**
’ e\ " ( ' 0 “
£2 ~ N 0 J
. £3 . V 0
0  otherwise
P 12°2
i
Pl3*3
P23cr2^ '3
1
Pl2cr2 <7?
PlS^S P23<J2Cr3 °3
The matrix of observations on the explanatory variables X  can be decomposed 
into where i indexes the n sample observations and I the number of
independent variables m. Similarly, y\ =  [3/1*] i^ n *  The maximum likelihood function 
of the model consists of two parts: one part which is the result a bivariate probability 
distribution if the Code is not signed, and a second component resulting from a 
trivariate probability distribution if the Code is signed and excess stock returns are 
observed.
C ase 1: y2i =  0 (C od e n ot signed) The joint probability of the normally dis­
tributed random variables £1 from (2.20) and £2 from (2.21) equals
Prob(e2 ^  -X%% -  , 6y+1 -  X?0/?, <  ci <  6y+2 -  X f/3 ,)-95 90, -90,
/.
-XFfa-foiXFh) f 9 y + 2-x\0(3x
I .v+t-Xfo^
} e i |e2 ( e lj  e2 ) f e 2 { €2 ) d £ l d e 2
= /e  i ,e 2 (€l i e2)
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where / £2 (e2) stands for the density function of £2 , and f £l,£2 (ei,e2) and f £l\£2 (ei,e2) 
denote the joint density and conditional density function of the random variables E\ 
and e2 respectively. The conditional distribution of £\ given £ 2  is normal as well: 
£ 1  | £ 2  ~  N(/ii|2, <7i|2) where p, ^ 2 = P\2^2 / ^ 2  ajad cr^ =  1  — p\2. The density function 
f £2 (e2 ) and the conditional density function / ei|e2 (ei, 6 2 ) are equal to
/«,|«(«x, (2 ) =  ^<t> ( !i^ 12)  and / £2 (e2) =  ±<j> ( a )  ,
so that
Prob(e2  < - X f p 2 -  P3 ( X f ^ ) ,  0y + 1  -  X f f t  < £l <  0y + 2  -  X f f t )
=  #  ^  ( s )  d£2.
V —OO
Case 2: 1/21 =  1 (Code signed)
The joint probability of the normally distributed random variables £\ from (2.20), 
e2 from (2.21) and £ 3  from (2 .2 2 ) is
Prob(e2 > -X % %  -  P3 { X f ^ )  , 6 y + 1  -  X f P ,  < ex <  0y + 2  -  X f/?!, e3)
/•oo
— I  /  fei,ei,e3(£\,£2i£z)d£\d€2
J-xl*(32-fiz{xl5p{) Jey+1- x f°p1
rco rQy+i—X^Pi
fe3 ( 3^ ) I fe2\e3 {e2 ^ 3) I /ei|£2i£3( ^ 1  j 2^ j €3)^1^2*
J - x F f a - M x l s p j  Jev+1- x f ° p 1
where / £3 (e3 ) stands for the density function of £3 , / e2 |£3 (e2 > 3^ ) denotes the conditional 
density function of e2 given £3 , / ei,e2 )e3(e 1 , 6 2 , 6 3 ) denotes the joint density of £1 , £2 , and 
£3 , and / ei|e2 le3 (ei, e2, £3 ) the conditional density of £\ given £ 2  and £3 . The conditional 
distribution of £ 2  given £ 3  is normal as well: £ 2  | £ 3  rsj N(M2|3> <^1|3) where M2|3 =  
p2 3a2 £3 / & 3  and =  a2(l — p23). The conditional distribution of £ 1  given £ 2  and £ 3  
likewise equals £ 1  | £2 , ^ 3  ~  -^(^ 1 1 2 ,3 5  3 ) where
_  (Pl2 ~ Pl3p23)cr^ 2  +  (Pi3  — Pi2p23)°"2£3 
M l >2 ' 3  -  a 2 a3(l -  & )
J2 _  -t [Pl2 ~ 2P12P13P23 +  P1 3 ]
" 1|2'3 "  1 •
The density functions necessary to compute the probabilities which enter the like­
lihood functions are
fei|e2,£3(el>e2,e3) =  (j) ( ~M2]3 ) ,
/.*,(«*,«*) = 
and /„(« ,) =
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so that
Prob(e2 > - X f / ? 2  -  , dy+ 1  -  X f >P1 < e, ^  9y + 2  -  e3) =
/ w  I* -  *  ( • " " ? ■ " " ) ]  i *  ( = 3 “ )  *
Combining the above probabilities for the two cases we obtain the log-likelihood 
function £^ 2 , 3  =  In L =
™ T r -x2iP2-p3(xuPi)
S a - l t o j l n
1 = 1
2/2 i In
The integrals are calculated using Monte-Carlo integration:
[ a W{z)<j>{z)dz *  i  J ] *  W(Zr) • < 0 (^ )
J — 0 0  r
where denotes the number of drawings zT from a normal distribution with density 
(p(z) which is truncated below a. As in Hajivassiliou and McFadden [1998] the trun­
cated standard normal variate on the interval [—0 0 , a] is generated through a mapping 
q from a uniform (0,1) random variable u according to: q(a,u) = $ _ 1 ($(a) • u). The 
maximization of the ln-likelihood function is carried out through numerical optimiza­
tion procedures. Both the numerical optimization routines of Broyden, Fletcher, Gold- 
farb and Brown (requiring only first derivatives) and the Goldfeld-Quandt Quadratic 
Hill Climbing Algorithm (requiring first and second derivatives) are used.
C hapter 3
‘Awakening of the M ute’- 
Takeover R egulation and th e  
V oting Premium;
3.1 Introduction
So far, the literature on the voting premium has largely slighted the relationship 
between take-over regulation and the price differential between voting and non-voting 
shares. A variety of papers (c.f. [Zingales [1995], Rydqvist [1996]) have established 
that the voting right of dispersed shareholders becomes valuable when it is crucial 
for a transfer of control. The degree to which atomistic shareholders are pivotal in 
control changes, however, depends on the prevalent take-over regulation. This paper 
focuses on how a change in corporate governance rules affects the value of the voting 
right, as measured by the price differential between voting and non-voting stock. The 
paper employs a data set of German dual-class shares during the ten-year period 
1988-1997 to furnish evidence on the determinants of the voting premium before 
and after the introduction of a voluntary Takeover Code in Germany in 1995. The 
Takeover Code contains the mandatory bid rule (MBR) as its core element. The 
paper argues that the mandatory bid rule affects the voting premium in two ways in 
the presence of concentrated ownership. First, it changes the way in which minority 
shareholders participate in transfers of control pre- and post- 1995. In the absence 
of the mandatory bid rule, voting minority shareholders are forced into a position 
of ‘mute consent’ whenever the majority block changes hand. The mandatory bid 
requirement, however, induces their ‘a w a ken in g the acquirer has to make a tender 
offer to minority voting shareholders at a price not smaller than the price paid to 
the incumbent blockholder. The empirical study confirms that majority control has 
a negative impact on the voting premium before the structural break in 1995, and a
67
CHAPTER 3. VOTING PREMIUM 68
positive one thereafter. Secondly, the acceptance of the mandatory bid rule changes 
the control value of signatory companies. Since the MBR reduces the extent to which 
the value of control can be enlarged through a pyramiding structure of subsidiaries, 
the voting premium is significantly smaller for companies which have chosen to abide 
by the Takeover Code.
The paper argues that the value of the voting right results from two factors: the 
value of control benefits the voting right confers and the probability that the voting 
right is crucial for a transfer of control: When the value of control benefits rises with 
the amount of assets under control, there are several ways to increase private control 
benefits without enhancing the amount of outstanding equity. The generic principle is 
to recruit investors who commit capital but do not share in the control of the company. 
This article considers three means of separating control from cash-flow rights: debt, 
non-voting preference shares, and a pyramiding structure of subsidiaries. The paper 
analyses how these variables relate to the observed price differential between voting 
and non-voting stock.
Apart from the amount of control benefits the voting right confers to a potential 
new controller, it is decisive whether an atomistic shareholder is pivotal for a transfer 
of control to a new shareholder. Since control benefits are exclusively consumed by 
the party in control, the price difference has to reflect the price a potential aspirant for 
control would be willing to pay to atomistic shareholders to establish control over the 
company. Whether small shareholders are able to capture a share of this price largely 
depends on the practice of control transfers, the prevalent ownership structure and 
corporate governance regulation. In the US and other economies with an Anglo-Saxon 
system of corporate governance ownership is usually dispersed and competition for 
control intense (see Allen and Gale [1995]). This is the institutional setting of studies 
on the voting premium carried out by Zingales [1994, 1995a], Rydqvist [1996] and 
Nicodano [1997]. In these studies voting rights are valuable because they can make a 
difference to the outcome of a control contest. Outside shareholders may be able to 
extract some of the winner’s private benefits of control and sell their shares at a price 
higher than their post-takeover price. The intensity of competition in the market for 
corporate control is therefore the key determinant for the voting premium in these 
models. Given the paucity of competition for corporate control in Germany (Franks 
and Mayer [1997]), this paper casts transfers of corporate control in an alternative 
institutional framework where control can also be acquired through negotiated sales 
of share stakes. Even if control is contested minority common stockholders will not 
fare better than preference shareholders under a change in control. The incumbent
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controller will bargain exclusively with the outside control aspirants about his con­
trolling interest. Small voting shareholders are only pivotal for a transfer in control 
if there is no controlling incumbent blockholder and control is contested.
This changes under a regulatory regime which imposes the mandatory bid rule on 
transfers of control. In 1995 Germany experienced a regulatory change through the 
launch of a voluntary Takeover Code, which obliges its signatories to adhere to the 
mandatory bid rule. The mandatory bid rule stipulates that a party which purchases 
a controlling interest of another listed company’s voting equity is obliged to make an 
offer to the remaining target shareholders at a price not smaller than the price paid 
for the controlling block. So even if there is no competition for control, can small 
ordinary shareholders capture a share of private control benefits. This is the case 
if the negotiated takeover price is higher than the value of security benefits under 
the new controlling party. As opposed to the regulatory structure before 1995, a 
controlling incumbent blockholder is a prerequisite for a potential differential payoff 
in favour of small voting shareholders in a transfer of control. The empirical study in 
this paper provides supporting evidence for this hypothesis and shows that majority 
control carries a significant and positive effect during 1995-1997, and a negative one 
during 1988-1994.
Since acceptance of the Code is voluntary, it is also possible to analyse how the 
value of the voting right changes in response to an individual compliance decision. 
Adherence to the Code implies that subsidiaries are likely to be acquired with a 
higher fractional equity ownership than necessary for control. This reduces the extent 
to which the value of control can be enlarged through a pyramiding structure with less 
than fully controlled subsidiaries. The maximum separation of control and cash-flow 
rights is no longer likely to be attainable. The empirical results lend support to this 
hypothesis: the voting premium is significantly smaller for companies which signed 
the Takeover Code. This also holds true when taking into account the endogeneity of 
the acceptance decision through a non-linear instrumental variable estimation.
The paper proceeds as follows. The first part discusses the theoretical rationales 
for the determinants of the voting premium. In a first step, we derive factors proxying 
for the value of corporate control. Then, the paper proceeds to analyse how minority 
shareholders participate in the different modes of corporate governance in Germany 
pre- and post- 1995. The second part presents the empirical evidence on the hypothe­
ses derived in the first part. After presenting the data set of German companies with 
dual-class shares and the institutional background of preference shares in Germany,
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the empirical study seeks to capture how the determinants of the voting premium 
changed between the two subperiods 1988-1994 and 1995-1997. Finally the effect on 
an individual compliance decision with the Takeover Code is examined.
3.2 Rationales for the source o f the voting pre­
mium
The market prices of ordinary and preference shares reflect the value of the shares to 
the marginal investor. Since it is unlikely that the marginal investor is a controlling 
shareholder, the shareprices reflect the value of the shares to the small shareholder 
uninvolved in the control of the company. The voting premium therefore has to 
reflect the potential future control value associated with an ordinary share. The 
voting right becomes valuable if it becomes indispensable to a new control structure 
of the company. The value of corporate control itself depends on the amount of 
private benefits the controlling shareholder derives with a given capital investment. 
The value of a voting right of an atomistic shareholder is thus the result of two factors: 
(a) the (future) amount of private control benefits the voting share confers and (b) the 
probability that the voting share becomes crucial in a transfer of corporate control 
The next two sections will analyse empirical proxies for both these components of the 
voting premium
3.2.1 The value of control benefits
The literature on corporate control issues (see Grossman and Hart [1988], Harris and 
Raviv [1988] and Zingales [1995b]) has long emphasized the importance of private 
benefits of control. Examples for these benefits which are exclusively consumed by 
the party in control are excessive salaries, self-dealing or synergies favouring other 
branches of business of the controller. Given the nature of control benefits it seems 
reasonable to assume that these benefits are proportional to the total amount of 
assets under control (Nicodano [1997]). The larger the amount of controlled assets, 
the greater is the social prestige, and the more abundant are the opportunities to 
divert profits and consume perquisites.
There are several mechanisms by which to increase the ratio of control to cash­
flow rights for voting shareholders. The general principle is to increase the proportion 
of investors who are willing to commit capital but abstain from control rights. In 
the following we consider three means of increasing the ratio of control to cash-flow 
rights for voting shareholders: debt, non-voting equity and pyramiding. All three
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instruments increase assets under control, without diluting the control rights of exist­
ing voting shareholders. Debtholders and nonvoting shareholders receive fixed future 
interest and dividend payments for relinquishing control rights. Pyramiding is an in­
direct way of increasing the ratio of control to cash-flow rights by building a structure 
of majority-controlled subsidiaries. Minority shareholders in subsidiaries contribute 
funds to increase the amount of assets under control, while voting shareholders of the 
holding company remain in control of the subsidiaries’ assets through the interfirm 
majority stakeholdings. All three mechanisms increase the value of the voting shares 
by increasing control rights. The ratio of control to cash-flow rights is termed the 
‘private benefit multiplier’ (PBM), since it reflects the units of assets under control 
per unit of voting equity.
D ebt Debtholders are the classic example of investors who refrain from exercising 
control in favour of fixed schedules of interest rate payments in the future. If B  denotes 
the amount of debt outstanding and S  the firm’s voting equity, then the private benefit 
multiplier of debt is given by (B  +  S )/S . As opposed to equity holders, bondholders 
only gain control of the firm’s assets if the firm value shrinks below the value of debt 
and equityholders file for bankruptcy. Whereas low levels of leverage unequivocally 
raise the PBM, an increasing debt ratio increases the likelihood of bankruptcy and 
therefore the probability of a shift in control to bondholders. One would therefore 
expect increasing returns to control at moderate levels of gearing, and decreasing 
returns at high debt to equity ratios. This paper uses the capital gearing ratio to 
proxy for the increase in private control benefits due to debt issuance1.
N on-voting stock A similar instrument to separate control from cash-flow rights 
are non-voting preference shares, a hybrid security with elements of both debt and 
equity claims. Preference shares usually carry a higher dividend right than ordinary 
voting stock as a compensation for the lacking voting rights. The amount of preferred 
shares outstanding, S nv, has a similar effect on the PBM, namely (Snv + S )/S .  The 
limits to the multiplier effect are determined by the respective national corporation 
law, which usually provides for a maximum percentage of non-voting to voting stock. 
In Germany companies are only allowed to issue 50% of their equity as non-voting
b ecau se of the possiblity of negative equity values in accounting we use B/{B -f- S) instead of 
(B +  S)/S.  The former ratio stays positive even for moderate levels of negative equity positions 
(i.e., as long as — E < B,  which is satisfied in this sample). The discontinuity of (B +  S) /S  at very 
high levels of debt (where the ratio changes from a very large positive to a negative value) does not 
appropriately capture the multiplier effect. The use of (B + S) /S  as its squared value would be even 
more questionable.
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stock2. Since the difference between ordinary and non-voting preference shares serves 
as a measure for the value of corporate control, the voting premium should be higher 
the larger the fraction of non-voting equity.
Pyram iding  As Nicodano [1997] first pointed out in the context of the voting pre­
mium, a third way of increasing the amount of assets under control with a fixed equity 
investment is the creation of a pyramiding structure of subsidiaries. Consider a fully 
integrated company A  with its assets entirely financed by voting equity S\. The 
majority shareholder of company A  decides to acquire control of another fully equity- 
financed company B  with an equity position of The investor has two options of 
how to arrange a new control structure. We assume that a percentage equity invest­
ment of Xjj+i is necessary for control. The subscript j , j  +  1 denotes a controlling 
stake of a layer j  company in a subordinate layer j  + 1  company and j  = 0 stands for 
the ultimate holding company or investor3. First the investor could acquire a fraction 
xqi of equity S 2 thus controlling Si +  S 2 with a corresponding equity investment of 
xqi(Si +  £ 2 ). Alternatively company A  could acquire a controlling interest of X1 2S 2 . 
Company A  would then hold the amount of original assets Si plus an equity stake 
of X12S2 . Whereas the amount of controlled assets remains unchanged, the control 
of the integrated business group A  and B  now only requires an equity investment of 
£oi (Si +  X12S 2 ) as opposed to £ 0 1  (Si +  S2 ). The ratio of controlled assets to equity 
participation increases from l/xoi to (Si +  S 2 )/\xqi(Si +  X1 2 S2 )]. The key to the 
increase in the PBM are external investors on the level of the subsidiary who commit 
capital but do not share the control of the company. The multiplier effect for alterna­
tive control structures where each subsidiary is controlled through a fractional equity 
investment of Xjj+i generalizes to
o m - l  s r ^ K i+i q i + l
PBM = ------  0 ^ k=1 *----- —
Em _ 1  T T  ^  s T 'K i+ i  0 1 + 1  1 = 0  1  lj= 0  x j>j+1 2- ^ k = l  ° k
where m  stands for the number of layers of the holding structure and Ki+i denotes 
the number of subsidiaries on a specific layer i. The stronger the vertical structure 
of the business group, i.e., the longer the chain of subsidiaries owning subsidiaries, 
the higher the PBM. It can be shown that d P B M /d S l£ + 2 > d P B M /d S £ ° + 1  (see 
Appendix), i.e., the more real assets are placed in higher-order hierarchical layers 
instead of horizontal ones, the higher the leverage to private benefits of control. If the
2 See Rydqvist (1992) for a detailed overview of the significance and regulation of non-voting 
shares in different countries.
3 This notation implies that a subordinate company j  + 1  cannot own a stake in a company of the 
same level j  -f 1 or of a higher hierarchical layer j. In fact, the data on the subsidiary structure of 
the sample companies only specifies these hierarchical interlacings.
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company chooses a higher equity participation than Xjj+i, the multiplier effect will 
shrink, i.e., dP B M /dxjj+ i < 0 .
In order to determine the multiplier effect on the value of control for a company 
with a given structure of subsidiaries, it is simply necessary to add the equity posi­
tion of each subsidiary taking account of the fact that equity positions of subsidiary 
companies have to be subtracted from the amount of controlled assets. The following 
formula is applied to determine the degree of control leverage:
^-^m —1 n i+ 1    1 V^-Ki+i ~fc q i+ 1
P B M  =  ^ i = 0  = 1— -  ' f  = 1  i,i+I k where ®Ji + 1  > x. (3.1)
soiS} ’ ’, + 1
In contrast to P B M  which determines the multiplier effect of alternative hypothetical 
control structures, the basis for the calculation of the actual P B M  is the equity 
capital of the respective holding companies which already incorporates the equity 
positions of its subsidiaries. The numerator of P B M , which captures the amount 
of controlled assets, therefore removes the double counting of equity participations 
and real assets. Control of the holding structure implies control of the ultimate 
holding company which is achieved through an equity investment of zoi^i- In a 
sense, the formula for the de facto multiplier ‘reverses’ the procedure by which the 
hypothetical P B M  is constructed. The formula also allows for different ownership 
fractions x * i+ 1  of subsidiaries as long as they exceed the necessary control quota, x. If 
a subsidiary is entirely controlled by a holding company, i.e., x*i+l =  1 , it is excluded 
from the PBM calculation, since its net contribution to the PBM is zero. Given the 
above considerations the voting premium should be higher the larger the extent of a 
corporate hierarchical structure.
The above considerations suggest that the voting premium should positively de­
pend on the multiplier mechanisms for private benefits of control. In particular we 
derive the following hypotheses:
H ypothesis 1  Both the private benefit multiplier due to pyramiding and the ratio 
of non-voting equity to overall equity should be positively correlated with the voting 
premium.
H ypothesis 2 The amount of capital gearing should have a non-linear effect on the 
voting premium. For low levels of leverage the price differential between voting and 
non-voting stock should rise, for higher levels of leverage the relation should reverse 
because of an increasing risk of control change to debt claimants.
CHAPTER 3. VOTING PREMIUM 74
3.2.2 Corporate control transfers and minority shareholders
Apart from the potential control value with which an ordinary share is vested, it is 
decisive whether the voting right of an atomistic shareholder is relevant for a transfer 
in corporate control. The corporate governance framework and the corporate own­
ership structure together determine the mode of corporate control transfers across 
different countries. In Germany negotiated sales of share stakes and acquisition of 
shares in the open market have been the predominant mechanism for corporate con­
trol transactions (Franks and Mayer [1997]). Public tender offers, though subject 
of general guidelines issued by the ‘Borsensachverstandigenkommission’ (Stock Ex­
change Commission) in 1979 have never achieved any practical significance except for 
going-private transactions prior to 1995.
Contrary to the Anglo-Saxon practice, the German market for corporate control 
is characterized by a paucity of hostile takeovers. Edwards and Fischer (1994) indi­
rectly attribute the rarity of hostile takeovers to the difficulty of replacing incumbent 
management after a change in ownership structure. The management board can only 
be dismissed by a majority vote of the supervisory board. Members of the supervi­
sory board in turn can only be replaced before the end of their five-year appointment 
with a 75% majority vote of shareholders. Edwards and Fischer (1994) argue that 
the widespread existence of higher than 25% blockholdings can render it imperatively 
costly for potential raiders to acquire the necessary 75% majority. In addition, po­
litical influence of trade unions and management of target companies can undermine 
takeover attempts in Germany. In the hostile acquisition attempt of Thyssen by 
Krupp in 1997, it was mainly political pressure which thwarted the takeover bid. The 
CEO of Thyssen, Dieter Vogel, successfully recruited support from the head of the 
federal state of North-Rhine Westphalia to avert the takeover bid and launch merger 
talks instead.
In the following section the wealth implications of a corporate control transac­
tion for minority shareholders are derived under the two different regulatory scenarios 
in Germany pre- and post 1995. The cardinal difference between the two regula­
tory scenarios is the protection of minority shareholders through a mandatory bid 
requirement. It is crucial whether the respective regulatory guidelines provide for a 
mandatory tender offer to the minority voting shareholders if a shareholding passes a 
certain threshold (mandatory bid rule) or whether the acquirer can purchase a con­
trolling interest without consideration to minority shareholders (market rule). The 
mandatory bid rule (MBR) implies the principle of non-partiality or non-differentiated
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bids, since it requires that all target shareholders be offered a price not lower than 
the price at which the initial equity position was acquired.
The following set-up will be used to study the implications of the corporate gov­
ernance regimes pre- and post- 1995. Assume that there are two contenders for the 
corporate control of a company. Each of the two parties produces a certain cash-flow 
Yi and derives private benefits of control Bi, where i = 1,2. While private benefits are 
only enjoyed by the party in control, the cash flow is divided equally among sharehold­
ers according to their fractional equity ownership. There is symmetric information 
between the parties and investors about Yi and Bi. For means of simplicity we assume 
that both contenders intend to acquire 100% of the voting equity4. The total number 
of shares (voting and non-voting stock) of the company equals N, of which N v are 
voting and N nv non-voting shares respectively.
‘M ute  consent’: P rac tice  of control changes in G erm any prio r to  1995
Corporate governance in Germany prior to 1995 was characterized by a moderate 
protection of minority shareholders. In contrast to corporate governance rules in the 
UK, there was no requirement to submit a public tender offer to all shareholders after 
a shift in majority control (market rule). In the following we will consider the payoffs 
to both minority voting and nonvoting shareholders if control is acquired: (a) through 
a sale-of-control transaction, and (b) by way of share purchases in the open market.
N egotia ted  block sales In this case contender 1 is an incumbent blockholder who 
has a controlling interest of x per cent of voting stock in the company. The aspirant 
for control thus has to bargain over the transfer of the control stake. A sale of control 
comes about if the contender pays a price of at least B i/x N v+ Y i/N  per voting share in 
the block, i.e., iff the reservation value of the contender exceeds the reservation value 
of the incumbent: (B2 — B i)/N v > x(Yi —Y ^ /N . The surplus is divided between the 
two parties according to their relative bargaining power. Independent of the division 
of surplus, atomistic holders of ordinary and preference shares are excluded from 
the sale-of-control transaction. Because of their free-riding behaviour (Grossman and 
Hart [1980]) they will both obtain
U v =  U nv =  y 2/ N  ( 3 . 2 )
per share, where n v and H.nv denote the payoffs to voting and non-voting shareholders 
respectively.
4 Similar results can be obtained if both contenders only acquire a controlling interest of x per 
cent of voting stock and the offer is allocated pro rata.
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Share purchases in open m arket. In the absence of an incumbent blockholder 
party 2 can undertake successive share purchases in the open market. If this is possible 
without revealing a corporate control objective, a share can be acquired at a price 
of Y i/N  in the open market. Without any prospect of a change in control the price 
for an atomistic voting share corresponds to the value of cash-flows generated under 
the current management. Once it becomes certain that the new blockholder strives 
for the control of the company, the share price of both voting and non-voting stock 
immediately reflects this prospect and changes to Y2 /N , i.e.,
IT =  Unv = Y2/N  (3.3)
(Grossman and Hart [1980]). In both cases atomistic holders of ordinary shares do 
not gain to a larger extent from a transfer of control than preference shares. Because 
of their free-riding behaviour both classes of shares will just be compensated with the 
level of security benefits they obtain under the respective management. This changes 
if control is contested and there is competition in the acquisition of outstanding dis­
persed shares. This has been the setting of other papers which have investigated
the determinants of the voting premium Zingales [1994] and [1995a], Rydqvist [1996],
Nicodano [1997]. If there is competition for control, the price of ordinary atomistic 
shares does not only have to reflect the security benefits under the likely winning party, 
say Y2/N , but also the reservation value of the inferior party, {Yi/N + B \/N v) (Harris 
and Raviv [1980]). The payoffs to voting and nonvoting shareholders are therefore
Uv =  max p i / N ^ Y i / N  + B i/N 9)} (3.4)
Unv = Y2 /N . (3.5)
If Y2/N  < (Y i/N  +  B i/N v), a differential payment results in favour of voting shares. 
In Germany, however, the relevance of this scenario is limited, since competition 
for control is moderate and takeover battles similar to the Anglo-Saxon model are 
virtually unknown.
Proxies for th e  likelihood of differential payoff to  voting and  non-voting 
stock The above analysis has shown that voting shares only receive a superior pay­
ment in a transfer of control if there is no blockholder with a controlling interest and 
control is contested. Both in Zingales [1994, 1995a] and Rydqvist [1996] the proba­
bility of a contested acquisition is proxied by the existing ownership structure of a 
company. To capture the likelihood with which small shareholders become pivotal in 
a potential takeover contest Zingales [1994, 1995a] used the (Relative) Shapley value 
(Milnor and Shapley [1978]). Other proxies used for ownership stability are the size
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of the largest shareholder (Rydqvist [1996]) or a dummy variable for majority control 
(Zingales [1994]). For the purposes of this paper we include dummy variables for ma­
jority control and qualified majority control, i.e., an equity ownership of more than 
75%, to capture the possibility of contested control. The latter variable is particularly 
important in the German context, since a 75% majority is de facto required to replace 
the incumbent management.
H ypothesis 3 Market rule: In the pre- 1995 period the voting premium is (weakly) 
negatively correlated with majority-control
Not only ownership concentration of voting shares, but also the ownership struc­
ture of preference shares could affect the voting premium. Bergstrom and Rydqvist 
[1992] analyse a scenario where the outside contestant wants to acquire 100% of both 
voting and non-voting shares. Because in this set-up both non-voting and voting 
stock are pivotal to private benefits of control, but the bidder can price discriminate 
between the two classes, it is possible that a premium is paid to non-voting stock. 
The premium is large if there is a small percentage of non-voting stock outstanding 
and most of this is concentrated in the hands of the incumbent blockholder. Another 
rationale is put forward by Megginson [1990] who applies the Jensen and Meckling 
[1976] argument to the differential treatment of voting and non-voting shareholders. 
He uses the amount of inside ownership of non-voting stock as a proxy for man­
agement’s disincentive to discriminate against non-voting shareholders. One might 
similarly argue that the incumbent blockholder is more inclined to undertake actions 
in favour of non-voting shareholders (e.g. early reimbursement of dividend arrears, 
conversion of preference into ordinary shares) the more non-voting stock he owns. In 
order to take account of these potential effects we include the amount of holdings in 
non-voting stock of the largest shareholder in the company.
H ypothesis 4 The percentage ownership of preference shares by the largest holder 
of voting stock has a negative impact on the voting premium.
‘Awakening of th e  m u te’: R egulatory  shift in 1995
In 1995 the structure of corporate governance regulation in Germany experienced 
an important change. Parallel to initiatives of the EU Commission to draft an EU 
Takeover Directive the German stock exchange commission introduced a voluntary 
Takeover Code. Modelled after the UK City Code the Takeover Code stipulates that 
a public tender offer has to be made to all target shareholders after a share package
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of more than 50%5 has been newly acquired (mandatory bid rule). The acceptance 
of the Code is voluntary and only imposes a private contractual obligation upon 
the signatories. Even though the Code is based on a private initiative of the Stock 
Exchange and industry representatives it increases the probability that a corporate 
control transfer involves the mandatory bid rule. This is given more weight by a joint 
declaration of German banks not to accompany any raider which has not signed the 
Takeover Code.
N egotia ted  block sale. Under the mandatory bid rule atomistic shareholders have 
the right to participate in the sale on the same terms as the selling blockholder. As 
opposed to the market rule, a transfer of control only occurs if (B2 —B i) /N v > (Y 1-  
Y2)/ N , since the acquirer has to make the same offer to all voting shareholders. Despite 
decreasing the likelihood of a control transfer the mandatory bid rule introduces the 
possibility of a superior payoff to voting minority shareholders. The incumbent and 
the control aspirant play a Nash-bargaining game. The incumbent carries a relative 
bargaining power 6 (where 0  < 6 ^  1 ) with respect to the contender who has the 
reciprocal bargaining power of (1 — 9). The transaction price will therefore be a 
weighted average of the contender’s reservation value of B2/N v -f Y2/N  per voting 
share and the incumbent’s reservation value of B \/N v -f Y i/N  per voting share. The 
payoff for minority holders of ordinary shares equals
Iff =  max{y2 /A ^ [B 2 /A u +  y2/^ ]  +  ( l-^ )[B i/iV v +  y 1 /iV]}, (3.6)
n™ =  Y2/N  (3.7)
i.e., they can either decide to tender their shares and receive 6[B2/N V + Y2/N] + (1 — 
6) [B i/N v+Y\/N] or to remain a minority shareholder with a payoff otY2/N . Holders of 
preference shares are exempted from the mandatory bid rule (Ubernahmekommission 
[1996]) and will therefore only obtain Y2/N , i.e., the level of security benefits under 
the new management. Clearly, in this case atomistic holders of ordinary shares are 
better off than holders of non-voting stock. A nonzero probability that a potential 
raider abides by the Takeover Code is sufficient to raise the value of voting above 
non-voting stock.
Share purchases in open m arket. If there is no controlling blockholder and no 
competition for control, owners of preference and ordinary shares will both obtain the
5 Following severe criticism regarding the laxity of its stipulations the Takeover Commission has 
reduced the threshold for the mandatory tender offer to 30%. The new regulations came into effect 
on 1st January 1998 after the sampling period of this data set.
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level of cash-flow under the new controlling party, Y2 /N . In the absence of competition 
this will also be the price paid in the mandatory tender offer since this will be the price 
paid for the last shares acquired when surpassing the critical threshold level of 50%. 
If there is more than one contender for control the payoffs equal IP  and Hnv given by 
[3.4] and [3.5] respectively. In the case of dispersed ownership the mandatory bid rule 
therefore does not affect the payoffs to minority voting and nonvoting shareholders.
Proxies for th e  likelihood of differential payoff to  voting an d  non-voting 
stock. Table IV contrasts the possible differential payoffs to minority voting and 
non-voting shareholders under the two regulatory regimes, market and mandatory bid 
rule, and with respect to the two mechanisms for control transfers, sale of share stakes 
and open share purchases. Under the mandatory bid rule transfers of control through a 
block trade will always involve the participation of holders of ordinary shares and may 
lead to a premium in favour of voting stock. The existence of a majority blockholding 
is thus a prerequisite for participating in the bargaining surplus in a transfer of control. 
The mandatory bid rule has, however, no effect on the differential payoff to voting and 
non-voting shareholders under dispersed ownership and uncontested purchases in the 
open market. The difference to the pre- 1995 scenario (market rule) consists of the 
new possibility for voting shareholders to receive a differential payment in a sale-of- 
control transaction. Given the low level of competitiveness in the German market for 
corporate control, we would expect this effect to outweigh any superior payoff through 
contested open market purchases.
H ypothesis 5 Mandatory bid rule: During the post- 1995 period the presence of a 
majority owner is positively related to the voting premium.
Effect of acceptance of Takeover Code on voting prem ium  of signatory
The previous paragraph highlighted how the mandatory bid rule augments the value 
of atomistic voting stock by increasing the likelihood that minority voting target 
shareholders participate in the transfer of control. On the other hand, the mandatory 
bid rule can decrease the control value of voting stock by restricting the multiplier 
effect due to pyramiding.
If a company decides to sign the Takeover Code it is obliged to adhere to the 
mandatory bid rule in the role of a potential bidder. This means that it is likely 
that the company has to acquire more than x% of the target’s equity to establish 
control. As analysed under [??], any fractional equity ownership in excess of x  reduces 
the private benefit multiplier. Adherence to the Code therefore implies freezing the
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contribution of a hierarchical ownership structure to P B M  at its current level. If the 
value of control also depends on future possibilities to increase the P B M , then the 
acceptance of the Code reduces the current value of private benefits of control. If the 
voting premium reflects the discounted value of future private benefits of control, then, 
ceteris paribus, the voting premium should shrink after acceptance of the mandatory 
bid rule.
At the same time, the acceptance of the Code restrains the company in the role of 
a potential target. The management board is obliged to abstain from any defensive 
measures which might thwart a public tender offer to which the company is subjected. 
Since, however, German corporate law prohibits defensive instruments such as poison 
pill securities, the significance of this stipulation is de facto very limited. We therefore 
posit the following hypothesis:
H ypothesis 6  Companies which signed the Takeover Code exhibit a lower voting 
premium.
3.3 Em pirical evidence
3.3.1 D ata and sum m ary statistics  
Voting prem ium
The voting premium is calculated as an average of the shareprices of the ten first 
trading days in October each year. According to the listing history of dual-class 
shares the sample would have to consist of 627 observations (Table A. II.) and 8 8  
companies during October 1988 to October 1997. The shareprices could, however, 
only be retrieved for 601 companies years and 84 companies. The shareprices are taken 
from ‘Datastream’ and are adjusted for stock splits, etc. Share prices and dividend 
payments are adjusted if the par value of voting and non-voting shares differs. The 
voting premium VPit is defined as
D u   p n u
v p « = 5 ^ -  (3-8)it
where P?t {P£v) is the price of a voting (non-voting preference) share of company 
i. Table II shows that the average premium in the sample is 26.34%, Kotizer Leder 
exhibits the minimum premium of -57.3% in October 1990 and Hartmann & Braun 
the maximum premium of 280.9% in October 1988. The voting premium of Kotizer 
Leder declined from -5% to -57.3% when Adolf Merckle increased his stake from 25.1% 
to 50% in 1990 (through an additional 24.9% holding of his investment vehicle Meru
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Vermogensverwaltungs GmbH). The voting stock of Hartmann & Braun appreciated 
in the wake of Mannesmann’s takeover in 1988. While ownership structure is certainly 
one of the principal determinants of the variation in the voting premium, the following 
sections will show that other factors such as the value of control rights as well as index 
membership also account for a sizeable fraction of the cross-sectional and time series 
variation. The preference shares of business software house SAP, for instance, which 
as the more liquid category form part of the DAX 30, trade at a premium to their 
voting counterparts. Overall, the level of the voting premium is comparable with the 
level found in Canada (23.3%) and Switzerland (20%). It is, however, higher than the 
level observed in the US (5%), Sweden (1 2 %), and the United Kingdom (13.3 %), but 
significantly smaller than levels observed in Israel (45.5%) and Italy (81%).
Table II presents other general characteristics of this sample. The concentration 
of ownership in German dual-class companies is reflected by the fact that 73% are 
majority controlled, and a substantial 27.5% are controlled with a qualified majority of 
75%. These characteristics axe in fine with the general ownership structure of German 
publicly traded companies, of which 70% are majority-controlled (see Chapter 2 ). 
The maximum number of blockholders (with shareholdings higher than 5%) is five. 
Blockholdings of preference shares are less frequent, but do exist. The average size of 
preference share stakes owned by the largest voting stockholder (higher than 5%) is 
5%.
As in Italy, preference shares are prevalent in both large companies and small and 
mid-sized companies, and not concentrated among small companies like in the US 
(Zingales [1995]). Dual-class share companies with a large market capitalization are 
BMW and VW (car manufacturers), RWE (electricity), MAN (manufacturing) and 
SAP (software), which are all constituents of the DAX 30, the index encompassing 
the 30 largest German companies in terms of market capitalization and daily stock 
turnover. About 24% of dual-class share companies are a member of either the DAX 
30 or the MDAX, which comprises the 70 next largest companies with respect to 
market value and trading volume. The liquidity of the two share classes decides which 
of the two classes is included in the index. In 11.3% of dual-class share companies 
preference shares are members of the indices since they are more liquid than ordinary 
shares. Examples of companies with preference shares as index members are Escada, 
Fresenius, RWE, and GEA.
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Ownership structure
The sample consists of all German companies with both ordinary and non-voting pref­
erence shares traded on the German stock exchanges in the official list, the regulated 
and the free market during 1988 to 1997. Firms are only included in the sample if 
they have bearer ordinary and preference shares outstanding, companies with regis­
tered shares in either of the two categories are excluded from the sample. Table A.V. 
describes the data and documents its sources. The data on the ownership structure is 
obtained from ‘Hoppenstedt Aktienfiihrer’, which lists the main holders of ordinary 
and preference shares of companies listed on the official list, the regulated market and 
of companies with the most liquid shares in the free market. The handbook is pub­
lished yearly and its deadline for publication is 30 September of each year. Also, with 
the introduction of the ‘Wertpapierhandelsgesetz’ (WpHG) in 1995 shareholdings of 
voting stock higher than 5%, 25%, 50%, and 75% have to be reported to the super­
visory board, the ‘Bundesaufsichtsamt fur den Wertpapierhandel’, within seven days 
after exceeding or falling short of one of these thresholds ( § 2 1  WpHG). As a transi­
tory regulation the law required to report all of the existing significant shareholdings 
at the day of the annual shareholders’ meeting after 1  April 1995 (§ 41 WpHG). Since 
shareholders have responded with significant delay to the disclosure requirement6, the 
data cannot be used to reconstruct the exact time of ownership changes dining 1995 
and 1996. But the data was used to cross-check the ownership structure as of the end 
of September in each year. The ownership data is used as presented by ‘Hoppenstedt 
Aktienfiihrer’, with slight alterations with respect to shareholders which are majority 
owned by the same parent company. Whenever a company is majority controlled 
by a holding company, the shareholdings of the subsidiary are fused with the share­
holdings of the holding companies in the dual-class company. For example, in 1996 
Colonia Versicherungs AG features two main shareholders: Vinci BV with a holding 
of 46% and Kolner Verwaltungsgesellschaft fur Versicherungswerte with 30% of voting 
stock. Since the latter company is a subsidiary of Vinci BV, we classify Colonia as 
majority-controlled.
Private benefit mulitpliers
The data on the holding structure of the dual-class companies in the sample is taken 
from ‘Hoppenstedt Aktienfiihrer’. The stock exchange guide lists all significant share­
6In 1995, the Bundesaufsichtsamt filr den Wertpapierhandel received 1100 notifications according 
to § 41 (200 according to § 21), in 1996 the number of firm-time notifications was still 1080 (500 
according to § 21). Only in 1997 did the number of § 41 notifications reduce to merely 6 (360 
according to § 21).
CHAPTER 3. VOTING PREMIUM 83
holdings of companies up to the third hierarchical layer of holdings with their re­
spective equity positions and quota of shareholding. Whenever the equity position 
in a subsidiary is denominated in a foreign currency it is converted to DM with an 
exchange rate at 30 September of each year. The total equity position of each sub­
sidiary is stated in nominal terms, since the equity holding is consolidated at its 
nominal value in the balance sheet of the holding company. In order to remain con­
sistent in terms of nominal valuation the equity position of the holding company is 
also included with its nominal value implying that the market-to-book ratio remains 
stable across the holding structure. A controlling interest of a company is assumed to 
exist if a company owns more than 25%, respectively 50% of another company’s stock. 
This threshold of 25%, the so-called ‘blocking minority’ (‘Sperrminoritat’), is chosen 
because several major corporate decisions, changes of the corporate charter such as 
increases or decreases of share capital or a merger, require a 75% majority of voting 
shareholders. A 50% majority conveys de facto control over a company, since it is 
sufficient for AGM decisions of a more operative nature like dividend payments, the 
discharge of the management board and the election of members of the supervisory 
board. In this sample the average ratio of control to casli-flow rights equals 1.41 if 
we assume control is accomplished with a higher than 25% shareholding. This means 
that a nominal equity participation of 1 DM in a dual-class company grants on aver­
age control rights over equity with a nominal value of 1.41 DM. The ratio decreases to 
1.172 if we require a 50% shareholding for control. The ratio equals one for companies 
with no or only fully owned subsidiaries. Heidelberger Zement exhibits the maximum 
‘control leverage’ with a control cash-flow ratio of 5.997.
Table II also shows the degree by which private benefits are multiplied through 
capital gearing and the issuance of preferred share capital. In tliis sample the capital 
gearing ratio averages 38.6% and varies between 3.2% and 172%, where the latter 
figure arises because of a negative equity value. On average the voting share capital 
corresponds to about 70% of total share capital in the sample of German dual-class 
shares during 1988-1997.
Dividends
As opposed to preferred stock in the US, German preference shares are more of a resid­
ual claim (equity) than a fixed claim (debt). This is because preference shareholders 
participate ^besides their minimum guaranteed dividend- in further profit distribu­
tion. As an example, Lufthansa pays a minimum of 5% of par value to preference 
shareholders, but if ordinary shareholders receive a dividend of 6 % of par value, this
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dividend payment will also have to be extended to preference shareholders. The pref­
erential dividend consists purely in a lower bound guarantee with the same full upside 
dividend potential as ordinary shares. The paragraphs below outline the legal pro­
visions and the various statutory amendments of the dividend regimes for preference 
shares.
Legal provisions According to § 139 I AktG the dividend privilege must consist in 
a priority dividend which is paid to preference shareholders before profit is distributed 
to holders of ordinary shares. The preference shareholders thus assume an interme­
diary position between debtholders whose claims are senior to those of preference 
shareholders and holders of ordinary shares. The priority dividend is cumulative, i.e. , 
if it is not or not fully paid in one year, it has to be paid at the expense of profits of 
subsequent years with the same priority vis-a-vis ordinary shares, and together with 
the current priority dividend. The cumulative preferred dividend constitutes a mate­
rial precept of profit distribution: if the company shows accounting profits, they have 
to be distributed to satisfy current and postponed dividend priorities (Bezzenberger 
[1991]).
Apart from dividend rights, holders of preference shares are equipped with a con­
tingent voting right. The voting right enters into force if the priority dividend m* has 
not been fully paid during one year and the arrears not been fully repaid during the 
following year together with the full priority for that year. For example, if in year t 
preference shareholders obtain no dividend, they gain the voting right at the AGM in 
t +  2  if in year t + l a  dividend of less than 2 m* is paid.
S ta tu to ry  am endm ents Besides these compulsory characteristics, the corporate 
charter can specify the size and additional features of the dividend rights of prefer­
ence shares. All German preference shares currently participate beyond their priority 
dividend in the distribution of profits. Very often the corporate charter grants an ad­
ditional dividend to preference shares in excess of the amount distributed to ordinary 
shares. The current dividend regimes of preference shares can broadly be classified 
into three categories depending on the relation of priority and excess dividends: (a) 
no additional dividend: after payment of the priority dividend mi, ordinary shares re­
ceive the same amount, and the remainder is equally split between the two categories; 
in this case, the priority dividend only constitutes a differential dividend in case of 
insufficient profits where ordinary shares receive less than mi\ (b) constant additional 
dividend: after payment of the priority dividend m*, ordinary shares receive the same 
amount, after which profit is distributed such that preference shares always receive an
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excess dividend X{ with respect to ordinary shares; (c) variable additional dividend: 
same as (b), except that the additional dividend Xki varies according to the dividend 
ordinary shares receive, d\t, i.e., the sequence (xki)k=i,..,i determines the additional 
dividend for growing dvit. Table I summarizes the three dividend regimes and their 
empirical relevance. The most common dividend regime is a combination of a min­
imum and an additional dividend. In eight companies does the additional payment 
vary according to the amount distributed to ordinary shares. Five of the eight pref­
erence shares with a varying additional dividend carry a progressive dividend scheme 
where x ^  < ££+1 ,1 5  in the remaining three cases the additional dividend decreases the 
higher the dividend distributed to ordinary shares, i.e. x ^  >  %k+i,i (see also Table 
A.IV). The additional dividend never exceeds the priority dividend. In category II the 
additional dividend equals on average 2 .1 % of the stock’s nominal value, i.e., less than 
half of the average minimum dividend of 5%. In roughly 20% of dual-class shares no 
additional dividend is paid, which is compensated through a higher priority dividend 
of 5.8% on average.
D ividend paym ents Table A.III shows the percentage of cases in which prefer­
ence and ordinary shareholders received differential and identical dividend payments 
respectively during 1988-1997. A differential dividend payment in favour of preference 
shares can occur in three cases: (1 ) preference shares obtain an additional dividend 
with respect to ordinary shares, d™ =  dvit +  x it, if the dividend to ordinary shares 
exceeds the minimum dividend, <Pit > ra*; (2 ) the minimum dividend is paid to prefer­
ence shares, — m;, but there is insufficient profit for ordinary shares to obtain an 
identical amount, d\t < ra*; and (3) preference shares obtain cumulated minimum div­
idend payments for more than one year, d™ — ra*, but there is insufficient profit 
for ordinary shares to obtain an identical amount, d%t < J2t m*. The first case occurs 
most frequently, in 64% of the company years. Both classes of shares receive the same 
dividends if (1 ) there is insufficient profit to distribute any dividends, dvit =  d™ — 0 , 
and (2 ) if there is no statutory provision for an additional dividend and the dividend to 
ordinary shares exceeds the minimum dividend, d™ =  d™ > ra*. Identical dividends 
to both classes of shares are paid in 28% of company years, whereby 1 2 % result from 
the absence of an additional dividend and 16% from dividend omissions. The voting 
right, which emerges after two years of unpaid minimum dividend, was effective in 
11% of the company years in the sample (Table II).
While accounting for some of the price differential between voting and non-voting 
shares, the different dividend regimes for preference and ordinary shares should not 
constitute the prime source of the price differential. This is because the dividend
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guarantee is defined in terms of the par value, which in this sample corresponds on 
average to 26.63% of market value. The minimum dividend makes up on average 
1.07% of the market value of preferred stock, the additional dividend only 0.37% of 
the market value. This is marginal compared to a price differential between voting 
and non-voting stock which equals on average 26% of the market value of preferred 
stock.
Economic significance and relative performance of dual-class shares
Although the first preference shares were introduced in Germany in the late 1930s, 
they only reached practical significance during the economic upswing in the eighties. 
In 1980 only 6.3% or 29 out of the listed companies on German stock exchanges were 
preference shares; the number increased to 17% or 90 listed companies in 1989. Table 
A.I. depicts that by the end of 1997 a total of 110 listed companies had preference 
shares outstanding, of which 71 list both ordinary and preference shares. A substantial 
increase in the number of companies with dual-class shares occurred during 1990, as 
Table A.II. shows. Fourteen companies entered the sample either through an initial 
public offering with dual-class shares or through a listing of a formerly unlisted class. 
The number of companies with dual-class shares has remained relatively constant over 
the subsequent seven years.
Figures 1 and 2 show cumulative return indices for both preference and ordinary 
shares during the 1988-1997 period. The indices include only return observations for 
companies in which both classes of shares were simultaneously listed, i.e., at each 
point in time the two return indices for the two classes of shares include the same 
number of companies. If only one of the two classes of shares is listed, the company is 
excluded from the index. The shares enter the index portfolios with an equal weight. 
In Figure 1 the return index only encompasses the capital gains of the two classes of 
shares, i.e.,
C'” = ft £E(i  + * 7 " )
t= t0 i = l
where r™'v = (P™'v — PJt-i)/ PJt-i • ^  ls striking that ordinary shares underperform 
preference shares in terms of capital gains by nearly 2 1 % even though they are already 
disadvantaged in terms of dividend payments. The return indices in Figure 2 include 
dividends and are calculated as above but with r™'v = (P™’v — P^-i +  <%t'V)/P it- 1 * 
The inclusion of dividend payments widens the return gap between the two classes 
of shares. The graph shows that preference shares outperform ordinary shares by 
46% over the sample period. The difference between the buy-and-hold returns of the
CHAPTER 3. VOTING PREMIUM 88
specification:
VPU = 0O + P^PYRh +  0 2CGu + 0 3(C G «f + PiNVit
+p5DAit +  p eDIa + P7VRu + 0%IXu +  +  £j( (3.9)
The econometric analysis consists of a fixed effects panel data model with heteroskedas- 
ticity and serial correlation consistent standard errors8  (Arellano [1990, 1993]). The 
fixed effects model seems an appropriate specification since the paper focuses on the 
specific set of German dual-class shares during 1988-1997 and not on a randomly 
drawn sample from a large population (Baltagi [1995]). Furthermore there are no 
time-invariant variables which would warrant a random-effects model. For a formal 
comparison of the random and fixed effects models the Hausman test is performed. 
This paper uses the forward orthogonal deviations operator (Arellano and Bover [1995] 
and Arellano [1993]) to obtain robust standard errors9. The transformed system is 
also the basis for an extended model which is used to obtain the Hausman test statistic 
which is robust to heteroskedasticity and serial correlation of arbitrary forms (Arel­
lano [1993]). Table III presents the results of the estimation under alternative spec­
ifications. Specification I and II include variables proxying for the degree of control 
leverage and differences in dividend rights. They only differ in the definition of the 
private benefit multiplier due to subsidiaries. Whereas specification I assumes a 25% 
shareholding as the critical level to confer control, specification II requires majority 
control. The two regressions show that the ratio of controlled equity to invested eq­
uity increases the value of the voting right and therefore the voting premium. This 
finding provides supportive evidence for Hypothesis 1 . Both the economic and sta­
tistical significance are superior if only shareholdings of more than 50% are included 
in the private benefit multiplier. This suggests that majority control implies a higher 
control value than a qualified minority holding of 25%. On average, a 1  unit increase 
in the private benefit multiplier of pyramiding results in an 8 % increase in the voting 
premium. The result can be interpreted in line with the finding of Megginson [1990] 
that subsidiaries exhibit a smaller voting premium than the sample average. In the 
light of this paper’s rationale, the finding might result from the fact that subsidiaries 
exhibit a lower degree of control leverage than holding companies. The impact of cap­
ital gearing, CGu, on the voting premium shows the expected behaviour and supports 
Hypothesis 2: for levels of gearing below 41.27% the voting premium increases in II,
8 Heteroskedasticity consistent estimation leads to a fairly sizeable change in the estimated stan­
dard errors of the slopes (especially for the coefficient estimate of I Xu), whereas a further correction 
for serial correlation changes the standard errors only slightly.
9The constant term is elimated by transforming the data with the forward orthogonal deviations 
operator.
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for higher levels the premium decreases. Contrary to the above conjectures, the ratio 
of non-voting stock to total equity is negatively correlated with the voting premium, 
though the coefficient estimate is insignificant. An explanation for this result might 
be an enhanced liquidity of preference shares which accompanies a higher fraction 
of nonvoting stock. The higher liquidity increases the value of nonvoting stock and 
reduces the voting premium.
The differential dividend payments to voting and non-voting stock have both an 
economically and statistically significant impact on the voting premium. If dividend 
arrears of more than one year are paid to preference shareholders, the voting premium 
decreases on average by about 27%. This is a substantial increase given that the 
average differential dividend only equals 3.5% in these company years. In years where 
the voting right is effective, i.e., where dividend arrears of at least two years are 
accumulated, the voting premium is on average 13.8% lower. For company years in 
which voting stock is put on par with non-voting stock in terms of dividends, the voting 
premium is on average 8 % higher. Almost as economically significant as payments of 
dividend arrears is membership in a stock market index, IX{t. If the preference share 
is a member of the DAX or MDAX, i.e., it is more liquid than the ordinary share, 
the price differential is about 27% lower on average (specification III and IV). An 
indication that the ratio of non-voting stock to total equity might proxy for liquidity 
instead of control value gives the comparison of I and III. The standard errors of the 
coefficient estimate are higher in III than in I confirming the correlation between NVu 
and IX it. The Hausman test for specifications I and II does not reject the hypothesis of 
no correlation between individual effects and regressors. Therefore the coefficients 
from the fixed and random effects model (not reported) do not differ systematically. 
For specifications III and IV the Hausman tests comes closer to rejection of the null 
hypothesis of no correlation between individual effects and regressors. The difference 
between the coefficient estimates of the fixed and random effects model (not reported) 
is restricted to the ratio of non-voting stock and the dummy variable for an identical 
dividend to preference and ordinary shares, D Iit. The standard errors of the random 
effects model are substantially smaller than the standard errors of the fixed effects 
model (except for the dividend dummy variables) suggesting a rather low power for 
the test. The fixed effects estimator seems more appropriate, since despite the low 
power, the hypothesis of no correlation is rejected at the 10% significance level. The 
random effects model is therefore likely to suffer from inconsistency due to omitted 
variables.
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Transfers of corporate controls pre- and post 1995
In order to analyse the impact of the regulatory change on the payoff to minority 
voting shareholders (Hypotheses 3-5), the econometric set-up additionally includes 
ownership variables, i.e., dummy variables for simple majority control SMu (rrjj > 
0.5) or qualified majority control QMit (rrfj > 0.75). Furthermore, we include the 
percentage ownership of non-voting stock of the largest voting shareholder, ONa10:
VP« = /30 + 0 ,3  Mit + P2ONit + 03CGit + P^CGuf +  05 W *
+(36DAit +  07DIit + 0qV Rit +  @gIXi t +  /ij +  £j,(3.10)
The regressions are run for the subperiods 1988-1994 and 1995-1997 in order to com­
pare the coefficient estimates before and after the introduction of the Takeover Code 
(Table IV). A structural break between the two subperiods is confirmed by the Chow 
test, which rejects the hypothesis of equal parameter estimates for the two periods 
at the 99.9% confidence level for both specifications. As put forward in Hypotheses 
3 and 5, the coefficient estimates for majority and qualified majority control change 
from a negative sign during 1988-1994 to a positive sign during 1995-1997. Under 
the mandatory bid rule minority shareholders of voting stock are able to capture a 
fraction of the bargaining surplus of the controlling blockholder through the tender op­
tion. Before the new regulatory structure, however, a majority shareholder thwarted 
any competition for control and therefore led to a lower value of voting stock. The 
latter finding is in fine with international evidence for Sweden, Italy and the US which 
establishes a firm negative fink between majority control and the value of the voting 
right in the absence of a mandatory bid rule. The fact that the coefficient estimates 
are small and not significant for simple majority ownership highlights the presumption 
that competition for control is less pronounced in Germany than in the Anglo-Saxon 
capital markets. Anticipation of the new corporate governance rules might also have 
blurred the effects of majority control prior to 1995. A third possible explanation for 
this finding might be the instability of ownership structure over time. Current major­
ity control might not be a good proxy for possible competition for control, since the 
majority position might easily dissolve in the near future or vice versa. Franks and 
Mayer [1997] report that in the 4 year period 1988-1991 about 4% of companies with 
concentrated ownership became widely held, and for 8 % the reverse was true. The 
difference in the coefficient estimates for simple and qualified majority control in I and 
II highlights the value of a qualified minority block of 25% which can be used to block 
statutory changes. The small economic and statistical significance of simple majority
10The private benefit multiplier due to pyramiding was only retrieved for the 1991-1994 period.
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control suggests that there might still be competition for a 25% block of votes. Only 
a qualified majority of more than 75% thwarts competition for control and results in a 
statistically significant 7% decrease in the voting premium. The Hausman test high­
lights that the random effects estimator (not reported) seems equally applicable for I 
and II, since the hypothesis of no correlation between individual effects and regressor 
cannot be rejected.
Majority control gains in economic and statistical significance in the post 1995 pe­
riod where the presence of a majority owner increases the voting premium by 32.8% 
(simple majority) and 28.9% (qualified majority) respectively. The overall explana­
tory power for the second subperiod is correspondingly higher, and explains up to 
42.40% of the variation of the voting premium in specification IV. Shareholdings of 
non-voting stock by the largest voting stockholder have a negative and statistically 
significant effect on the voting premium. A 1 % increase in the holding of non-voting 
stock, decreases the voting premium by an amount of 0.6% to 1.3%. This lends sup­
port to Hypothesis 4 and suggests that the main blockholder acts more strongly in the 
interests of its non-voting shareholders (e.g., through prompt repayment of dividend 
arrears, conversion decisions or bargaining over a takeover price for preference shares), 
the higher its own non-voting equity stake. The economic significance is, however, mi­
nor which might reflect the small legal leeway to discriminate between the two classes 
of shares. It is also noteworthy that the impact of index membership of preference 
shares on the voting premium doubles from 1988-1994 to 1995-1997. This might be a 
reflection of the growing demand for index shares from index funds which have mul­
tiplied in Germany during the last years. This result could therefore extend Shleifer 
[1986]’s finding of significant positive abnormal stock return after inclusion in the S&P 
500 to long-term evidence of positive valuation effects due to index membership. The 
remaining coefficient estimates are similar to the ones during the subperiod 1991-1994 
(Table III). An exception is the coefficient estimate of the ratio of non-voting stock 
which becomes positive (though not significant) during 1995-1997 indicating that it 
might proxy for the control value (Hypothesis 1) rather than for liquidity differences. 
The dummy variables for dividend payments lose significance in the post- 1995 period. 
This might be due to the short time period in which expectations about dividend pay­
ments might weaken the valuation differential between years with superior and equal 
dividend to preference shares. For specifications III and IV the fixed effects estima­
tor is preferred to the random effects model, since the hypothesis of no correlation 
between individual effects and regressors is rejected at the 99.99% confidence level. 
The difference between the coefficient estimates of the fixed and random effects model 
(not reported) is large, although there is no change in the signs of the coefficient esti­
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mates. The random effects coefficient estimates for majority control, capital gearing 
and index membership of preference shares are only half in absolute size compared 
to those of the fixed effects estimator. The coefficient estimate of the voting right 
dummy, however, becomes more than twice as large as in the fixed effects model. 
The standard errors of the random effects model are substantially smaller than the 
standard errors of the fixed effects model suggesting a rather low power for the test. 
The fact that the hypothesis of no systematic variation between the two estimators 
is nevertheless significantly rejected, points to serious inconsistency of the random 
effects estimates. This finding is corroborated by a correlation of —0.68 between the 
individual firm-specific effects and the linear function of regressors, Corr(ui,Xi{3), in 
the regression for simple majority control and of —0.61 in the regression for qualified 
majority control.
Effect of acceptance of Takeover Code on voting premium of signatory
The endogeneity of the acceptance decision of the Takeover Code allows the testing 
of the impact on the voting premium of the signatory in both a time series and 
cross-sectional dimension (Hypothesis 6 ). We include the dummy variable ‘TCu 
equal to one if the company signed the Code and zero otherwise in the econometric 
specification. The regression makes use of the full sample of observations during 
1988-199711.
VPit =  A, +  0iTCit + 02ONit + 03CGit +  (3n(CGh)2 +  psNVu
+ / ? 6  DAit +  PjDIit +  P3V  Rn +  PglXa +  Hi + £j,(3.11)
The econometric results in Table IV provide evidence in favour of Hypothesis 6 . The 
coefficient estimate for the dummy variable lTCu carries a negative coefficient esti­
mate, which is statistically significant at the 99.99% significance level. The acceptance 
of the Code is on average associated with a substantial 14.6% decline in the voting 
premium. This result lends further indirect support to the multiplier effect of pyra­
miding analysed in section [3.2.1]. It also provides an additional explanation for the 
out performance of preference shares (see Figure 1 and 2). Returns to preference shares 
start to exceed returns to ordinary shares between 1994 and 1995. The underperfor- 
mance of ordinary shares thus coincides with the introduction of the Takeover Code 
and might at least partially result from lower expected control benefits.
Because of the voluntary nature of the Code one might suspect that unobservable 
characteristics of the acceptance decision are correlated with unobservable factors of
11 Because of the period-specific effects of the ownership variables we omit the dummy variables 
for majority control.
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the voting premium, resulting in an inconsistent estimate for TCu12. This objec­
tion can be refuted on two accounts. First, the dummy variable TCu is only semi- 
endogenous in the sense that companies could decide about acceptance only since the 
introduction of the Code in 1995, i.e., the non-acceptance during 1988-1994 must be 
considered exogenous. Second, we construct an instrumental variable (IV) estimator 
for the acceptance decision in order to analyse a potential inconsistency resulting from 
the endogeneity during the 1995-1997 period. Hoffmann-Burchardi [1999] shows that 
companies which are constituents of major stock market indices and companies in 
industries with a high overall acceptance rate have been more inclined to sign the 
Code. On the other hand, companies with a controlling blockholder were found to 
be more reluctant to accept the Code. Using membership in the DAX or MDAX, 
the percentage of acceptance per industry, and the presence of controlling shareholder 
together with the other exogenous variables in [??] we construct an IV estimator for 
TCit during 1995-1997. We find that the coefficient estimate of the nonlinear IV 
estimator equals —15.34% and is still significant at the 99% confidence level. The dif­
ference in the coefficient estimates between the IV estimator and the OLS estimator is 
very small pointing to only minor inconsistency of the OLS estimates. If it all, taking 
account of the partial endogeneity of the acceptance decision strengthens rather than 
impairs the empirical support in favour of Hypothesis 6 . The fact that the coefficient 
estimate for index membership of preference shares becomes insignificant could result 
from collinearity between Code acceptance and index membership. The Hausman 
test statistic indicates no systematic difference between the fixed and random effects 
estimator for this specification.
3.4 Conclusion
The chapter has investigated the determinants of the voting premium, the price differ­
ential between voting and non-voting shares. It shows that the price differential is a 
reflection of the value of controlled assets per unit invested in voting stock and the way 
in which minority voting and non-voting shareholders participate in transfers of con­
trol. Both factors are influenced by the existing regulation of corporate governance. 
The chapter studies how a change in corporate governance rules in Germany in 1995 
affects the voting premium through these two channels. The German stock exchange 
introduced a voluntary Takeover Code in 1995 which contains the mandatory bid rule.
12 One might argue that private information of the management about future takeover activity 
detains management to sign the Takeover Code. At the same time, management makes use of this 
information by buying voting stock and by short-selling non-voting stock thus increasing the voting 
premium.
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The mandatory bid rule stipulates that a party which purchases a controlling interest 
of another listed company’s voting equity is obliged to make an offer to the remaining 
target shareholders.
In a first step, the chapter shows how mechanisms to separate control from cash­
flow rights translate into a higher voting premium. Non-voting stock, debt and a 
pyramiding structure of subsidiaries are all instruments that increase the available 
capital stock without diluting control rights. The amount of controlled assets increases 
per unit of voting stock. In a second step the article seeks to cast light on the 
relationship between takeover regulation and the voting premium. The chapter focuses 
on the regulatory change from two different points of view: first, the effect on the 
voting premium as a result of an individual acceptance decision and second, the overall 
change in the payoff to minority voting and non-voting shareholders in corporate 
control transactions.
First, acceptance of the Code affects the premium through its effect on the amount 
of controlled assets. The mandatory bid rule imposes a takeover bid for 100% of 
the target’s stock. Equity participations in subsidiaries are thus likely to surpass the 
threshold which is required for control. This reduces the extent to which a pyramiding 
structure of subsidiaries can be used to increase the control value of voting stock. The 
empirical analysis lends support to this hypothesis, since it shows that the coefficient 
estimate of the dummy variable for acceptance of the Code carries a negative sign.
Second, the chapter studies how the differential payoff to voting and non-voting mi­
nority shareholders changes in sale-of-control transactions with and without a manda­
tory bid requirement. The mandatory bid rule requires a tender offer to minority 
shareholders after a change in majority control. In the absence of the mandatory bid 
rule shareholders of voting and non-voting stock experience identical payoffs when 
a majority block changes hands. The existence of a majority shareholder tends to 
preclude any superior payoff for voting minority shareholders. Under the mandatory 
bid rule, however, voting minority shareholders can participate in a sale-of-control 
transaction on the same terms as the controlling blockholder. Through the manda­
tory bid rule the minority voting shareholders are equipped with the option to sell 
their shares to the new controlling party at the same price as the blockholder. Small 
voting shareholders are able to free-ride on the bargaining efforts of the controlling 
blockholder. The presence of a majority shareholder can therefore be beneficial to 
minority voting shareholders. In order to test for the effect of the two regulatory sce­
narios, we study how the voting premium is related to majority control in Germany
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during the two subperiods 1988-1994 and 1995-1997. In fact, the empirical analysis 
shows that the coefficient estimate for majority control changes from a negative to a 
positive sign from the first to the second subperiod. This reflects the change in the 
way in which minority voting and non-voting shareholders participate in corporate 
control transactions under the new regulatory structure.
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3.5 Tables and Figures
TABLE I
DIVIDEND REGIMES OF PREFERENCE SHARES
The table juxtaposes the different divident regimes of preference shares with and without additional 
dividends. The priority dividend is denoted by m*, the excess dividend by x* and the dividend to 
ordinary shares by d\t.
Payoff for preference shares d™ Number 
of firms
Average dividend 
in % of par value
I Dividend regime with no additional dividend 
d™ =  (mi | dvit ^  +  (dvit | d°it > m<) 16 771 =  5.8 x =  0
II
Dividend regimes with additional dividend
dff = (mi | dvit ^  m{) +  (d\t +  x{ \ dvit >  m{) 62 m =  5.0 x =  2.1
III dit =  (mi 1 d\t ^  mi)+ 8 in =  5.0 Xki €  [1; 4]
E L i «  +  xki 1 ^  d\t >  djE_lt.) where
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FIGURES I AND II
Figure 1 and 2 show cumulative return indices for both preference and ordinary shares 
during the 1988-1997 period. The indices include only return observations for companies 
in which both classes of shares were simultaneously listed, i.e., at each point in time the 
two return indices for the two classes of shares include the same number of companies. 
If only one of the two classes of shares is listed, the company is excluded from the index. 
The shares enter the index portfolios with an equal weight. In Figure 1 the return index 
only encompasses the capital gains of the two classes of shares, i.e.,
IIn v ' v =  ft * £ ( i + C ’)
t= to t=l
where r ™ 'v = ( P ™ ,v -  /  Pit-i- The return indices in Figure 2 are calculated as
above but include dividend payments, i.e., r™'v =  (P™’v — P^-i +  d™’v)/Pit-i-
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TABLE II 
S u m m a r y  s t a t i s t i c s
Variable Mean SD Min Max Obs
Voting premium V P 0.263 0.456 -0.573 2.809 601
Simple majority control SM 0.730 0.444 0 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 764
Qualified majority control QM 0.275 0.447 0 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 764
Blockholding of preferred stock 
of largest voting stockholder O N 0.049 0.167 0 . 0 0 0 0.980 763
Capital gearing CG 0.386 0.263 0 . 0 0 0 1.720 684
Control/Cash-flow with x^i+i > 0.25 PYo.25 1.410 0.704 1 . 0 0 0 5.997 332
Control/Cash-flow with iEtjt+i > 0.5 PYo.5 1.172 0.428 1 . 0 0 0 5.896 332
Ratio of preferred to total equity N V 0.283 0.177 0 . 0 0 0 0.500 796
Acceptance of Takeover Code TC 0.077 0.267 0 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 880
Preferred member of M(DAX) I X 0.113 0.316 0 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 880
Payment of dividend arrears DA 0.056 0.230 0 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 625
Equal nonzero dividend to preferred 
and ordinary stock D I 0.115 0.320 0 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 625
Voting right effective V R 0.109 0.312 0 . 0 0 0 1 . 0 0 0 705
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TABLE III
S o u r c e s  o f  p r iv a t e  b e n e f i t  m u l t i p l i e r s  f o r  s u b p e r i o d  1991-1994
The table presents the coefficient estimates of a fixed-effects panel data model 
for the voting premium in the subperiod 1991-1994. The standard errors are ro­
bust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of arbitrary forms. The p-values 
are reported below the coefficient estimates in parentheses. The Hausman test, 
also robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, is obtained as a Wald test 
in an extended model as suggested by Arellano [1993]. The first set of explana­
tory variables capital gearing CG, nonvoting stock NV  and the private benefit 
multiplier due to pyramiding PY  is designed to capture the degree to which a 
company has exploited means to separate control from cash-flow rights. Two 
dummy variables take account of differences in dividend payments between the 
two classes of stock: DA equals one if the preference share is paid dividend 
arrears of more than one year, and zero otherwise, and DI  equals one if prefer­
ence and ordinary shares receive the same nonzero dividend, and zero otherwise. 
The specification also includes the dummy variable VR  for the years in which 
the voting right of preference shares is effective. In order to capture liquidity 
differences between the two classes of stock we include a dummy variable IX  if 
the preference share is a member of a stock market index.
I II III IV
Capital Gearing CG
(CG)2
0.975
(0.053)
-1.160
(0.019)
1.016
(0.045)
-1.231
(0.013)
0.975
(0.054)
-1.160
(0.019)
1.016
(0.046)
-1.233
(0.013)
Nonvoting stock N V -1.226
(0.076)
-1.254
(0.168)
-1.225
(0.180)
-1.255
(0.169)
Pyramiding
x  =  0.25 
z =  0.5
PYO. 25
P Y o.5
0.045
(0.076)
0.082
(0.005)
0.046
(0.072)
0.084
(0.004)
Dividends
d t f  =
=  e f t  >  0
DA
D I
-0.266
(0.068)
0.079
(0.000)
-0.292
(0.044)
0.096
(0.000)
-0.266
(0.069)
0.079
(0.000)
-0.294
(0.044)
0.097
(0.000)
Voting right VR -0.138
(0.051)
-0.132
(0.054)
-0.137
(0.051)
-0.132
(0.056)
Liquidity IX -0.270
(0.000)
-0.290
(0.000)
Obs 208 208 208 208
R2  (in %) 15.30 16.67 16.02 17.50
Prob>F 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
Hausman test 1.32 1.37 1.73 1.84
Prob>F 0.242 0 . 2 2 1 0.093 0.072
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TABLE IV
POSSIBLE DIFFERENTIAL PAYOFF TO MINORITY ORDINARY AND PREFERENCE SHAREHOLDERS 
UNDER DIFFERENT TAKEOVER REGULATIONS
Possible differential 
payoff under
Type of control transfer 
sale of share stake open market purchases
uncontested contested uncontested contested
Market Rule no no no yes
Mandatory Bid Rule yes yes no yes
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TABLE V
I m p a c t  o f  t h e  t a k e o v e r  c o d e  o n  t h e  v o t i n g  p r e m i u m
The table presents the coefficient estimates of a fixed-effects panel data model for the voting premium in 
the subperiods 1988-1994, 1995-1997 and for the full sample 1988-1997. The standard errors are robust to 
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation of arbitrary forms. The p-values are reported below the coefficient 
estimates in parentheses. The Hausman test, also robust to heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, is 
obtained as a Wald test in an extended model as suggested by Arellano [1993]. The first two sets of 
specifications (I-IV) are designed to demonstrate the changing role of minority voting and non-voting 
shareholders in transfers of control before and after the introduction of the mandatory bid rule in 1995. In 
addition to the specifications of Table III, the regressions include variables of ownership structure, simple 
majority control SM  (xjj >  0.5) and qualified majority control QM  (xg >  0.75), and the percentage 
holding of non-voting stock by largest voting stockholder (x™). Specification V encompasses observations 
of the full sample period and includes a d um m y  variable for companies which signed the Takeover Code.
Time period 1988-1994 1995-1997 Full sample
I II III IV V
Ownership
xv0 > 0.5 SM -0.006(0.894) 0.328(0.043)
XVQ > 0.75
nv
0
QM
ON
Takeover Code TC
-1.318
(0.008)
-0.070 0.289
(0.053) (0.025)
-1.333
(0.007)
-0.613
(0 .0 0 0 )
-0.861
(0 .0 0 0 )
-0.269
(0.025)
-0.146
(0 .0 0 0 )
Capital Gearing CG 
(<CG)2
0.429
(0.025)
-0.624
(0.000)
0.335
(0.067)
-0.559
(0.001)
0.945
(0.037)
-1.063
(0.013)
0.846
(0.034)
-0.911
(0.018)
0.470
(0.005)
-0.561
(0.002)
Non-voting stock N V -0.841
(0.089)
-1.073
(0.035)
0.007
(0.994)
0.399
(0.709)
-0.462
(0.142)
Dividends 
d™ =  Y^rrii
<$” =  d?( > 0
DA
D I
-0.227
(0.048)
0.104
(0.024)
-0.233
(0.042)
0.118
(0.020)
-0.054
(0.338)
0.039
(0.699)
-0.038
(0.544)
0.033
(0.661)
-0.124
(0.054)
0.057
(0.284)
Voting Right VR -0.037
(0.646)
-0.046
(0.589)
-0.049
(0.599)
-0.054
(0.563)
-0.183
(0.001)
Liquidity IX - 0 . 1 2 2
(0.286)
-0.123
(0.296)
-0.214
(0.000)
- 0 . 2 1 0
(0.000)
- 0 . 0 1 1
(0.844)
Obs 286 286 181 181 490
R2  (in %) 11.79 13.36 31.86 42.40 23.57
Prob>F 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0
Hausman test 1.09 1.27 4.26 6 . 6 6 1.27
Prob>F 0.373. 0.252 0 . 0 0 0 0 . 0 0 0 0.2531
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3.6 A ppendix
3.6.1 A nnotations to  multiplier effects
Effect of vertical versus horizontal concatenation  of subsidiaries: The deriva­
tive of P B M  with respect to the equity position of a given subsidiary S]^+1 equals
dpM e s 1 n;=0 Hj+i s£ r  -  nU iXo1 s?1
g g i o + 1  D 2
where D2 corresponds to the denominator of the derivative. Correspondingly,
dP B M  _  Si=0_n3=0^ ££+l_Sfc=r_^ _^ i^o+^ Jo+2n^ o^ £jwSi=0_Sfc^ r_£t^  
- ^ T T -  J J 2
It can be easily seen that d P B M /d S £ +2 >  dPBM /dS% +1. ■
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3.6.2 Annotations to D ata
TABLE A.I.
TIME SERIES OF GERMAN DUAL-CLASS SHARE COMPANIES FROM 1988-1997 
The table provides an overview of the number of dual-class share companies in Germany during 
1988-1997. It lists the entries and exits of companies to and from dual class share companies during 
the sample period. The abbreviations in the ‘Type’ column denote the respective modes of entry 
and exit: Companies enter the sample of dual-class shares if previously unlisted ordinary shares 
are introduced on the stock exchange (LO), previously unlisted preference shares are introduced on 
the stock exchange (LP) or in case of an initial public offering with both classes of shares (LO/LP). 
Companies exit the sample if the company is fully acquired by another company and both classes 
of shares are delisted (TO) or preference shares are converted into ordinary shares (CV).
Date
3 1 /1 2 /8 7
3 1 /1 2 /8 8
Number
40
40
Entry Type
3 1 /1 2 /8 9  46
3 1 /1 2 /9 0  60
BMW LP
Bluthardt LO/LP
Hugo Boss LO
GEA LO/LP
Hertel LO
VK Mtihlen LP
Westag h  Getalit LP
B.U.S. Berzelius LO/LP
Deutsche Beteiligungs-AG LO
Hornblower Fischer LO/LP
Kunert LO
Macrotron LP
MLP LO
NAK Stoffe LP
Nordstem Allg. Vers. LP
Pegasus Beteiligungen LO/LP
SAP LP
Sartorius LO/LP
SEMA Group Systems LO
Sixt LO
Siidzucker LP
Glunz LO
Heidelberger Zement LP
KIH LO
Kniirr-Mechanik LO
New-York Hbg. Gummi LP
Pongs &; Zahn LP
Rhon-Klinikum LO
SPAR Handels-AG LO
Exit Type
Massa CV
3 1 /1 2 /9 1  68
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... CONTINUATION TABLE A.I.
TIME SERIES OF GERMAN DUAL-CLASS SHARE COMPANIES FROM 1988-1997
D ate N um ber Entry T ype E xit T ype
31/12/91 68
F. Reichelt LP Wanderer Werke CV
Walter Bau LO/LP
31/12/92 69
Heilit & Woerner LO/LP Friedrich Deckel 
Hartmann &; Braun 
YMOS
TO
TO
CV
31/12/93 67
Adolf Ahlers 
Ehlebracht 
Frbhlich Bau 
Wella
LP
LP
LP
LO
31/12/94 71
Moenus LP Deutsche Babcock CV
NORDAG LO/LP NAK Stoffe CV
31/12/95 71
Metro 1 LP Asko TO
Compudent LO Deutsche Beteiligungen CV
Biotest LO Kaufhof TO
FMC LP Lufthansa CV
Gerry Weber LO Stuttgarter Hofbrau CV
Vogt Electronic LO Tarkett Pegulan 
FAG Kugelfischer
CV
CV
31/12/96 70
Deinbock LO/LP Bluthardt CV
Fresenius LO Leffers CV/TO
Henkel LO VK Miihlen CV
Mobel Walther LO
31/12/97 71
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TABLE A.II.
NUMBER OF DUAL-CLASS SAMPLE COMPANIES DURING TRADING DAYS IN 1988-1997
Time Number of dual-class 
shares traded
Time Number of dual-class 
shares traded
3-14/10/88 40 1-14/10/93 68
2-13/10/89 41 3-14/10/94 71
1-12/10/90 59 2-13/10/95 71
1-14/10/91 68 1-14/10/96 69
1-14/10/92 69 1-14/10/97 71
Total 627
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TABLE A.III.
TIME SERIES OF DIVIDEND PAYMENTS TO PREFERENCE SHARES FROM 1988-1997
The table shows the percentage of cases in each year during the sample period 1988-1997 in which 
voting and non-voting preference shares received differential and identical dividends respectively. The 
dividend payment to preference shares can exceed the dividend payment to ordinary shares in three 
cases: 1. preference shares obtain an additional dividend with respect to ordinary shares, d™  =  
d \t +  X u, if the dividend to ordinary shares exceeds the minimum dividend, d±t >  ra*; 2. preference 
shares obtain the cumulated minimum dividend arrears for more than one year, d™  =  but
there is insufficient profit for ordinary shares to obtain an identical amount, i.e. d \t 
the minimum dividend is paid to preference shares, d™  =  rrii , but there is insufficient profit for 
ordinary shares to obtain an identical amount, d \t < m u .  Both classes of shares receive the same 
dividends if 1. there is insufficient profit to distribute any dividends {d%t — d™  =  0, and 2. if there 
is no statutory provision for an additional dividend and he dividend to ordinary shares exceeds the 
minimum dividend, i.e .d \t =  d™  >  m;.
Year I. Differential dividend  
Adit =  Adit ^
dvit >  rm dvit < m  
d™ = dvit + x it d™ = Z t™ i
Adit ^  m i
dvit < mit 
d% =  rm
II. Identical dividend  
Adu =  0
>  rm dvu =  0
>  "li d% =  0
Total
1988 0.64 0.08 0 . 0 0 0.18 0 . 1 0 1 . 0 0
1989 0.61 0 . 1 0 0 . 0 2 0 . 2 0 0.07 1 . 0 0
1990 0 . 6 8 0.04 0.04 0.17 0.08 1 . 0 0
1991 0.75 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 1 0 0 . 1 2 1 . 0 0
1992 0.69 0.03 0 . 0 1 0 . 1 0 0.17 1 . 0 0
1993 0.59 0 . 0 1 0 . 0 1 0 . 1 0 0.28 1 . 0 0
1994 0.56 0.08 0.04 0 . 1 0 0 . 2 1 1 . 0 0
1995 0.67 0.03 0.03 0.08 0.19 1 . 0 0
1996 0.55 0.13 0.06 0 . 1 1 0.15 1 . 0 0
1997 0.62 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.16 1 . 0 0
Pooled 0.64 0.06 0.03 0 . 1 2 0.16 1 . 0 0
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TABLE A.IV.
REGIMES FOR VARYING ADDITIONAL DIVIDENDS
The table shows the structure of varying additional dividend regimes. The additional dividend 
can either decrease with the dividend paid on ordinary shares (I. degressive additional dividend) 
or increase (II. progressive additional dividend).
Code Name Nominal share value Minimum dividend
(in % of par value)
(I) Degressive additional dividend: x ^ i >  % k+ u
KSB3 KSB 50 0.04
(0.02 | 0.04 < d \ t <0.1) +  (0.015 | 0.1 < d \ t <  0.14) +  (0.01 \d&> 0.14)
KKK3 Kiihnle, Kopp &Kausch 50 0.04
(0.02 | 0.04 « % t <0.1) +  (0.015 | 0.1 <d£ <  0.14) +  (0.01 \<%t >  0.14)
WKM3 WKM Terrain- u. Bet. 5 0.07
(0.02 | 0.05 <d% t <0.09) 4- (0.11 -  d&  | 0.09 < d ? t <  0.11)
(II) Progressive additional dividend: X ki <  % k+ ii
ASK3 ASKO 50 0.05
(0.02 | 0.05 <  d \ t <  0.16) +  (0.03 | 0.16 <  (%t  <  0.24) +  (0.04 | dvit >  0.24)
BIN3 Binding Brauerei 50 0.04
(0.01 | 0.04 <  d \ t <  0.12) +  (0.02 | d vit >  0.12)
LEF3 Leffers 50 0.05
(0.01 | 0.05 <  d \ t <  0.12) +  (0.02 | d vit >  0.12)
STG3 Stuttgarter Hofbr&u 50 0.04
(0.01 | 0.04 < d vit <0.08) +  (0.02 |d “i t >  0.08)
PEG3 Tarkett Pegulan 50 0.06
(0.01 | 0.06 < d v t < 0 .12) +  (0.02 \d°i t >  0.12)
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TABLE A.V.
DATA DESCRIPTION AND SOURCES
Variable Description Source
Voting premium Percentage discount of ordinary shares 
over preference shares
Datastream International
Majority control Dummy=l if firm is majority controlled, 
0 otherwise
Hoppenstedt 
Aktienfuhrer 1989-1998
Qualified majority Dummy=l if firm is controlled with a 
qualified majority of 75%, 0 otherwise
Hoppenstedt 
Aktienfuhrer 1989-1998
Blockholding Percentage shareholding of preferred Hoppenstedt
of preferreds shares by largest shareholder of 
ordinary shares
Aktienfuhrer 1989-1998
Capital gearing Ratio of debt over total assets Annual reports
Hoppenstedt 
Aktienfuhrer 1989-1998 
Datastream International
Control/Cash-flow Ratio of total equity under control to Hoppenstedt
with x  >  0.25 equity investment in holding company 
(Ass.: control in a subsidiary is achieved 
with a share stake of more than 25%)
Aktienfuhrer 1992-1995
Control/Cash-flow Ratio of total equity under control to Hoppenstedt
with x  >  0.5 equity investment in holding company 
(Ass.: control in a subsidiary is achieved 
with a shareholding of more than 50%)
Aktienfuhrer 1992-1995
Ratio of preferreds Ratio of preferred equity to 
total equity
Datastream International
Acceptance of Dummy—1 if company has signed Ubernahmekommission
Takeover Code the Takeover Code, 0 otherwise der Deutsche Borse
Preferred member Dummy=1 if preferred share is member Borsenzeitung of
of M(DAX) of either MDAX or DAX, 0 otherwise September 1988-1997
Payment of Dummy=1 if accumulated dividend arrears Datastream International
dividend arrears are paid to preference shares, 0 otherwise and Borsenzeitung
Zero dividend Dummy=l for dividend omission Datastream International
to preferred 0 otherwise and Borsenzeitung
Chapter 4
Clustering of Initial Public  
Offerings, Information R evelation  
and Underpricing
4.1 Introduction
While underpricing and long-term underperformance of initial public offerings (IPOs) 
have received considerable attention in the literature, the timing of the IPO decision 
has only recently been the subject of theoretical investigation. This is surprising since 
there exists ample empirical evidence that the market for IPOs is subject to dramatic 
swings. ‘Hot’ phases with an unusually high volume of offerings and severe underpric­
ing alternate with ‘cold’ periods which are characterized by lower issuance activity 
and less pronounced underpricing. In addition, there seems to be some evidence on 
inter-industry variation in the timing of IPO decisions. This chapter develops a model 
to examine the driving forces for these evident swings in issuance activity.
The modeling of clustering behaviour has become increasingly important in fi­
nancial economics (see Devenow and Welch [1996] and Brunnermeier [1997] for an 
overview). This chapter is related to herding models with information externalities 
by focusing on the revelation of a common-value component in the wake of price 
determination. A common value factor might represent the prospects for a specific 
industry or the overall state of the economy. The IPO price of one firm serves as a 
feed-back mechanism to other IPOs since it can reveal information about the com­
mon value factor and therefore change the value of other firms. In the presence 
of costly information acquisition and asymmetric information between a risk-averse 
owner-entrepreneur and risk-neutral investors, news about the common value factor 
can contribute to the clustering of IPOs in two ways. First, the risk of remaining 
private can increase in the wake of new information and induce the entrepreneur to
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sell-off his firm to risk-neutral investors. Second, investors might refrain from renewed 
information production and free-ride on the implicit information conveyed by the price 
of a previous IPO. Because investors do not incur information production costs their 
valuation might increase to a larger extent than the entrepreneur’s private valuation 
and therefore lead to a higher probability of a second IPO.
4.1.1 Empirical evidence on IPO clustering
The IPO activity of biotechnology firms at the London Stock Exchange in the 1990s 
provides some anecdotal evidence on the bunching of issues according to industries. 
The IPO of British Bio-Technology in mid 1992 was followed by the flotation of 
Enviromed, Anagen and Celsis International in 1993. Another recent example is the 
wave of IPOs of fashion designers. After the successful IPO of Italian designer house 
Gucci, US competitor Donna Karan launched its stock market floatation in June 1996, 
followed by Ralph Lauren which went public in mid 1997.
In a recent paper Helwege and Liang [1996] document that in the US 575 firms 
went public in the hot issue year of 1983, whereas in the cold issue year of 1988 the 
number of firms shrunk to a quarter of the 1983 figure. Underpricing (the price run-up 
from the issue price to the secondary market price) averaged 14.6% in 1983 and only 
6 .6 % in 1988. Ljungqvist [1997] also reports that a positive macroeconomic climate 
raises the average amount of underpricing. Furthermore, there exists evidence that 
hot issue markets typically arise from the bunching of IPO activity in a few industries 
(Ritter [1984], Helwege and Liang [1996]). The fact that four of the two-digit SIC 
categories1 represent over a half of the volume of the 1983 sample, indicates that hot 
IPO markets are, at least to some extent, related to industry-specific shocks (Helwege 
and Liang [1996]).
Table A.I and A.II give further evidence that issuance activity is clustered in 
both a time series and cross-sectional dimension. The tables depict the number and 
percentage of IPOs in two-digit SIC categories in the US during 1975-1984 respectively. 
Both tables manifest a strong bunching of IPOs in 1983 and to a smaller extent 
in 1981 and 1984. Table A.I. shows that the sign test of an equal proportion of 
IPOs during the 10-year period can be rejected for almost all industries during 1983. 
Similarly the percentage of IPOs in 1983 is for most industries more than two standard 
deviations away from the cross-sectional sample average. Cross-sectional differences 
are more evident in Table A.II. Electrics and gas (SIC 49) as well as food and kindred
1 Two-digit SIC categories represent the second level of the US industrial classification scheme 
comprising 81 industrial subsections, see Appendix A.I.
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products (SIC 2 0 ) exhibit substantial cross-sectional deviations from the sample means 
in 1980 and 1975, 1976 and 1978 respectively. Similarly, a large percentage of IPOs 
in fabricated metal products (SIC 34) took place during 1978-1980 counter to the 
overall inter-industry concentration in 1983. Other industries with industry-specific 
timing behaviour are transportation equipment (SIC 37) and oil and gas extraction 
(SIC 13) and to a smaller extent wholesale of non-durable products (SIC 51) as well 
as instruments and related products (SIC 38).
4.1.2 Overview
While these examples might suggest irrational herding behaviour, this chapter ex­
plains the clustering of IPOs by the release of positive industry (or economy-wide) 
information in the wake of an IPO . 2  The chapter develops a theoretical model which 
is used to analyse a sequence of going-public decisions3. It identifies conditions un­
der which the likelihood of a second IPO increases after a firm first in the industry 
has gone public (‘hot issue markets’). The model features two firms in an industry, 
which are owned by utility-maximising risk-averse entrepreneurs. The entrepreneur 
goes public if the utility he derives from the risky cash-flows of the firm are smaller 
than the (safe) proceeds he obtains by selling the firm to risk-neutral investors (who 
individually purchase only an arbitrarily small fraction of the firm’s stock). Since it is 
assumed that the entrepreneur first sells his firm to an underwriter who can diversify 
risk over time, the entrepreneur does not bear any risk which might arise because of 
insufficient demand for the issue4.
The overall firm value depends -in a multiplicative way- on a firm-specific and an 
industry-wide factor. The owner-entrepreneur only knows the realization of the firm- 
specific factor, but has no private information about industry prospects. Investors 
know neither the firm quality nor the industry prospects, but can purchase a noisy 
signal about the absolute firm value, the product of the industry- and firm-specific 
component. In this setting investors can be better informed about the state of the 
industry than the entrepreneur. This does not seem an unreasonable assumption, since 
investors such as managed funds or banks who consistently monitor the competitive
2 An example for the practical significance of industry information for the clustering of IPOs 
provides a quotation from Neil Austin, new issue specialist with KPMG: ’’The Granada/Forte bid 
focused attention on the sector and this has helped the successful debuts of Macdonald Hotels and 
Millennium & Copthorne in April [1996]”.
3While the basic model assumes that the ordering of the IPO decision is exogenous, the last part 
of the paper shows that the results can also hold if timing is endogenous.
4 The last part of the paper relaxes this assumption and considers the case in which the en­
trepreneur is exposed to the volume-related risk as well.
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dynamics of industries can be reasonably believed to have superior knowledge about 
future prospects of the industry. Also, investors are more likely to obtain information 
from other firms in the industry, from which the entrepreneur is shielded because of 
competitive considerations. The link from the first IPO to a second in the industry is 
established via information production of investors before the first IPO. The players 
use the secondary market price of the first issue to update their beliefs about the 
industry and, in particular, about the value of the second firm. There are two effects 
at place which determine the emergence of ‘hot issue markets’.
First, the rise of hot issue markets depends on how the riskiness of the firm changes 
in response to news conveyed about the state of the industry (‘variance effect’). If 
news about industry prospects are different from the prior belief of the entrepreneur, 
the variance of his firm value might increase and the entrepreneur becomes more 
inclined to go public. For example, if the a priori prospects of the industry are rather 
poor (there is an 80% probability of the industry being bad, and a 2 0 % probability of 
the industry being good), but subsequent information reveals a 50% probability of the 
industry being good, the variance of the industry factor increases and risk-induced 
selling pressure mounts. In a similar vein, Stoughton, Wong and Zechner [1997] assume 
that the number of firms traded publicly affects the variance of investors’ estimate 
of the total market size. Whereas in their set-up bunching can occur if the market 
variance shrinks, the present chapter argues that a rise in the firm value’s variance 
increases the risk of remaining private and induces the entrepreneur to sell off his firm 
to risk-neutral investors.
Second, it depends on whether the expected IPO proceeds rise to a larger extent 
than the expected private firm value (‘expected value effect’) after the first IPO. This 
can be the case if the level of information costs no longer justifies further information 
production and investors free-ride on the available signal realisation after the first 
IPO. The marginal benefit of further information collection is particularly small, if 
investors can rely on the informational outcome of the first IPO, i.e. if signal precision 
is relatively high. This ‘informational free-riding behaviour’ can increase the market 
valuation more than the entrepreneur’s private valuation. The entrepreneur no longer 
has to compensate investors for information acquisition through a lower issue price. 
Also, the level of participation increases compared to informed bidding, since all 
investors, not only investors with positive signals, purchase a share in the IPO. In 
this respect the chapter is related to Maksimovic and Pichler [1996] where an IPO 
is needed to raise the required finance in order to start full-scale production, but 
has the disadvantage of providing valuable information to potential entrants in the
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industry. Clumping of IPOs in their model occurs if other firms follow with an IPO 
to take advantage of bigger growth opportunities. In this model a second IPO also 
becomes more likely in the wake of favourable industry news, but rather through 
higher proceeds the entrepreneur can obtain by exploiting the superior informational 
state in which investors axe detained from information production. Contrary to other 
models of IPOs with asymmetric information between firm insiders and investors along 
the lines of Myers and Majluf [1984] the reduction of adverse selection is not the central 
element in triggering hot issue markets (e.g. Korajczyck, Lucas and McDonald [1991]).
Finally, the model offers an explanation for why hot issue markets often coincide 
with more pronounced underpricing than cold issue markets. Because of the empirical 
evidence put forward by Jegadeesh et al [1993], which is not supportive of the signalling 
role of underpricing (e.g. Allen and Faulhaber [1989]), underpricing in this model is 
either directly or indirectly due to information collection costs. Underpricing arises 
if the secondary market price is (on average) higher than the price of the primary 
issue. This comes about if the private information accrued by investors during the 
IPO is better than prior expectations about the firm value. Equally risk-induced 
selling pressure is triggered by unexpectedly positive industry information. So, both 
the clustering and underpricing phenomena result from the same underlying fact, i.e. 
positive surprise about industry prospects.
The model highlights the importance of an underlying or common value component 
between firms (e.g. the overall state of the industry or the business cycle) in provoking 
clustering phenomena like hot issue markets. Combined with asymmetric information 
and costly information acquisition the price determination for one firm can - through 
news about the common value factor- change the value of other firms in the industry or 
economy. This feed-back mechanism can trigger hot issue markets because it changes 
the valuation of firm-owners and investors in different ways. The valuation differential 
of the two parties subsequent to news about a common value factor is the prime feature 
which differentiates this model from other analyses of the timing and pricing of IPOs.
This chapter is primarily concerned with IPOs as an instrument of primary equity 
issuance, not as a means to a capital increase as in Maksimovic and Pichler [1996]. 
However, the findings of the chapter could easily be extended to a round of secondary 
financing where the owner-entrepreneur has to decide between raising funds via equity 
issuance in the stock market or private financing. Analogously, this decision will be 
influenced by the variability of the firm’s private value (‘variance effect’) as well as 
investors’ valuation (‘expected value effect’). If a previous stock market floatation in
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the same industry has increased the uncertainty of the industry’s prospects by way of 
positive news, the entrepreneur will be more inclined to finance the firm’s expansion 
through a secondary issue than through private ressources. This decision will be 
enforced if investors abstain from information production, so that the entrepreneur 
can exploit the favourable informational state to increase IPO revenues.
The chapter proceeds as follows. The first part outlines the general set-up of 
the model. It describes the strategy space of investors and entrepreneurs for both 
a potential first and second IPO. The second part derives pooling equilibria for the 
first firm’s IPO decision if one of the two entrepreneurs is exogenously assigned to 
first decide about going public. The third part then focuses on the impact the first 
firm’s IPO decision has on the going-public decision of a second firm in the industry. 
Equilibrium conditions are derived for which the likelihood of a second IPO increases 
after the first firm has gone public. The last section covers possible extensions to the 
basic model. Most importantly it shows that the results of former propositions also 
hold in case of an endogenous ordering of the IPO decision if additional restrictions 
are imposed on the coefficients of relative risk-aversion of the two entrepreneurs. Also, 
it is shown that hot issue markets can still arise in the presence of informed bidding 
even if the variance of IPO proceeds is taken into account. Given the importance of 
the ‘variance effect’ the last part considers whether the effect also arises for alternative 
distributional assumptions about the firm value.
4.2 The model
4.2.1 Firms
There are two firms in an industry which can be either of high or low value. The 
value of the firm Vi with i G {1,2} depends both on the overall prospects of the 
industry and on the quality of the firm’s projects. Both the firm and the industry 
may be of two types: I  =  1 (good prospects) with probability a  or I  =  0 (bad 
prospects) with probability 1 — a. The firm characteristics can similarly be Fi = 1 
(high quality) with probability e and F* =  0 (low quality) with probability 1 —e. The 
drawings for the value of the firm Fi axe independently and identically distributed. 
Furthermore the distribution of industry prospects is independent of the distribution 
of firm characteristics. The overall firm value is given by the product of industry 
and firm specific characteristics, i.e. Vi = I  - Fi. The firm can therefore only be of 
high value Vi =  1 if both the firm-specific and industry-wide factor are favourable. In 
all other three cases the overall value of the firm is zero either because of bad firm
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characteristics, low industry prospects or both. Thus the firm is of high value V* =  1  
with probability as and of low quality Vi = 0  with probability 1  — ae.
4.2.2 Timing
The timing structure consists of two periods in which the two firms decide sequentially 
about an IPO. Firm 1  is exogenously chosen to first decide about going public in 
period 1. The information set of the players is denoted by O* where i € {1,2} stands 
both for the respective firm and period. In the first round the information set of the 
players consists of the a priori expectations about firm and industry characteristics 
as outlined in 4.2.1, i.e. Oi =  fi. The IPO of each firm is associated with four dates. 
If the entrepreneur decides to undertake an IPO at ti =  1  he sets a price pi for his 
firm, and investors decide whether to produce information about the value of the firm 
at t\ =  2 . At t\ =  3, trading commences in the secondary market and the number 
of participants in the IPO, <$i, is revealed. A new management takes over the firm at 
ti =  45, and the quality of firm 1 is made public. 6
Both the number of participants in the IPO and the quality of the first firm allow 
the players to update their expectation about industry prospects and the value of 
the second firm in the industry. They have a new information set, O2 , depending on 
the type of the first firm, Fi, and the number of participants in the IPO, <$1 . The 
information set 0 2  therefore consists of a specific realization of the tuple {Fi, <5i}. 
The sequence of events from t2 =  1 to t2 =  4 is repeated for a potential second IPO. 
Figure 1  shows the time structure of the model for the first and second firm’s IPO 
decision.
The equilibrium concept employed is a Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium which implies 
backward induction of the players’ optimal strategies. Thus, investors’ information 
production decision is derived before analysing the going-public decision of the en­
trepreneur. First, conditions for pooling equilibria are derived under which the first 
firm will go public. Second, equilibrium conditions are determined under which it is 
more likely for the second firm in the industry to go public after an IPO in the first 
period.
5IPOs axe often associated with equity sales by controlling shareholders (see Pagano et al [1996]).
6It is not necessary to assume that the agents learn the true quality of the firm shortly after 
secondary trading starts. In effect, the revelation of firm type changes the factor by which the 
players update their information on the prospects of the second firm. Since the entrepreneur has 
an informational advantage about the quality of his firm he can advance his informational leap even 
further if information about the quality of the first firm is revealed. In this sense, this paper focuses 
on a special case with the maximum amount of asymmetric information between the entrepreneur 
and investors. The results of this paper hold even more so in the more general informational setting.
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4.2.3 Investors
There are n risk-neutral, perfectly competitive investors who neither know the quality 
of the firms nor the prospects of the industry. Investors can, however, purchase a noisy 
signal S  about the overall firm value, Vi =  Fi • I  , at cost c. The signal can be either 
good (S  =  G ) or bad (S  = B) with the following degree of precision:
P ( S ik = G \ V i  = l )  = l , f c € { l , . . . , n }
P ( S ik = G 1 ^  =  0) = 7 , 7 < 1
It is assumed that investors only purchase a share if they obtain a good signal. The 
informational set-up of this model is based on Chemmanur (1993) with the main 
difference being that firm value is a composite of industry and firm prospects. The 
information production decision is derived in its general form, which allows for differ­
ent informational preconditions in the first and second period. We assume that the 
number of shares equals the number of investors, i.e. the value of the firm is divided 
into n shares7. Investors will only acquire information if the benefits of additional 
information at least outweigh its costs. If pi is the issue price of the firm’s shares then 
uninformed bidding will yield the following aggregate payoff for the n  investors8
P(Vi =  1 I ©0(1 -  Pi) + P{Vi = o I O i) ( - P i ) . (4.1)
With probability P(Vi = 1 | ©0 the firm value is 1 and investors gain (1 — p^ .  
Otherwise the value of the firm is 0 and investors incur a loss amounting to the price 
they paid for the firm. The benefit of informed compared to uninformed bidding is 
that informed investors only purchase a zero-value firm if they mistakenly receive a 
good signal, which happens with probability 7 . The payoff from informed bidding is 
therefore
P(V i =  1, S =  G, ©0(1 -  Pi) +  P(V i =  0, S =  G, © 0 ( - f t )  -  c
where c denotes the aggregate information production,costs of the n investors. Re­
stating this expression in terms of known conditional probabilities, we obtain
P(Vi =  1 I ©0(1 -  Pi) +  l P { V i  =  0 I © 0 (-P i) -  C. (4.2)
By setting the payoff from uninformed bidding [4.1] equal to the payoff from informed 
bidding [4.2] one obtains the minimum IPO share price which will induce informed
7It seems reasonable to assume that the number of shares to be sold is determined prior to the 
IPO and that it should take the number of potential investors into account.
8 Note that the n  investors are here considered in their aggregate; for an individual investor the 
condition (and also subsequent expressions) have to be divided by n.
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bidding. This price p. is given by
-*=  (i — i)P(Yi =  o | ©i) ( 4 ' 3 )
This is the price where the costs of information production exactly offset the benefit 
from not purchasing the stock if the investor receives a bad signal. The lower price 
bound for informed bidding is higher the greater the costs of information production. 
The lower the probability of the firm being of zero value and the lower the precision 
of the signal, the higher the lower bound for informed bidding. For pi higher than p., 
informed bidding is strictly preferred, as the loss from bidding for a bad firm increases. 
On the other hand, the maximum price the firm can charge for its stock is given at 
the point where the benefits from participating in the IPO with a good signal is equal 
to the payoff from not bidding which is 0. Therefore the maximum price which the 
firm might charge for its stock is
p.  =  P(Vj =  11 Qj) -  c  . .
Pt P(Vi = 1 | 0 ;) + 7P (V i = 0 | 0 ;) ' V '
The upper price limit for informed bidding is higher the more likely the firm is of high 
value and the smaller the error probability of obtaining a bad firm despite a good 
signal. The smaller the information production costs the higher the maximum price 
that the firm can charge in the presence of informed bidding. In order for informed 
bidding to occur the following parametric restriction on the cost and precision of the 
signal has to hold:
c < ( 1  -  7 )P(Vi =  1 I ei)P(Vi =  O | 0 i )  =  Ci (4.5)
This condition is more likely to hold if the costs of information production, c, are small, 
the precision of the signal is high ( 7  small) and P(Vi =  1 | 0*) is close to 1 / 2  implying 
a high risk of uninformed bidding. The condition is equivalent to postulating that 
a  < E{vt 1 00 < pi. If condition (4.5) holds, then there are three possible regions of 
investor behaviour depending on the price of the IPO: for p. ^  pi ^  pi investors buy 
a signal and purchase a share in the IPO if they receive a good signal. If pi > pi, they 
will refrain from participating in the IPO, since they expect to make a loss. For pi < 
p. the price is too low to warrant information production, hence investors engage in 
uninformed bidding.
If condition (4.5) does not hold, investor behaviour can only fall into the two 
categories of uninformed bidding or no bidding. The maximum issue price the en­
trepreneur can charge is the price where the payoff from uninformed bidding is equal
to the payoff from no bidding, i.e. the firm’s a priori expected value E(Vi | 0 *).
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4.2.4 Entrepreneurs
The two firms are fully owned by utility maximizing, risk averse entrepreneurs. The 
owner-entrepreneurs face the choice between remaining private and going public. The 
proceeds from going public depend on the firm’s price setting strategy which is influ­
enced by the size of information production costs.
Remain private
Entrepreneurs are assumed to exhibit a mean-variance utility function where p stands 
for the coefficient of risk aversion. If the entrepreneur of a high-quality firm decides 
to remain private, he will obtain the following expected utilities E(Uf )  conditional 
on the quality of his firm
E(Uf  | Fi = l , e i) =  P(I  =  l \ e t) - p P { I = l \ e i) - P( I  =  0 \ e i). (4.6) 
E(Uf  I Fi =  0 ,0 ;) =  O. (4.7)
Because of the normalisation of the firm value to V i G  { 0 , 1 }  and the composite 
nature of the overall firm value the expected utility for a high-quality firm reduces 
to the above probability terms. The entrepreneur knows the quality of the firm’s 
projects Fi, but has no inside information about industry prospects. The owner of 
a high-quality firm faces some uncertainty about the realization of the industry-wide 
factor which manifests itself in the variance term of his utility function. The expected 
utility of an entrepreneur with a low-quality firm is zero independent of industry-wide 
prospects, since the firm value is a product of the industry and firm-specific factor.
Going public
Uninformed bidding. If the entrepreneur decides to float his firm, there axe three 
possible optimal prices depending on the size of information production costs. If 
c >  Ci, information production costs will impede investors from collecting information. 
The highest price the entrepreneur can charge will be the firm’s a priori expected 
value. His expected utility from an IPO under uninformed bidding amounts to
E (U *P0 ! C >  Ci, © i )  = P(Vi =  1 I © i ) ,  : - (4.8)
independent of firm quality. Since investors do not produce information, all n investors 
will purchase the stock and there is no variance associated with the quantity of shares 
sold.
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Inform ed bidding. If c <  q , then the entrepreneur faces two choices: he can either 
set pi in which case only investors with positive signals will purchase shares, or he can 
set p. in which case investors will refrain from acquiring information and all n investors
— I
purchase shares. In order to derive the expected utility in the former case, we first 
have to determine the expected number of investors purchasing shares. Although the 
entrepreneur knows the quality of his firm, the number of participants in the IPO, 
<5i, is a random variable for him. His action at L =  0  will therefore depend upon 
his expectation of the number of shares purchased, conditional on his firm type and 
industry prospects. The entrepreneur knows that n investors purchase information 
and that with probability 7  zero-value firms can be mistaken for high-value firms. 
The expected number of investors X  mistakenly purchasing a low-value firm is thus 
given by the mean of the binomial distribution B(n,  7 ) ,  E(X)  =  7 2 7 . Even the owner 
of a low-quality firm can still expect proceeds of 7 pi from the flotation if his firm is 
mistaken for a high-value firm. The entrepreneur of a bad firm keeps a fraction of 
(1 — 7) shares, but since the type of his firm is revealed these shares will be worthless 
and the variance is reduced to zero. Thus, if the entrepreneur sets pi and investors 
engage in informed bidding, the expected utility for a firm with high and low quality 
projects respectively is given by
E(u!PO\Fi =  i,p = pi, e i) = p , - p { i  = i \ e , ) + ' / p i - p ( i  = Q \ e i) (4.9) 
S (f//p o |F , =  0,p =  p „ e ,) =  7p{. (4.10)
Indu ced  uninform ed b idding. If the entrepreneur, on the other hand, sets a price 
equal to p., he will induce uninformed bidding in which case all n  investors purchase 
a share. The expected utility from induced uninformed bidding is therefore
E(U'p o \p =  p. ,Q,)=pt (411)
for both high- and low-quality firms. Equating equations (4.9) and (4.11) we find that 
firms will induce informed bidding iff
(1 -  7)P(K =  1 1 e i ) P ( V j  =  0  1 0Q[P(f =  1 1 Qj) +  7 P ( I  =  0  1 O j ) }  ,
c p (V i = 1 1 e;) + P (V i = 0 1 eob + (1 -  7) ( p ( i  = 11 e<)+7P ( i  =  01 ©*))] -Ci
(4.12)
It can be easily seen that c* < Ci, so that one can differentiate three different optimal 
prices depending on c. For small information production costs, the firm will set pi in 
which case only investors who receive positive signals will purchase the stock. With 
rising costs of information production, the firm has to set a lower price in order 
to compensate investors for the higher information production costs. At c = c*, it
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becomes no longer optimal for the firm to induce investors to produce information since 
the proceeds from the IPO will be greater in the presence of uninformed bidding. This 
is because without information production all investors will purchase a share in the 
IPO and not only investors who received positive signals. With c > ci: the maximum 
price the firm will be able to set is E(Vi | O*) =  P(V* =  1 | Oi).
4.2.5 Equilibrium conditions for first IPO w ith  informed bid­
ding
An IPO of a first firm in the industry only has implications for the going-public deci­
sion of a second firm in the industry when investors will engage in informed bidding. 
We will therefore only derive equilibrium conditions for an IPO with information ac­
quisition. One of the two firms in the industry is exogenously chosen to first decide 
about an IPO. The firm undertakes an IPO if the expected utility the entrepreneur 
derives from an IPO is greater than the utility he derives as the owner of the firm. 
Since there axe no costs of mimicing a high-quality firm (and no benefits from sepa­
ration), there is no scope for separating equilibria. The following proposition states 
the conditions under which an entrepreneur decides to take his firm public in the first 
period.9
P roposition  1  There exists a pooling equilibrium where good and bad firms choose 
to go public in the first period and investors produce information iff c < c\ and
a ( l - a ) P > a 'f{1- e) +  t  +  l i \ ~ a)]- (4-13)v ^  ea +  7 ( 1  — ea) v '
In the going-public equilibrium IPO proceeds axe always smaller than the expected 
private value of a high-quality firm, a, which is reflected by the fact that the right hand 
side of the inequalities, the difference between expected firm value and IPO price is 
always positive. This difference, however, shrinks the higher the probability of the firm 
being good, since a high e reduces the informational asymmetry between entrepreneurs 
and investors. The trigger of the IPO is the risk-aversion of the entrepreneur, p, and 
the variance of the firm value, a ( l  — a). A firm is more likely to go public the higher p, 
and 0(1 —a). The maximum variance is obtained when a  is 0.5, i.e. when uncertainty 
about industry prospects is at its peak.
9 Proofs to this and other Propositions and Lemmas are relegated to the Appendix, except for 
straightforward applications of Bayes’ Rule.
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4.2.6 Secondary market trading
For purposes of this model it is useful to differentiate between observed and expected 
underpricing. In the former case issues are on average not (over-) underpriced, but 
(over-) underpricing occurs for issuers of (zero) high-value firms. This is the case if 
c <  c*, where dependent on the number of bidders the secondary market price is 
higher or lower than the issue price. Expected underpricing, however, requires that 
P i  < E (\i) on average. For c\ < c < ci, the entrepreneur induces uninformed bidding 
by setting p , and issues will be on average underpriced, since p1 < E{V\). In case c 
is prohibitively high (c >  Ci), investors will engage in uninformed bidding and bid no 
more than E(Vi) in which case neither observed nor expected underpricing results.
Since we assume information production for the first IPO, we can only consider 
cases with observed underpricing. After , the IPO the number of participants in the 
IPO (which are the ones that obtain S =  G), <$i, becomes public knowledge. The 
secondary market price of the firm will then equal Vi conditional on the aggregate of 
the information produced by all investors.
L em m a 1 In a pooling equilibrium, where investors only participate in the IPO if 
they find S =  G, and all investors receive good signals Si, then the secondary market 
price of the first firm will be
^  =  £ ( ^ ^  =  5 , ) =  “ £ae 4- (1 — ae) 7n *
If however, investors receive less than n good signals, the firm cannot be of high value 
and the secondary market price E(Vi | n > <$i) =  0 .
This Lemma derives directly from Bayes’ Rule. The precision structure of the 
signal implies that high-value firms are always recognized as such, but zero-value 
firms can be mistaken for a high-value firm. Once one bad signal is obtained by an 
investor, the market infers that the respective firm can no longer be of a high-value. 
It can be shown that
L em m a 2 If all investors obtain good signals the secondary market price is higher 
than the issue price so that underpricing Si > pl results in an equilibrium in which 
n = Si.
The higher the information production costs and the lower the signal precision the 
larger the extent of underpricing. The impact of c is, however, by far stronger than 
the impact of 7. Information production costs unequivocally increase the extent of
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underpricing, whereas an increase in 7 has dual implications: it not only decreases 
p i ,  but also the secondary market price, since the quality of private information is 
doubtful. Information production costs have less and 7  more impact on the level of 
underpricing the higher the probability of the firm being of high value. W ith increasing 
prospects of the IPO firm being of high value, c loses in significance and the quality of 
the signal becomes more important. On average, of course, there is no underpricing, 
since in all other cases in which n > 6 issues will be overpriced. So, in the case of 
informed bidding, observed underpricing only arises with positive information shocks.
4.3 Implications for the second firm’s IPO decision
After investors learn the type of the first firm at ti =  4, they can use this information 
together with the number of participants in the IPO, 8 1 , to update their beliefs about 
the probabilities of V2 = 1 and V2 = 0. Depending on the type of the first firm 
and the number of participants in the IPO we obtain four possible informational 
outcomes depending on the combination of F\ and 8 1 : 1 . 0 2i = {n = 6 1 , Fi = 1 }, 2. 
O2 2  — {n > ^  1}? 3. O2 3  =  {n =  8 \,F \  =0} ,  and 4. © 2 4  =  {ti > 8 \ ,Fi = 0}.
The four cases and the respective adjusted expectations of the investors and the 
entrepreneur about the value of the second firm are juxtaposed in Table I.
Since for © 2 3  and © 2 4  the expected value remains unchanged after the first IPO, 
these cases do not lead to a higher probability of a second firm going public. In @22 
the entrepreneur will be indifferent between going public or remaining private, since 
in both cases his payoff will be zero. The case which deserves further consideration 
is the one where all investors obtain positive signals and the firm is revealed as a 
high-quality firm, ifr =  1. In this case investors and the entrepreneur of a high-quality 
firm update their beliefs about the expected value of the second firm to E(V2 | ©21) =  
P(V2 =  1 | 0 21) =  ae/(a +  (1 -  a )7n) and E{V2 \ F2 =  1, ©2i) = P(I =  1 | ©21) =  
a / ( a  +  (1 — a )7 n) respectively. It can be easily seen that the expected value of the 
second firm is greater after the first firm in the industry has undertaken an IPO.
It becomes obvious that both investors and the entrepreneur of a high-quality firm 
can extract the same relative amount of information from the secondary market price, 
namely 1 /(a -f- (1 — a )7”), but that the entrepreneur can exploit this information to 
a larger extent in absolute terms. This shows that the asymmetric information be­
tween investors and the entrepreneur actually increases after the first IPO, since the 
entrepreneur can better decode the information conveyed by the secondary market 
price of the first firm’s IPO. Thus, asymmetric information increases after an infor­
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mation release. If bunching still occurs, then it must be triggered by other forces 
than a decrease of asymmetric information as put forward by Korajczyk, Lucas, and 
McDonald (1991).
4.3.1 Investor behaviour and inform ation costs
Again, for the second IPO, investor behaviour depends on the information production 
costs and the price setting strategy of the entrepreneur. Table II describes investor 
behaviour in the second IPO depending on the level of information production costs. 
Because of information production in the first period, costs for information acquisition 
must be smaller than c\. In the second period, cj and C2 are the respective cut-off 
values for informed vs. induced uninformed and induced uninformed vs. uninformed 
bidding respectively. It can easily be seen that c < C\ does not necessarily imply 
c < c2.
Lem m a 3 The upper cost bound for informed bidding in the second IPO is smaller 
than the upper cost bound for informed bidding in the first IPO, i.e. c2 <  c\, iff
a  + (1 — a)7n
a£ >  -------77 -^-----— 7-a  +  ( 1  — 0 )7 ™ +  1
The inequality in Lemma 3 holds the higher the precision of the signal, 1 — 7, and 
the higher the probability of the firm being good. If e is high, then the second firm 
is likely to be of high value. The marginal benefit of further information collection 
is low and uninformed bidding more likely. Equally, the higher the precision of the 
signal, the more reliable the information conveyed in the first IPO and the higher the 
incentive to free-ride on this information.
Since similarly there is no predetermined ordering of c\ and cjj, informed bidding 
in the second IPO only comes about if the costs of information production are smaller 
than min{ci, c%}. This should be the case for firms and industries where the complexity 
of the product is minor and the competitive structure clear-cut, such as retailing, 
eating and drinking places and possibly manufacturing.
There are two ranges for possible values of c for which induced uninformed bidding 
arises after informed bidding in the first IPO. For induced uninformed bidding to arise 
in the second IPO, c has to be higher than c£, but smaller than c2. One constellation 
of c values which provokes induced uninformed bidding in a second IPO after informed 
bidding in a first IPO is c£ <  c < c2 <  c\. In this situation the cost bound for induced 
uninformed bidding in the second IPO is more restrictive than the cost restriction
CHAPTER 4. INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS 124
for informed bidding in the first IPO. This is the case if the information conveyed in 
the first IPO is so reliable (7 low) that only low information production costs could 
provoke further information collection about the value of the second firm. Information 
production costs are, however, still high enough so that it is more profitable for the 
entrepreneur to induce uninformed bidding instead of compensating investors for their 
information production costs. This structure of information costs mostly applies to 
firms which operate in a complex technological environment (e.g. biotechnology), but 
where there are enough independent research laboratories able to assess the state of 
product development in the industry. On the one hand, information acquisition is not 
trivial, but the information obtained through independent sources is very reliable.
A second constellation of c values for induced uninformed bidding in the second 
IPO arises for c\ < c < c* < c^ - In this case both c\ < c\ and c\ < C2 impose 
restrictions on the parameter values. The latter restriction implies that for induced 
uninformed bidding in the second IPO information production costs are allowed to 
be higher than for informed bidding in the first. This situation can arise if investors 
expect the firm to be good (e close to 1), industry prospects to be poor (a  ^  1/2), and 
a good signal to be almost completely misleading (7 close to 1). Since the positive 
news conveyed after the first IPO are very unreliable the entrepreneur can obtain 
higher IPO proceeds in the absence of information production. This is true because 
in case investors obtain a positive signal they mistrust the signal and abstain from the 
IPO so that even a high-value firm will obtain minuscule IPO proceeds. In order for 
the second condition c\ < c\ to hold, again the marginal benefit of further information 
collection has to be negligible. This can either be the case when information about 
industry prospects is very precise (7 close to 0) or, on the very contrary, if information 
is so bad (7 close to 1) that even further information collection during the second 
IPO does not add significantly to investors’ knowledge. The latter is predominant in 
industries with a high pace of technological advancement, where it is costly to obtain 
information on the prospects of success for an individual company or the industry as a 
whole. An example might be electronic equipment as well as the telecommunications 
and software industries.
If C2 <  C2 <  c < c\, then investors will abstain from information production 
and engage in uninformed bidding. With information production costs higher than 
C2, investors voluntarily abstain from further information collection and prefer to bet 
blindly the firm’s expected value P(V2 =  1 | 02 i). Here, information acquisition costs 
are substantially higher, but again the validity of information spares investors renewed 
information collection. Firms in industries like electrical engineering, fabricated metal
CHAPTER 4. INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS 125
and transportation equipment are likely to fall into this category.
4.3.2 Equilibrium conditions for hot issue markets
In the following, we will analyse how the going-public decision of the second en­
trepreneur is affected by the positive news about industry prospects conveyed by the 
first IPO. Again, the conditions are only derived for F2 =  1, since there are no costs 
of mimicing a high-quality firm and no benefits from separation.
D efin ition  1 Hot issue markets arise if the first IPO in the industry makes it more 
likely for a second firm to go public, i.e. if the expected utility derived from an IPO 
rises to a larger extent than the expected utility from remaining private after a first 
IPO occurred, i.e.
E(UiPO | F2 =  1,02i) -  E{U[po | F2 = 1) > E (U f  | F I  =  1,0 2 i) -  E(U? | F, =  1 ).
(4.14)
This equation can be broken down into two components.
D efin ition  2 The change in the difference between the expected firm value to the 
entrepreneur and expected IPO proceeds Rfpo from the first to the second IPO
AE = E(V l | F, =  1) -  E{R[PO | Fi =  1) -  [E(V2 \ F2 =  1, 0 2 i) -  E (R iP 0  \ F2 = 1 , ©;
is termed ‘expected value effect ’.
The effect is positive if A E > 0 and negative for A E <  0 . If the ‘expected value 
effect’ is positive, expected IPO proceeds rise to a larger extent than the expected 
firm value to the entrepreneur. A positive ‘expected value effect’ does not imply 
that expected IPO proceeds surmount the expected firm value to the entrepreneur 
10, but that a second entrepreneur might be more inclined to undertake an IPO after 
a first firm in the industry has prepared the ground. The economic interpretation 
of the ‘expected value effect’ is the free-riding of investors on information about the 
industry factor conveyed in the first IPO. The market valuation of the firm can increase 
to larger extent than the entrepreneur’s private valuation because investors abstain 
from renewed information acquisition.
D efin ition  3 The change in variance of the entrepreneur’s private valuation 
AVar = p[Var{V2 | F2 =  1,0 2 i) -  Var(V,[ | =  1 )]
is termed ‘variance effect’.
10 This will never be the case since investors have an informational disadvantage about the quality 
of the firm and have to be compensated for information collection.
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The effect is positive if A Var >  0 and negative for AVar <  0. If the ‘variance 
effect’ is positive, the variance of the entrepreneur’s private valuation increases from 
the first to the second IPO by revealing news about the prospects of the industry. 
In economic terms, the risk associated with remaining private increases and provokes 
risk-induced selling pressure. Inequality [4.14] can be restated in the following way
AE + pAVar > 0 . (4.15)
Hot issue markets arise as long as the joint impact of the two effects is positive.
H ot issue m arkets due to  risk-induced selling  pressure
With informed bidding in the second IPO, i.e. c <  min-fc^c^}, the expected private 
firm value rises to a larger extent than expected IPO proceeds so that the ‘expected 
value effect’ is negative or at most neutral. Hot issue markets can therefore only be 
triggered by an increase in the firm’s variance:
P ro p o sitio n  2 Case 1 : Hot issue markets with informed bidding [c <  m m {cj,c2}]: 
The second firm is more likely to undertake an IPO after the first firm in the industry 
is floated if the firm is likely to be of high quality (e is close to 1), and <  7n>
The conditions ensure that a positive ‘variance effect’ dominates the negative ‘ex­
pected value effect’. A high probability that the firm is of high quality reduces the 
negative impact of the ‘expected value effect’. The latter condition yields a positive 
‘variance effect’ by imposing parameter conditions which increase the entrepreneur’s 
risk of remaining private.
Although both the price and the expected percentage of investors participating 
in the IPO rise, the growth in IPO proceeds is weaker than the gain in the en­
trepreneur’s private valuation. If e is close to 1, the information asymmetry between 
the entrepreneur and investors is negligible and the ‘expected value effect’ is almost 
neutral. If e equals one and there are no information production costs, expected pri­
vate firm value and IPO proceeds coincide. While there is no informational advantage 
for the entrepreneur, investors are able to obtain superior information about the firm 
value by way of their private signal. But this is exactly offset by the fact that only 
investors with positive signal realizations purchase a share in the IPO. The more the 
parameters deviate from these values the greater the wedge between expected IPO 
proceeds and private firm value. Similarly the valuation differential widens from the 
first to the second IPO with increasing c and decreasing e.
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With an only moderately negative ‘expected value effect’ hot issue markets can be 
triggered by risk-induced selling pressure. The risk of remaining private increases for 
two parameter constellations: First, if a is close to zero, there is an almost unequivocal 
understanding of gloomy industry prospects. Any signal realization after the first IPO 
which reverses the picture by conveying a prosperous industry outlook, will increase 
the uncertainty about the industry factor. Second, if a is smaller but close to 1/2, 
there is still potential for an increase in the variance of the private firm value. With an 
equal probability of a good and bad industry uncertainty about the future state of the 
industry reaches its climax. In order for the firm’s variance to increase an imprecise 
signal quality (7 1) has to ensure that the expectation about the industry factor
does not rise above 1/2.
Even if the informational asymmetry between investors and entrepreneur is re­
solved (e close to 1) the likelihood of a second IPO can diminish if the firm’s variance 
decreases after the first IPO. This points to the fact that a decrease in asymmetric 
information per se is not sufficient to generate bunching of IPOs. Since the variance 
of the industry factor a ( l  — a) reaches its maximum at a =  1/2, a sufficient condition 
for the variance to decrease after positive industry news is a  >  1/ 2. Thus, when the 
a priori probability of bright industry prospects is greater than 50%, further positive 
news will reduce the risk of remaining private.
H ot issu e m arkets due to  inform ational free-rid ing
A common feature of hot issue market equilibrium conditions in the presence of in­
duced or “voluntary” uninformed bidding is that investors “free-ride” on the industry 
news conveyed by the first IPO. While it was profitable for investors to engage in 
information production in the first period, the level of information production costs 
no longer justifies information acquisition given the incremental knowledge about the 
industry factor after the first IPO. The entrepreneur does not have to compensate 
investors for their information production activity, and the unrestricted participation 
in the IPO increases proceeds from a second IPO. Contrary to the case of informed 
bidding in the second IPO, the ‘expected value effect’ can become positive in the 
presence of (induced) uninformed bidding. Hot issue markets can thus arise due to 
the dual trigger of informational free-riding (‘expected value effect’) and risk-induced 
selling pressure (‘variance effect’).
P rop osition  3 Hot issue markets with induced uninformed bidding: The second firm 
is more likely to undertake an IPO after the first firm in the industry is floated if
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Case 2a: c\ < c < < c\: the firm is likely to be of high value (e close to 1), the
signal is sufficiently precise (y close to 0) and industry prospects are very bad (a
close to 0);
Case 2b: c2 <  c < c\ < c^ : the firm is likely to be of high value (e close to 1), the
signal is sufficiently imprecise (y close to 1), industry prospects are very uncertain
(a smaller but close to 1/ 2) and information production costs are sufficiently large 
(c smaller but close to c\).
Compared to the previous case of informed bidding IPO volume is always greater 
under (induced) uninformed bidding. The maximum price the entrepreneur can 
charge, however, is lower if investors are induced to abstain from information pro­
duction. Note that for c <  C2, the maximum price under informed bidding is p2 > P2- 
Since in the presence of informed bidding the ‘expected value effect’ is at most neutral, 
the parameter constellations which trigger a positive ‘expected value effect’ with in­
duced uninformed bidding will have to make the ‘volume effect’ more than outweigh 
the disadvantageous price differential.
In case 2a, with e approaching 1 and y  close to zero, p2 and p2 move closer to­
gether11, reducing the price differential between informed and induced uninformed 
bidding. The precise signal and high expected firm quality makes additional informa­
tion acquisition after the first IPO less attractive and the difference between informed 
and uninformed bidding shrink. Also, the comparison between the first period IPO 
price pi and p2 shows that the higher value of c depresses pi} but has a counter- 
current effect on p2. In case 2a, a positive ‘expected value effect’ additionally requires 
a  or 7  to be close to 0. If a approaches zero, the entrepreneur expects low proceeds 
with informed bidding since only investors with wrong signals participate in the IPO. 
Furthermore, given that the signal is very precise (low 7), there would be very few mis­
guided investors. The percentile participation in the first period IPO, o :+ 7 ( l—a) <  1, 
is thus decreasing for small a and 7. With induced uninformed bidding, however, the 
entrepreneur lures all n investors into the IPO and thus more than compensates for 
the lower IPO price. Hot issue markets are further fostered by a positive ‘variance 
effect’ which is released by a combination of an a priori miserable industry outlook 
(a  close to 0) and a subsequent startlingly positive outcome of the first IPO. This 
contradictory informational evidence increases uncertainty about industry prospects 
and the risk associated with remaining private.
11 Both p2 and p2 increase with rising e, but the first derivative of p2 with respect to e at 7  =  0 is 
greater than the first derivative of p2 with respect to e for e > 1 / 2 .
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In case 2b, hot issue markets arise if information asymmetry between investors 
and entrepreneur is trifling (e close to 1), the precision of the signal is inferior, the 
prospects of the industry almost at the peak of uncertainty (a only insignificantly 
smaller than 1/2) and c close to its upper limit c\. It is clear that the higher in­
formation production cost, the smaller the price the first entrepreneur could charge 
in the presence of information production and therefore the larger the price increase 
from pi to p2. A similar effect is obtained by a low signal precision which increases
p. and lowers px. An unreliable signal (7 /*  1) also makes p rise to a larger extent —2 — *
than p2 if e increases. 12 A poor signal does not drastically increase the benefit of 
information acquisition over uninformed participation, so that an increase in expected 
firm quality has a more pronounced effect on pr  Since the price difference between p2 
and p2 is minor and there is still a slight increase in IPO volume, higher IPO proceeds 
are obtained by charging p2 and leaving investors in a state of ‘ignorant benevolence’ 
after the first IPO. The positive ‘variance effect’ disengages because of increasing un­
certainty about industry prospects, this time induced by general uncertain investor 
sentiment (a close to, but still smaller than 1/2) and poor signal quality (7 close to 
1). The poor signal precision makes the industry outlook only slightly less opaque 
after the positive outcome of the first IPO. Industry prospects are revised upwards, 
but the increase is marginal (a still ^  1/2).
P rop o sitio n  4  Case 3: Hot issue markets with uninformed bidding [c% < C2 < c < 
cj].' The second firm is more likely to undertake an IPO after the first firm in the 
industry is floated if the firm is likely to be of high value (e close to 1), the signal is 
sufficiently precise (7 close to 0) and industry prospects are very bad (a close to 0).
In case 3 the highest possible price the entrepreneur can charge is E(V{ | O21, F2 =  
1) which for c > C2 exceeds p2- Here it is clear that both IPO price and volume 
are higher compared to informed bidding. Since information production costs are 
substantial, investors rely on the current reliable industry information (7 close to 0) 
and abstain from further information collection. In order for the ‘expected value ef­
fect’ to be positive, it suffices if the information asymmetry between investors and 
entrepreneur is low, i.e. e close to 1. In this case proceeds in the second IPO and 
expected firm value to the entrepreneur are almost the same; in the first IPO ex­
pected proceeds were, however, significantly lower than expected firm value to the 
entrepreneur (which was close to a) so that the rise in expected IPO revenue exceeds
12 Both p2 and p2 increase with rising e, but p2 is concave in e, whereas p2 in convex. The first 
derivative of p2 with respect to e for 7  /*  1 is greater than the first derivative of p2 at e =  0 .
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the increase in expected firm value from remaining private. The parameter restric­
tions imposed by the sequence of cost bounds again trigger a positive variance effect 
as in case 2 .
4.4 Underpricing and hot issue markets
Again, the level of information production costs decides about the type of potential 
underpricing. In case c < min{cj,c£} investors collect information about the value 
of the second firm. Again, it can be shown that the issue price is smaller than the 
secondary market price if all investors obtain positive signals during the second IPO 
(‘observed underpricing’). The amount of observed underpricing can even increase 
from the first to the second IPO:
Proposition  5 The amount of underpricing increases after the first IPO, i.e. (II2  — 
p2) > (IIi — Pi), if the firm is likely to be of high value (e close to 1 ), the costs of 
information production c are close to zero and
^ > ( r = V  (4 1 6 )
It can be shown that the lower the costs of information production, the stronger 
the increase in underpricing from the first to the second IPO. The higher c, the higher 
the resulting underpricing in both IPOs. High information production costs, however, 
have a higher impact on underpricing in the first IPO than in the second. Therefore, 
an increase in underpricing is more likely the smaller the influence of information 
production costs.
The conditions which ensure an increase in underpricing coincide with the ones 
yielding hot issue markets. The parameter combination e close to 1 and c close to zero 
simultaneously ensure that the ‘expected value effect’ becomes close to neutral. The 
‘variance effect’ comes about if investors are surprised by the positive outcome of the 
first IPO. Observed underpricing results from the same effect, namely unexpectedly 
positive information about the overall firm value. Both underpricing and hot issue 
markets are therefore phenomena which arise from realizations which increase the 
firm’s a priori expected value. Although this does not explain why issues axe on 
average underpriced, it highlights why underpricing is higher than average when issues 
are clustered. Condition [4.16] is almost identical to the condition for a positive 
‘variance effect’, 7 ” > a2/(  1 — a )2. The higher power of 7  in [4.16], however, imposes 
a more exacting condition on the signal precision and the industry factor. This is due 
to the fact that secondary market prices incorporate the signal realizations of both
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rounds of information production. Therefore both an increase in underpricing and hot 
issue markets arise if uncertainty reaches its peak either due to a very unpromising 
prior industry outlook and stunningly good news in the first IPO (small a), or by 
way of general uncertainty about industry prospects and very poor signal quality (a 
smaller but close to 1 / 2  and 7  1).
For information production costs of c% < c < c<i the entrepreneur optimally charges 
p2 < E { \ 2 | @21) which provokes induced uninformed bidding The issue is thus, on 
average, priced below its expected value. The measure for underpricing in this case is 
no longer the difference between the issue price and the secondary market price (which 
in the case of induced uninformed bidding is zero, i.e. no observed underpricing, as no 
private information is transmitted into the secondary market price), but the difference 
between the average issue price and the firm’s expected value. In case of expected or 
average underpricing there is no requisite coincidence with hot IPO markets. Given 
the specific cost bounds for information acquisition, issues will always be priced below 
their expected value. Since no new information gets into prices, induced uninformed 
bidding will cut off the path to further hot issue markets. Thus hot issue markets die 
away either because uncertainty can no longer rise, or because investors abstain from 
information production. Table III provides an overview of how a positive ‘expected 
value’ and ‘variance effect’ concur with underpricing.
4.5 Extensions
4.5.1 Endogenous tim ing of IPO decision
An interesting path of further investigation is to analyse whether the equilibrium 
conditions for hot issue markets still hold if the ordering of the IPO decision is en­
dogenous. In a case where industry prospects are rather moderate, an IPO of one 
firm in the industry can raise IPO proceeds of competitor firms (relative to private 
firm value) by disclosing unexpectedly positive industry prospects. Waiting for an­
other firm to pave the way to the stock market with favourable industry news may 
therefore be profitable. In particular, entrepreneurs with low-quality firms might be 
tempted to wait for a second period in which investors abstain from information pro­
duction. On the other hand, the waiting strategy involves the risk for both high- and 
low-quality firms that another high-quality firm precedes with an IPO and reveals 
poor industry prospects. In this case the expected utility for entrepreneurs of both 
high- and low-quality firms shrinks to zero. The respective risk aversion coefficients 
of the two entrepreneurs should therefore be a determinant for the timing of the IPO.
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We therefore assume that entrepreneurs exhibit different coefficients of risk-aversion, 
pl and p2 respectively. Sufficiently risk-averse entrepreneurs will independently of firm 
type always choose to go public in the first period so as to avoid the risk of a total 
loss. In fact it can be shown that
Proposition 6  There exists a pooling equilibrium, in which independent of firm type 
an entrepreneur with risk aversion coefficient p1 goes public in the first period, and a 
second entrepreneur with a risk aversion coefficient of p2 is more likely to follow with 
an IPO after the flotation of the first firm, iff
Pi > P \ P2 < min{p*,p**} and p2 > p***.
For the parameter values of the hot issue market equilibria in cases 2b and 3 (see 
propositions [3] and [4]) there exists a solution to the system of inequalities. I f we 
further assume that c2 =  ka where k < 1 , then this also holds for the parameter 
constellations of hot issue markets under informed bidding, i.e. e /*  1  and a \  0  
(proposition [2 ]).
A necessary condition for a pooling equilibrium of hot issue markets is therefore 
px > p2. This condition ensures that the first entrepreneur undertakes an IPO because 
of the risk-reduction benefit, but the less risk-averse second entrepreneur waits for a 
second round with higher expected proceeds. The risk-tolerance of the second en­
trepreneur is, however, limited by p2 < min{p*, p**} in order to still leave an incentive 
for an IPO in the second period.
4.5.2 Variance of IPO proceeds
In section [4.2.4] we assumed that the entrepreneur could sell his firm to a risk-neutral 
underwriter who could diversify the risk of varying IPO proceeds over time. This as­
sumption is obviously only necessary if investors engage in information production. 
Only then is it possible that fewer than n investors participate because they can pos­
sibly obtain a negative signal. If the entrepreneur is exposed to the risk of insufficient 
demand for the IPO issue, the variance of IPO proceeds has to be taken into account 
in order to determine the benefits of an IPO. Even if the variance term is included in 
the entrepreneur’s expected utility from an IPO, hot issue markets can arise:
Proposition 7 Hot issue markets with informed bidding c <  min-jcj*,^*} : The 
second firm is more likely to undertake an IPO after the first firm in the industry is 
floated if there is a sufficient number of investors n > n*, the firm is likely to be of 
high value (e /  1 ), the signal is sufficiently imprecise (y /  1 ) and industry prospects 
are very bad ( a \ 0 );
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First, a relatively large number of investors is required in order for the variance 
of private firm value to outweigh the variance of IPO proceeds in the first period 
IPO. Poor industry prospects (small a) in combination with a positive signal realiza­
tion after the first IPO ensure that the variance of private firm value increases after 
the first IPO. The variance of IPO proceeds depends crucially on the degree of signal 
precision. If the signal is very unreliable ( 7  f  1), almost all investors will participate 
in the IPO so that the variance of expected IPO proceeds is negligible and rises to a 
smaller extent than the variance of private firm value.
One could also easily include the variance of IPO proceeds for the case of (induced) 
uninformed bidding in the second period. Under the equilibrium conditions for hot 
issue markets the variance of the private firm value increases after the first IPO. The 
volume-related risk factor associated with an IPO, however, would disappear and the 
likelihood of a second IPO would rise to an even larger extent.
4.5.3 Robustness of ‘variance effect5
Since the ‘variance effect’ is crucial for the emergence of hot issue markets, it is 
worthwhile investigating whether the effect is robust to the introduction of other 
distributions than the binomial distribution B(l,p) used in this chapter. The trigger 
for a hot issue market is a simultaneous increase in both the firm’s expected value and 
its variance due to positive news about one of the valuation factors. If we use other 
distributional assumptions to characterise the firm value, this feature of the first and 
second moments has to be fulfilled. In fact, it can be easily shown that
P ro p o sitio n  8  The variance of an underlying asset can increase in line vjith its 
expected value if the distribution of the asset is subject to a B(n,p) binomial or a 
normal distribution.
This result holds since the expected value and variance of the B(n,p) binomial 
distribution only change for a constant factor in comparison with JB(l,p). For large 
n, the normal distribution approximates the binomial distribution and can therefore 
also exhibit the required characteristic.
4.6 Conclusion
This chapter has argued that there are two effects at place which can trigger hot issue 
markets in a setting where both entrepreneurs and investors do not have complete 
information about industry prospects. First, it depends upon whether the expected
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IPO proceeds rise to a larger extent than the expected private firm value after one firm 
in the industry has gone public. This in turn depends on whether investors free-ride 
on the industry information revealed in the first IPO. If the marginal benefit of further 
information production does not outweigh its costs, investors’ ‘uninformed valuation’ 
of the firm can increase to a larger extent than the expected private firm value. This is 
because more investors participate in the IPO (not only the ones with positive signal 
realizations) and investors do not have to be compensated for information acquisition 
through a smaller issue price. Second, the rise of hot issue markets depends on the 
change in the riskiness of the firm in response to news conveyed about the state of the 
industry (‘variance effect’). If the uncertainty about the state of the industry rises 
after the first IPO, the risk-reduction benefits of an IPO render a flotation relatively 
more attractive.
The model also offers an explanation for why hot issue markets often coincide 
with more pronounced underpricing than cold issue markets. Both underpricing and 
hot issue markets arise from the same underlying phenomenon, namely that the value 
of the IPO firm is higher than initially expected. The model could be generalized 
to a setting in which there axe n privately owned firms in the industry, each with 
a decreasing degree of risk-aversion. Less risk-averse owners can only be induced to 
go public if the riskiness of their firm has significantly increased in the wake of an 
IPO. Waves of IPO activity thus fade away if the risk-diversification benefit no longer 
warrants a stock market flotation for the remaining private entrepreneurs with a lower 
degree of risk-aversion.
The model suggests hypotheses for empirical examination with respect to hot is­
sue markets. First, the model establishes that underpricing (as a signal for positive 
industry news) increases the likelihood of subsequent IPOs. On the other hand, a 
failure of an IPO will reduce further incentives to go public in the same industry An 
unsuccessful issue is associated with worse than expected industry news and hence 
overpricing of the issue. Therefore, one would expect higher underpricing to be as­
sociated with an increase of IPOs in the same industry and vice versa. In contrast 
to the current empirical evidence by Helwege and Liang [1996] this model suggests a 
causal relationship rather than simultaneity between clustering and underpricing.
The model also offers some insight into the inter-industry clustering effects of IPOs. 
Besides the risk-induced selling pressure the model implies that the clustering of IPOs 
is the result of informational free-riding by investors on the industry news conveyed 
by the first IPO. This effect only arises in the presence of (induced) uninformed
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bidding, where information production costs are relatively high. Therefore one would 
expect the clustering phenomenon to be more pronounced in industries with high 
product complexity and market uncertainty, such as telecommunications, electronics 
and software.
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4.7 Tables
FIG URE I
TIMING
p eriod  1  
IPO of firml
period  2  
IPO of firm 2
*1 = 1
firm 1 decides 
about. IPO 
and issue price
*1=2
investors decide 
about, inform­
ation acquisition
-  +  -  +
t 1 = 3 *1=4 *2=1 *2=2 *2=3 *2=4
revelation revelation repetition of sequence
of <5i of F\ fo r  firm  2
TABLE I
REVISED EXPECTATIONS OF SECOND FIRM VALUE AFTER FIRST IPO
f Signal Revealed type of first firm
realization Fi =  l F i = 0
Investors Entrepreneur Investors Entrepreneur
jp2  =  1 F 2  =  l
r) =  f),     « ____
1 q+(1—a)7n a+(l—a ) y n
n >  8\ 0  0  a e  a
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TABLE II
INFORMATION ACQUISITION COSTS AND INVESTOR BEHAVIOUR
Case Information
costs
Parameter restrictions Investor behaviour 
in second IPO
1 c < min{ci,C2 } — informed
2 a c£ < c < C2  < c\ £ /  1 A 7  \  0 induced uninformed
2 b C2 < C < 0 J< C 2 e / 1  A 7 / I  A a  /  1/2 induced uninformed
3 c \<  c2  < c < cj £ /  1 A 7  \  0 uninformed
TABLE III 
HOT ISSUE MARKETS AND UNDERPRICING
Case Hot issue markets due to
AE  Parameter values A Var Parameter values
Underpricing 
Type Parameter values
1 - £ / I
2 a + e / l A 7 \ 0
2 b + e / l / \ c f  c\
3 + £ 1 A 7  'S* 0
-f- 7  /  1 A a  /  1/2 observed
-f a  \  0  average
+ 7  /  1 A a  /  1/2 average
+ a  \  0  no
£ /  1 A 7  /  1A 
a  /  1/2 A c \  0 
no restriction 
no restriction
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TABLE A.I
N U M B E R  OF IPO S IN T W O -D IG IT  SIC CA TEG O RIES IN T H E  US D U R IN G  1975-1984
The table lists the IPOs in each two-digit SIC category in which at least 10 IPOs took place 
during 1975-84. In order to test for the clustering of IPOs across time a decile-based variant of 
the sign-test is used. Under the null hypothesis of H q  : =  P ( Xi j )  = 0 .1  where Xi j  denotes the 
number of IPOs in a specific industry i =  1 , ...,26 in a specific year j  =  1975,..., 1984 the random 
variable X i j  is distributed binomially B ( r i i ,  0.1). The null hypothesis is rejected if X ^  ^  k a/2 
or Xij > /ci_ a / 2  where ka / 2  and ki_a/2 are the greatest respectively the smallest integers which 
satisfy
<  “ / 2  and <  a/2
respectively. Numbers market with * indicate years in which the null hypothesis can be rejected 
at the 5% significance level.
SIC Industry 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 rii
89 Services, NEC 0 0 1 0 0 0 2 0 4 * 3* 1 0
49 Electric/Gas/Sanitary 1 0 0 0 0 3 2 1 3 2 1 2
2 0 Food/Kindred Prod. 2 1 0 1 0 1 2 0 1 5* 13
39 Misc. Manufacturing 0 1 0 0 0 3 5* 0 4 * 1 14
62 Security/Comm. Brokers 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 13* 0 14
63 Insurance Carriers 0 0 2 1 0 1 2 1 7* 1 15
27 Printing and Publishing 0 0 0 0 0 1 3 0 1 0 * 2 16
56 Apparel/Accessory Stores 1 0 0 0 0 0 3 0 1 1 * 2 17
34 Fabricated Metal Prod. 0 1 0 1 1 3 4 2 5* 1 18
37 Transportation Equip. 0 1 1 0 1 2 3 _ 0 7* 4 19
51 Wholesale: Non-durables 0 0 0 0 0 2 3 1 1 1 * 7* 24
59 Miscellaneous Retail 0 1 0 0 1 1 3 1 1 1 * 6 * 24
45 Transportation by Air 0 0 0 1 0 5 8 * 2 7* 2 28
48 Communications 0 0 0 0 0 5 5 4 1 0 * 6 30
60 Depository Institutions 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 17* 18* 35
50 Wholesale: Durables 0 * 1 0 * 0 * 0 * 4 8 * 2 15* 9* 39
67 Holding/Investment Co. 1 0 * 0 * 0 * 1 5 1 2 13* 16* 39
58 Eating/Drinking Places 0 * 0 * 1 * 1 * 1 * 1 * 9 9 23* 9 54
80 Health Services 0 * 1 * 1 * 0 * 3 1 * 8 !* 29* 14* ,. 58
28 Chemical/Allied Prod. 2 0 * 0 * 2 1 * 5 14* 3 32* 4 63
61 Non-Depository Instit. 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 * 0 * 1 * 49* 16* 6 6
13 Oil and Gas Extraction 0 * 1 * 1 * 2* 15 30* 63* 1 * 2 * 0 * 115
38 Instruments/Related Prod. 0 * 0 * 3* 4* 8 5* 29* 1 0 49* 13 1 2 1
36 Electronic Equipment 0 * 3* 1 * 4 * 6 * 15 43* 1 1 53* 31* 167
73 Business Services 1 * 3* 1 * 3* 3* 4 * 33* 2 0 70* 29* 167
35 Industrial Machinery 2 * 8 * 3* 6 * 8 * 17 27* 1 2 63* 2 2 168
10 22 15 26 49 115 280 84 519 226 1346
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TABLE A.II
PE R C E N T A G E  N U M B E R  OF IPO S IN T W O -D IG IT  SIC CA TEG O RIES IN T H E  US DU R IN G
1975-1984
The table presents the percentage of IPOs in two-digit SIC categories in the US during 1975-1984. 
The last two columns show the time series averages and standard deviations for each industry, 
whereas the last two rows denote the cross- sectional averages and standard deviations for each 
year. Numbers marked with * and * are two respectively one standard deviations away from the 
cross-sectional average, numbers marked with 2 and 1 are two respectively one standard deviations 
away from the time series average.
SIC 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 X i S D i
89 0.0 0.0 io.o: 0.0 0.0 0.0* 20.0 0.0* 40.02 30.01 10 14.9
49 8.3* 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 25.0:1 16.7 8.3 25.0 16.7 10 10.2
20 1 5 .4 : 7 .7 : 0.0 7 .7 : 0.0 7.7 15.4 0.0* 7.7* 38.52 10 11.5
39 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 7.1 0.0* 0.0* 92.9:2 0.0* 10 29.2
62 0.0 7 .1 : 0.0 0.0 0.0 21.4 35.71 0.0 28.61 7.1 10 13.6
63 0.0 0.0 13.3: 6.7: 0.0 6.7 13.3 6.7 46.72 6.7 10 13.8
27 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 6.3 18.8 0.0 62.52 12.5 10 19.6
56 5.9* 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0* 17.7 0.0* 64.7* 2 11.8 10 20.2
34 O.O1 5.6* 0.01 5.6* 5.6* 16.7* 22.21 11.1* 27.81 5.6* 10 9.4
37 0.0 5.3* 5.3* 0.0 5.3 10.5 15.8 0.0* 36.8*2 21.1 10 11.8
51 0.0 4.2* 0.0 0.0 4.2 4.2 12.5 4.2 45.82 25.01 10 14.7
59 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 8.3 12.5 4.2 45.82 29.21 10 15.6
45 0.0 0.0 0.0 3.6 0.0 17.9* 28.61 7.1 25.01 17.9 10 11.3
48 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 16.7* 16.7 13.3* 33.31 20.0 10 11.8
60 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0* 0.0* 0.0* 48.61 51.4: 10 21.1
50 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 2.6 12.8 2.6* 5.1 33.31 41.0*2 10 14.9
67 0.0 2.6 0.0 0.0 0.0 10.3 20.5 5.1 38.52 23.1 10 13.2
58 0.0 0.0 1.9 1.9 1.9 1.9 16.7 16.7: 42.62 16.7 10 13.6
80 0.0 1.7 1.7 0.0 5.2 1.7 13.8 1.7 50.02 24.1 10 16.0
28 3.2 0.0 0.0 3.2 1.6 7.9 22.2 4.7 50.82 6.4* 10 15.7
61 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0* 0.0* 1.5 74.22 24.2 10 23.8
13 0.0 0.9 0.9 1.7 13.0: 2 6 .1 ; 54.8: 0.9 1.7* 0.0* 10 17.8
38 0.0 0.0 2.5 3.3 6.6* 4.1 24.01 8.3 40.52 10.7 10 12.8
36 0.6 1.8 0.6 1.8 1.8 2.4 19.8 12.0* 41.92 17.4 10 13.4
73 0.0 1.8 0.6 2.4 3.6 9.0 25.81 6.6 31.71 • 18.6 10 11.4
35 1.2 4.8 1.8 3.6 4.8 10.1 16.1 7.1 37.52 13.1 10 10.8
X , 1.4 1.7 1.5 1.6 2 . 2 9.0 17.8 4.8 41.3 18.8
S D t 3.5 2.5 3.3 2.3 3.2 7.6 11.4 4.8 18.8 12.4
CHAPTER 4. INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS 140
4.8 Appendix
4.8.1 Proofs to  Lemmas and Propositions 
P r o o f to  P rop o sitio n  1 :
For c <  cj the entrepreneur will set the maximum price for his firm that he can 
obtain in the presence of informed bidding pi. If the entrepreneur decides to keep his 
firm in private hands, he obtains o [ l — p{ 1 — o)] if he owns a good firm and 0  if he 
owns a bad firm. If he decides to go public, the entrepreneur of a good firm obtains 
pi [a +  7 ( 1  — a)] and the entrepreneur of a bad firm obtains 'ypi. Since 7 P1 > 0 the 
bad firm always has an incentive to go public. The good firm, however, only goes 
public if the proceeds from the IPO outweigh the utility from owning the firm which 
is the case if condition (4.13) holds.
In the cases where it is more profitable for a good firm to stay private it will be 
impossible for an entrepreneur of a bad firm to increase his utility by way of an IPO 
since investors foresee that it will only be profitable for a bad firm to undertake an 
IPO. Investors will not pay more than Pi =  0 for the shares of the firm so that also 
a bad firm will remain private when an IPO incurs infinitesimally small transaction 
costs. ■
P r o o f to  L em m a 2:
The difference between the secondary market price and the issue price
_ _  0 5  ole — c
1 ole 4- (1 — as) 7 n ole +  (1 — as) 7
can be simplified to
o le (  1 — 0 5 )7 ( 1  — 7 n_1) 4- c(o5 4- 7 n( l  — as)
[ole 4 - ( 1  — 0 5 )7 "] [5 0  +  7 ( 1  — 0 5 )]
Since numerator and denominator are both greater than zero the secondary market 
price is greater than the issue price i f c > 0 o r 7 < l .  ■
P r o o f to  L em m a 3:
•  Substituting for P (V i =  1 | ©*) and P(V{ =  0 | 0*) in [4.5] for i =  1,2 yields 
Ci =  (1 — 7 )5 0 ( 1  — 5 0 ) and
_  5 0 ( 1  — 7 ) [ (1  — 0 )7 ” +  o ( l  — 5 )]
2 [o +  (1 — o )7 n]2
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• Ci >  C2 implies (A; — ae)/k2 <  1 — ae, where k =  a +  (1 — a)7 71. Solving 
k2 — k/(l  — ae:) +  ac/1  — a  =  /(A:) >  0 as a quadratic equality yields
1 — (4 — 4ae)ae
( 2  -  2 ae ) 2
which gives k\ =  and A;2  =  1 . The roots have the following characteristics:
— For ae — 1/2 the roots coincide.
— For ae > 1 / 2 , k\ > 1  so that f(k )  > 0 for all k, since 0 < k < 1 .
— For ae < 1/2, ki lies in the interval [0,1[ so that f(k )  > 0 for A: < A^ .
• Summarizing the conditions for which c2  < Ci yields
Proof to Proposition 2 :
Since c <  min{ci, c%} does not impose any restriction on the parameter values, we 
only need to consider the sign of the “expected value” and “variance effect”:
•  “Expected value effect”:
Substituting for P(Vi =  1 | 0*) and P(I4  =  0  | ©*) in [4.9] for i =  1 , 2  we obtain 
the issue prices for the first and second IPO:
The difference between the expected private firm value E(Vi | Fi =  1 ) and 
expected IPO proceeds of a high-quality firm E(U(PO \ =  1) in the first
period is
The difference between the expected value of a high-quality firm E(V2 | P2 =  
l , 0 2i) and IPO proceeds E{U{PO | F2 = 1, ©21) in the second period is
ae > ------------- r—------ .  ■a +  (1 — a) 7 n +  1
a +  (1 — 0 )7 ”
a j( l  — e) +  c[a +  7 ( 1  — a)] 
ea +  7 ( 1  — ea)
0 7 ( 1  — e) -f- c[a +  7 n+1(l — a)] 
ea + 7 [7 n(l — a) + a ( l — s)]
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The difference is increasing for the second IPO, since D2 — D\\
q (l -  <2 )7 ( 1  -  e)(l -  7 " ) [ 7  +  e(l ~  7 )] > Q m
[ea +  7 ( 1  — £a)\[ea +  7 [7 n(l — a) -f a ( 1  — e)]]
so that A E  < 0. Since the “expected value effect” is negative or at the maximum 
neutral (e.g. for a ,e  /*  1 ), hot issue markets can only be triggered through a 
positive “variance effect”.
“Variance effect”:
The difference in the variance of the firm value, Var (Vi | Fi = 1,0*), from the 
second to the first IPO
A V a r = l pa^ - ° ‘)? n n - p a ( l - a )[a + ( l - a ) 7 n ] 2  r  v '
can be rearranged to
pa( 1  — a )( l — 7 n)[(l — a ) 2 7 n] — a2]A Var = [a +  ( 1  — a ) 7 n ] 2
so that an increase in the variance (A Var > 0) comes about if 7 n >  
which is the case either for a  \ 0  or [ q /  1/2 A 7  /  1].
Combining the two effects in one inequality yields
p[7 n(l -  a ) 2 -  a 2] >  (1 -  6 )7 ( 7  +  ( 1  -  7 )c]
[a +  ( 1  — a ) 7 n ] 2  [ea +  7 ( 1  — £a)][£a +  7 [7 n(l — a) +  a (l — s)]]
"variance effect" "expected value effect"
If e and 7  are both close to 1, a < 1/2 and for n not too big, this inequality 
is satisfied. Since the difference between the expected firm value to the en­
trepreneur and the IPO proceeds is increasing from the first to the second IPO, 
hot issue markets can only be triggered if the increase in firm variance outweighs 
this effect. Since all terms are continuous at the chosen parameter values, the 
inequalities also hold in an environment of these values. Summarizing the above 
conditions for the parameter values we find that a combination of £ / " I ,  and 
a \ 0 V [ a /  I / 2 A 7  /* 1] yields hot issue markets. Cold issue markets arise if 
the variance of a second firm in the industry is decreasing in the wake of the first 
IPO. Since expected IPO proceeds are growing less than the expected value, it 
is obvious that if the variance decreases after the first IPO, the entrepreneur 
will derive greater utility from remaining private. ■
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Proof to Proposition 3:
The proof proceeds in the following steps. First, it will be shown for which parameter 
values information production costs are such that induced uninformed bidding arises 
in the second IPO. The two cases for which this situation arises are (2a) c£ < c < 
C2  < c\ and (2b) c£ < c < cj < C2  which will be considered separately. After 
identifying the parameter values for which these specific constellations of c values arise, 
we will investigate for which parameter values the going-public decision of the second 
entrepreneur will become more likely after the first IPO. Finally, the combinations of 
parameter values are compared to find existence of a solution.
1. Derivation of c*: Using [4.12] for i =  1,2 we find
ae(l —j)[k — ae)][a +  7 ( 1  — a )^n)
Cn = k{k[ea +  7  (k — ae)] +  [a A  7 ( 1  — a ) 7 n](l — 7  ){k — ae)} 
ea(l — 7 ) ( 1  — ea)[a A  (1 — 0 )7 ]
ea A (1 — £<x){l +  (1 — 7 )[a +  (1 — <2 ) 7 ] }  
where k =  a A (1 — <2 )7 ”.
2 . Case 2 a: c£ < c < C2  < c\
(a) Since c\ < C2 , it remains to be found for which values of e, a  and 7 , the 
inequality C2  < c\ holds. With e / 1 ,  the inequality simplifies to
7 n a  +  7 ( 1  — a)
[7 n(l — a) A a]2 a A (1 -  a )[7  +  (1 -  7 )(a  +  7 ( 1  — a))] ‘ 
Cross-multiplying and collecting terms we obtain
g(7 ) =  a 3 -1- 7 a 2(l — a) A 3a2j n — 2a(l A a2) jn — 2 7 n+1(l — a ) 3 +  
7 n+2(l -  a)2 +  cry2n(l -  a)2 A 7 2n+1(l -  a )3 >  0
This inequality holds if 7  \  0.
(b) In a next step we have to ensure that for the given parameter values above, 
AE +  pAVar > 0, so that a second IPO becomes more likely. For means 
of clearer exposition we separate the change in the variance of the firm’s 
value and the change in the difference between the expected firm value and 
expected IPO proceeds.
•  “Expected value effect”:
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— For C2 <  c <  C2 , the entrepreneur will set p2 in order to induce all 
investors to engage in uninformed bidding so that IPO proceeds in 
the second round equal:
E{u r \ F 2 = i , e 21) = P =  d°  + ( l - ° ) 7 “]
- 2  (1 -  7 ) [ ( 1  -  a )7 n +  a ( l  -  e)]
— The change in the difference between the expected firm value and 
expected IPO proceeds from the first to the second IPO equals
A E  _  <*7 ( 1  -  e) +  c[a +  7 ( 1  -  a)] ck________ a
£ 0  +  7 ( 1  — ea) ( 1  — j) (k  — ae)] k
(4.17)
where again k = a +  (1 — 0 )7 ”. Setting e /  1 we find that AE > 0 
iff
c[a +  (2 — 7 )7 n(l — a)] a
(1 — 7)7n(l — oc) a  + (1 — 0)7"
This inequality holds for 7  \  0.
“Variance effect”
See Proof to Proposition 2 .
Since all terms are continuous at the chosen parameter values, the inequal­
ities also hold in an environment of these values. Summarizing the above 
conditions for the parameter values we find that for any arbitrarily small a 
there exists an e /* 1 and 7  \  0  to satisfy the inequalities, i.e. a combina­
tion of £ / 1 , 7 \ 0 , and a \  0 triggers hot issues markets with induced 
uninformed bidding.
3. Case 2 b: c \ <  c <  c \ <  C2
(a) •  First we need to find parameter values for which c\ < c^- With e /  1
we obtain g(7 ) <  0. Further we let 7  1 . Since g( 1 ) =  0 we need
to differentiate ^(7 ) with respect to 7  and evaluate the derivative at 
7  =  1 which yields
7 = 1
=  n +  1 +  a ( —2n  — 1 )
In order for #(7 ) <  0 for 7  1 the function must be monotonically
increasing at 7  =  1 .
a  ^  1/2.
7 = 1
> 0 for a  <  which is true for
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Furthermore the relationship c*2 <  CJ has to hold. For e /  \ and 
a  =  1 / 2  this inequality translates into
i(7 ) =  7 2 n + 1  -  272" -  7 " + 1  +  37n -  1 < O (4.18)
Since i ( l )  =  0 and
derivative and evaluate at 7  =  1 which yields
=  2 n (l — n)
= 0  we have to calculate the second
7 = 1
d2i(l)
9 27
Since
7 = 1
< 0  for n > 1 , i{7 ) reaches its maximum at (1 ; 0 ).
7=1
Because 7) is monotonically increasing for 7 1, inequahty [4.18] is
satisfied.
(b) In a next step we have to ensure that for the given parameter values above, 
A E  -f- pAVar > 0, so that a second IPO becomes more likely. For means 
of clearer exposition we separate the change in the variance of the firm’s 
value and the change in the difference between the expected firm value and 
expected IPO proceeds.
• “Expected value effect”
We proceed the same way as under 2 (b) above, and then set € /  1, 
c =  c\ and a  =  1 / 2  in [4.17]. We find that A E  > 0 iff i( 7 ) < 0 so that 
the same results, as under 3a apply.
• “Variance effect”:
See Proof to Proposition 2 .
Since all terms axe continuous at the chosen parameter values, the inequal­
ities also hold in an environment of these values. Summarizing the above 
conditions for the parameter values we find that or any arbitrarily large 
7 1  there exists an e /  1 , a  /  1 / 2  and c f 1 c\ to satisfy the inequal­
ities, i.e. a second combination of e /  1 , a /*  1 / 2 , c /*  c\ and 7 / ^ 1  
triggers hot issues markets with induced uninformed bidding. ■
Proof to Proposition 4:
• For procedure and parameter values for c2 < C2 < c < c\:
See Proof of Proposition 3 (Case 2a).
• “Expected value effect”:
The expected utility from an IPO in this case will be E[U2PO \ c > C2 ,€>2 i] =
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i+(ie-a)7w • Consequently,
0 :7 ( 1  — e) +  c[a +  7 ( 1  — a)] o (l — e)A E = ea +  7 ( 1  — sa) a  4- (1 — a ) 7 n
For e S ' 1, the expected value effect is positive, since A E  > 0 for all c > 0.
• “Variance effect”:
See Proof to Proposition 2 .
Since all terms are continuous at the chosen parameter values, the inequalities also 
hold in an environment of these values. Summarizing the above conditions for the 
parameter values we find that for any arbitrarily small a  there exists an e /  1  and 
7  \  0  to satisfy the inequalities, i.e. a combination of e S  1 , 7  \  0 , and a  \  0  
triggers hot issues markets with induced uninformed bidding. ■
Proof to Proposition 5:
In a pooling equilibrium, where investors only participate in the IPO if they find 
S  =  G, and all investors receive good signals 6 2 , the secondary market price of the 
second firm will be
n 2 = E(v2 \n = s2, e 21) =  asa[e +  (1 — e)7 n] +  (1 — a) 7 2n
The second IPO in the industry is thus associated with underpricing of the following 
amount:
II2 — P2 =
06:7 ( 1  — 7 n -1)[7 n(l — a) +  a ( l  — e)] +  c{a[e +  7 n( l  — e)] +  (1 — a )7 2n}[a (l — a )7 T 
{ea +  7 [7 n(l — a) +  a ( l  — €:)]}{a[£: +  (1 — e)ln] +  (1 — 7 2n}
Comparing the amount of underpricing in the first IPO (see Lemma 1) with under- 
pricing in the second, and setting e S  1 and c =  0 we find that
1 I 2 - P 2  >  n x -  p i
7 n 1
>
[a +  (1 — 0 ) 7 2n][a +  (1 — a)jn+1] [a +  (1 — 0 ) 7  n][a +  (1 — 0 )7 ] 
Cross-multiplying and rearranging terms we find that this inequality holds for
2ra+l ^  a 2 
I ^  ( 1 —a ) 2 '
A special solution to this inequality i s o \ 0 or[o: // l / 2 A 7 // ’ l]. ■
CHAPTER 4. INITIAL PUBLIC OFFERINGS 147
P roo f to  P roposition  6 :
In order for the equilibrium conditions derived in propositions [2]-[4] to hold true 
also in a setting with an endogenous ordering of the IPO decision, we have to find 
restrictions on p{ which will trigger an IPO in the first and second period independent 
of firm type. Therefore for all four possible combinations of firm types, the first 
entrepreneur with px will always have to be the first one to go public, while the second 
one with p2 should follow in the second period. The discount rate between the first 
and second period is normalized to 1. We assume that entrepreneurs maximize their 
period 2  expected utility. The subscripts of p and F  stand for the two entrepreneurs 
with different coefficients of risk-aversion, while the subscripts in relation to U denote 
the first and second period utility. An equilibrium is defined as a set of strategies 
where the strategy of F\ is optimal given the strategy of F2 and vice versa.
• Conjecture: Investors believe that an entrepreneur’s going public decision is not 
influenced by his private signal about firm quality, but only by his coefficient of 
risk-aversion, p{.
• The following generic conditions for all categories of investor behaviour lead to 
a pooling equilibrium in pure strategies, where Fi goes public in the first period 
and F2 follows in the second period.
Fi =  1 : E(U [ P 0  | Fi =  1) > E (U f \ F 1 = 1) (4.19)
F2 = 1 : (jj^ V p o .p ) | Fi = = ^ > E (j j i p o  | p 2 =  i) (4 20)
Fi — 0  : identical expected utility for all strategies
F2 =  0 : identical expected utility for all strategies
F\ =  0  : identical expected utility for all strategies
F2 = 1 : E(U [ P 0  I F2 = 1) < E(U [  I F2 =  1 ) (4.21)
Fi =  1 : same as condition [4.19]
F2 = 0 : E(U2 ax{,p0'p} I F i =  1 , F2 =  0) > E(U { P 0  | F2 = 0) (4.22)
The conditions translate into the following specific restrictions on px and p2 for 
the different categories of bidding behaviour in the second period:
1 . c < min{ci,C2 } : informed bidding
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(a) For entrepreneur of :
a  — pla{ 1 — a) < px[a -f 7 ( 1  — a)]
(b) For entrepreneur of F2 :
a  — p2 a ( l  — a) > p j a  +  7 ( 1  — a)] (4.23)
Tf p  0 + 7 ( 1— c * )7n  >   a ________________
11 Pi  a + ( l - o ) 7 -  ^  a + ( l - a ) 7 n  ^ 2  (a + ( l - a ) 7 n ] 2  r n e n
entrepreneur 2  will choose to undertake an IPO in the second period. How­
ever, waiting until the second period involves the risk of negative industry 
news in the first IPO. The risky second period IPO proceeds therefore have 
to outweigh the safe proceeds of an IPO in the first period:
p2[a +  7 ( 1  -  a ) 7 n] -  - a ) (  1  -  7 ") > p j a  +  7 ( 1  -  a)]
(4.25)
7P2[“ + (! -  a) ln\ ~ P'2l 2plla  +  (1 -  a )7n](l -  a )(l -  7") > 7?, (4.26)
Solving inequalities [4.23]-[4.26] for p2, we obtain p2 < p1*, p2 > p2*, 
p2 < p3*, and p2 < pA*. In order for a solution to exist for the system 
of inequalities, p2* < p1*, p2* < p3* and p2* < p4*, which is equivalent to 
postulating that p2*/pu  < 1 , p2*/p3* < 1, and p2 */p4* < 1 . Using the pa­
rameter values which trigger hot issue markets in Proposition (2 ), a  \  0 
and e / 1  we find
p 2* / p u  =  7n < 1
lim p2 */p3* =  lim p2 */p4* =  lim ^ 2 2  < 1 if c2  =  A;a where k < 1
a —>oo a —>oo a —>oo
Thus, if px > p1*, p2  < m injp^jp3* ^ 4*}, and c2  =  ka  where k < 1 , 
Proposition (2) still holds if we allow for an endogenous timing of the IPO 
decision.
2 . c2 < c < c\ < c2 : induced uninformed bidding. Since F7(C/™ax^ /PO,P  ^ | F\ =  
1 , F2  =  1) =  E{U2 °*{ipo'f}  I Fi =  1 , F2 = 0) and E(U{po | F2  =  1 ) > E{U[po \ 
F2 = 0), condition [4.20] implies [4.22]. Thus the conditions for F2 reduce to
a — p2 a( 1  — a) > p j a  +  7 ( 1  — a)]
r, > ____«_______—2 a + ( l — a ) 7 n  ^ 2  [ a + ( l — a ) 7 n J2
p2[a +  (1 -  a)7n] -  P2 P2 + (x “  a )7n](l -  «)(! -  7n) > Pi[« +  7 ( 1  ~ «)]
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Using the parameter values which trigger hot issue markets in Proposition (3), 
e /  1, 7  /  1 and a  1 / 2  we find that p2 < 4c, p2 > —oo, p2 < -L. Thus, 
if p1 > 4c and p2 < min{4c, ^ } , Proposition (3) still holds if we allow for an 
endogenous timing of the IPO decision.
3. c2 < C2 < c < c\ : uninformed bidding. As under 2 p2 only has to satisfy the 
following three inequalities:
a — p2 a (l  — a) > px[a +  7 ( 1  — a)]
e a  ^  a ______________ n a ( l - a ) 7w
a + ( l — a ) 7 n  a + ( l — a ) 7 n  ' 2  [ a + ( l — a ) 7 n ] 2
a+(f f a)^ [a  +  (1 -  a )7n] -  Pi ( a+(1- ah. )  [a +  (1 -  <*)7”](1 ~  <*)(! “  7")
> p ,[a  +  7 (l -  a)]
Using the parameter values which trigger hot issue markets in Proposition (4), 
e 1, 7  0 and a / 0  we find that the above conditions are satisfied. Thus,
if p1 > p1* Proposition (4) also holds if we allow for an endogenous timing of 
the IPO decision.
• In all three cases the investors’ initial beliefs that the going public decision is 
not influenced by the entrepreneur’s private signal, but only by his coefficient of 
risk-aversion, p{, are consistent with the equilibrium strategies given the above 
parameter values. ■
Proof to  Proposition 7:
The variance associated with IPO proceeds under informed bidding is given by 
Var(Ri | Fi =  l ,p  =  0 {) =  E(R% \ F{ = l ,p  =  pit O*) -  [E(Ri | F{ =  l ,p  =  ph G* ) ] 2
where
E (R ? | Fi = l ,p  =  pu &i) =
Pl {P{I =  1 10<) +  Pi!  =  0 1 eo ^ i [ i2G )7(i -  7)"-1 +. . .  +  n2C)7"]} .
The last term in square brackets corresponds to the second moment M 2 of a random 
variable X  (number of investors mistakenly receiving a good signal) which is bino- 
mially distributed B  (n, 7 ). M 2 can be determined by way of the generating function 
G( z )  =  [ 7 z  +  (1 — 7 )]n of the binomial distribution B ( n , 7 ) where
M2 =  G"( 1) +  G'(l) =  n[(n -  1)72 +  7].
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Thus we obtain
VariFU | Ft = 1 ,p =  ft, 0;) =  p2{ [P ( / =  1 | ©<) +  P (I = 0  | © ^ [ ( n  -  1) 7 2  +  7 ]
-  [P(I =  1 | 0 ;) +  P (I = 0  | © i ) 7 ]2 }
In order for an IPO to take place under informed bidding in the first period we have to 
redefine the cost bounds between informed and induced uninformed bidding. Solving 
E(R[PO \ Fx = 1, pi = p i ) -  Var(R[PO \ F1 = 1 tPl =  p{) > E (R { P 0  \ F1 = I, 
Pi = p ), we find that there exists a cj* such that for c < c\* the inequality is 
satisfied. The above expression corresponds to a quadratic inequality of the form 
die2  4 - a^c 4 - as > 0 with ai < 0 and a3  > 0. We obtain c\* as the positive root of 
the corresponding quadratic equality. Similarly, c < ensures that an IPO with 
information acquisition dominates uninduced informed bidding in the second period. 
Furthermore, we have to ensure that Var(Vi | =  1) > Var(R[PO \ Fi = 1 ) which
is the case if n > = n*. A positive ‘variance effect’ giving rise to hot issue
markets finally requires that
AVar = Var(Vi | Fi =  1) -  Var(RIPO | Fi = 1 ) -
[Var(Vi | F2 =  1 ,0 21) -  V ar(R lP0 | F2 =  1 ,0 21)] < 0.
Substituting for the variance terms in the first and second period and simplifying, we 
obtain
p ^ ( l - a ) ( l - 7 ) rQ.j:(1 gQ)--„pl7 ’,+1 ( l—Q)+Q7+” Q(1—7)]—Pi(l~q)(1~7)[7+"Q (1—7)]
Rearranging this inequality we obtain
o;C7 3n+2[nc(l — 7)(1 — 7 ”) — 2(1 — 7 n)(c +  7 ) — C7 n+1] +  a 2 P(a) < 0
where P(a) is a polynomial in a. The inequality holds for a  \  0 A 7  f  1. Combining 
this with the condition for an almost neutral ‘expected value effect’ we obtain that 
hot issue markets arise for n > n*, e 1 , 7  1 and a \  0  if c <  min{cj*, d£}. ■
Proof to Proposition 8:
•  Robustness to B(n,p) binomial distribution: Assume a random variable for the 
firm value X  =  F y  with Y  being binomially distributed B(n,p). The expected 
value of the random firm value, E(X) ,  is equal to p which is identical to the 
expected value of a random variable Z  with a binomial distribution B(l,p).
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The variance Var(X) = £p( 1 — p) corresponds to the variance of Z, Var(Z)  =  
p(l  — p) except for a constant factor. Thus, even if the firm value is binomially 
distributed J5(n,p), the variance of the firm value increases if p increases from 
0  to 1 / 2 .
• Robustness to normal distribution: Since the binomial distribution B(n,p)  can 
be approximated by a normal distribution for n big enough, i.e. Y  ~  B(n,p)  «
n —»oo
N(np,np(  1 —p)), the distribution of X  = can equally be approximated by 
N(p,  £p( 1  — p)). So, even if the firm value is normally distributed, there can still 
be a ‘variance effect’ if the expected value of the firm increases. ■
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